Lion Air crash

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.... every airspeed indicator showed an increase in airspeed as the airplane was getting slower. That's the nature of a pitot static failure. ...


Placed in permanent memory.

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From the BEA:

( omitted for brevity )



At the risk of being impertinent, it seems they had lost touch with some of their basic airmanship skills, or perhaps were trained right out of them, or even cheated out of them by the automation.
 
Originally Posted by Win
Quote
.... every airspeed indicator showed an increase in airspeed as the airplane was getting slower. That's the nature of a pