Ethiopian ET302 Crash.

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Very easy. Throw both red guarded switches on the Captain's side of the pedestal. Trim motor power is removed. MCAS is disabled. Trim is disabled.

But you have to recognize it, and you have to take the airplane off autopilot.
 
All the unscientific fear mongering caused by unqualified or downright inept pilots will be a huge economic disaster for the entire airline industry. Who needs proof or evidence when you have hysteria and fear with people so scared of new technology these days even if it means flushing potentially billions of dollars down the toilet. The same thing happening with automated driving & assists, one little thing goes wrong and its the evil technology taking over the world
 
Quote Gen Chuck Yeager... the man who flew into the unknown...

"Know your systems" or say hello to mean old Mr.Gravity...
 
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https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/world/boeing-max-8-flights-suspended-intl/index.html

Originally Posted by CNN
In a statement, the Federal Aviation Administration confirmed that its ordering a temporary grounding of Boeing 737 Max aircraft, citing "new evidence collected at the site and analyzed today," and "refined satellite data."

Boeing said it supported the FAA and the Trump administration's decision. The company said it recommended the FAA to temporarily suspend the global operations of all its 371 Max aircrafts.

"We are supporting this proactive step out of an abundance of caution. Safety is a core value at Boeing for as long as we have been building airplanes; and it always will be," said Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg in a statement.

Boeing and the FAA said for several days that they had no plans to ground the aircraft.
 
Originally Posted by faltic
He is a businessman, not a politician.


He is also an author... The Art of the Deal... the book is noted for its 4 chapter 11s...
 
Originally Posted by faltic
All discussions fail to mentioning eyewitness accounts of smoke and debris trailing acft before crash. Has know one seen these accounts?


If your commercial bird pushes high subsonic speeds in a dive you might note vapor and a few debris trailing off...
 
Originally Posted by Astro14
Originally Posted by billt460
I seem to remember a couple of fatal, (no survivors), 737 accidents that happened with several years in between, similar to this. (I'm sure Astro remembers both, and he can feel free to add or correct anything I may have gotten wrong here). Both ended up being caused by the same thing. One happened in Colorado Springs, and the other 3 or 4 years later in Pennsylvania. They never solved the Colorado Springs crash until after the Pennsylvania crash happened.

If I remember correctly, it was caused by a faulty designed hydraulic valve. That somehow managed to reverse the rudder pedal input. But only sometimes under certain rare conditions. But all 737's continued to fly with that bad valve for several years in between both crashes. Because they never discovered it until after the Pennsylvania crash. (Both were similar accidents, going in near vertically).

I hope this doesn't turn into the same thing. Not being able to solve 2 non survivable crashes involving the same aircraft is scary. (Assuming they were both caused by the same thing). And that it turns out to be mechanical. Now it's just too early to tell.

They didn't ground the 737 after the Colorado Springs crash, because some believed at the time it might have been weather related. (Rolling wind shear off the mountains, or some such occurrence). Not to mention it would have been economically devastating to so many airlines worldwide, and would have made a mess of airline travel. This appears to be shaping up differently. That said, these 2 crashes involving the 737 Max aircraft happened months in between... Not years.

That was unbelievably good work finding that bad valve, and solving the problem once and for all. I hope the same thing happens here... Assuming something in the aircraft is faulty.


You remember correctly, Bill - and the forensic analysis that revealed the design flaw in the rudder actuator is a textbook case of how to conduct an investigation.

I talked about that in this thread: https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/4592998/all/Boeing_737_Max_take-off

I wasn't kind to the FAA or the 737 in my series of posts in that thread.

I'm clearly not a 737 fan, but I don't blame the 737 for either Lion Air or this crash.

We have, in both these crashes, the intersection of new design, poor communication from manufacturer, poor training by airlines, poor dissemination of updated procedures, and pilots who really don't know how to fly.

The specific crashes to which you refer were US Air 427 and United 585.

They crashed as the result of a design flaw and mechanical malfunction that slammed the rudder to the stop, and left it unresponsive to pilot input. Totally different than what we're talking about with Lion Air, and speculating about with Ethiopian.


I suspect that most of us with a little knowledge know what caused both the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents. Having the airplane trim against you while pulling on the yoke without knowing how to turn off this automated function in a recipe for a bad outcome, as happened with these two flights.
Lion Air is a disaster factory while Ethiopian is considered the best African airline after SAA, but that's a little like being considered the best drug dealer in Dayton OH.
US carriers have much higher training and experience standards, so their pilots can recognize and avoid the potential pitfalls built into this aircraft.
We flew one of these guys MCO-SJU on 2/15/19. It was a gorgeous new machine with a really nice interior. I'd fly on another tomorrow with any of the US operators, who have real pilots with real skills, training and experience.
That these crews couldn't recognize and deal with what was effectively a trim runaway is what should really frighten us, not the aircraft as delivered.
I'll add that I've never bought the NTSB's probable cause WRT the US AIR accident nor that of the UAL aircraft. My reasoning is that the type had been in service without issue with too many operators over too many hours and cycles for too many years for this fatal problem to suddenly manifest. That an NTSB lab rat was able to get a rudder control valve to cycle hard over using dirty hydraulic fluid at a certain temperature does not bring any convincing finding in my opinion.
 
Originally Posted by Astro14
Very easy. Throw both red guarded switches on the Captain's side of the pedestal. Trim motor power is removed. MCAS is disabled. Trim is disabled. But you have to recognize it, and you have to take the airplane off autopilot.
In addition to, lets call it "possible pilot confusion" issues, one has to ask why AoA (alpha) vanes or the signal pathway, are failing, causing the MCAS to kick on electric stab trim in the first place. Those sensors shouldn't be failing too often.
We talk a lot about pitch trim etc., but it is just reacting to one bad AoA sensor. Of course, part of the new fix coming will likely address how pitch trim gets activated with only one errant sensor, split cockpit philosophy aside.
 
I don't know about the MAX, but on the 737NG not all operators have an "immediate action" or "memory item" procedure for Runaway Stabilizer Trim. So the degree to which various airlines force their pilots to know the procedure "by nature", varies.
 
I'd be willing to bet that the MCAS pitch trim operation was called into question at some point by a younger, greener engineer somewhere in a conference room in Seattle:
Green Engineer: "Hey, one lonely AoA vane causes unwanted nose down trim."
Old Engineer: "Don't worry, pilots will recognize it and flip both the Trim Cutout switches before it crashes."
Sure its a judgement call whether its OK to force the pilots to take action when 1 AoA vane malfunctions. Safe to rely on pilot action out of a potentially confusing situation? Probably not.

Pitch trim on the 777 can withstand a single AoA failure from some stuff on pprune I was reading. Well, Boeing is now looking at making the 737 Max similar to other systems. A fix is coming.
 
Originally Posted by Astro14
I've said it before, and I guess it bears repeating, that decades of accident investigation has revealed that:

90% of eyewitness accounts are wrong.

They remember things that didn't happen, or describe things incorrectly/inaccurately.

This is worth repeating until people remember it.
 
So what's the way forward now? Wait til the software fix is out which they claim will be next month or just disable that system and start flying again?
 
Originally Posted by Wolf359
So what's the way forward now? Wait til the software fix is out which they claim will be next month or just disable that system and start flying again?


The system was installed because the airplane had an identified handling flaw*.

MCAS has to remain in place, or the airplane will lose its certification.

But, clearly, MCAS failure needs to be trained better, AOA sensors need to be made more reliable, and perhaps, a software fix will allow "implausible" sensor readings to be ignored so that the system is not triggered by faulty data.



*Ironically, the system was installed to make the airplane safer.

In taking the 1968 design (737) And upgrading it yet again with larger engines, Boeing discovered some handling problems.

Well, no kidding. If I had taken in 1968 Chevrolet Vega, added a modern engine, Bluetooth, and stretched it into an SUV, there might be some handling problems.

The fix for the handling problems was the system MCAS.

It had to be given sufficient authority to keep the airplane from stalling.

Enough authority, that it would override pilots.

And it's actions are predicated on inputs from angle of attack sensors on the airplane.

It's my strong suspicion that every single one of these problems starts with an AOA sensor failure.

The airplane thinks something is happening, when it is not.
 
Originally Posted by Wolf359
So what's the way forward now? Wait til the software fix is out which they claim will be next month or just disable that system and start flying again?

Software fix out in April, I thought I remembered reading. Grounded until then. Not too many planes, although costly to Southwest & American. Others overseas too.

Look for the software fix to begin using redundancy and/or a "reasonableness test" to detect and identify a bad AoA vane, instead of activating pitch trim stabilizer movement on just one bad AoA vane.

Pilot training of course. If you're running an airline, you would train pilots on how to recognize a runaway trim situation and show them the cut-out switches, and make them practice a full day on doing the same thing. U.S. pilots are probably already proficient. Foreign airlines need to have it pounded into them, apparently.
The rule is: If pilots don't like the way the aircraft is pitching from trim movement, turn it off and spin the Wheel of Fortune right in front of them.
 
A bit of History as to why MCAS was implemented (2 reasons):

1) For the 737-MAX(7,8,9), Boeing chose a new, more powerful engine, the new CFM LEAP-1B engine which has Carbon fiber fan blades with a titanium leading edge, noise reduction chevrons at the rear of the engine casing, and higher thrust and fuel efficiency.

This engine is larger than previous ones so two major design changes were needed, the addition of 8" of landing gear length and placing the engine forward and higher for increased ground clearance.

The net result was that because of the engines' position, the more powerful engines produced a net "pitch up" moment. Too much pitch up moment and the aircraft will stall under certain conditions.

2) In addition, operators of the older 737 fleets complained that stall characteristics and stall warnings needed to be improved.

The MCAS system is actually a software module that was added within both FCC's (Flight Control Computers) that is supposed to correct for any pitch up movements that might cause a stall.

The problem I see is that the active FCC (only one of the two FCC systems is active at any one time) is only monitoring one of the two Angle of Attack sensor vanes. If the active AOA is sending false data to the one active FCC, then MCAS kicks in and attempts to correct what may have been a non-pitch up (stall) situation.

In my opinion, even if only one FCC was active, sensor data from both AOA's should have been compared and any conflicts should have been resolved. A conflict should result in say a warning that there is an AOA conflict and the MCAS should disconnect the autopilot and an audio warning that might say, "Manual Control, Manual Control."

False sensor data has been the result of many air crashes in recently Automated Airplanes.

The Airworthiness Directive (AD) that was issued by the FAA last year gave a very detailed procedure in case of Trim Stab runaway.

737 MAX AD (Page 6)

Most pilots that I know of who sense a problem will kill any automation by quickly hitting the Cutoff Switches so they gain control of the airplane, and only afterwords will they attempt to resolve any automation conflicts. I.e., Fly first and then resolve.

stab_switches.jpg


737 MAX probes-max.jpg
 
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That's what my uneducated self has never understood. Is it really that hard to have the computer announce an AOA conflict in those exact terms?

It seems like AOA issues, whether freezing, failure, or whatever end with the computer almost silently acting unilaterally, leaving the pilot to figure it out.

I'm not pointing fingers here. Obviously well trained and skilled pilots have gotten through these issues without incident. I'm just agreeing "why not?"
 
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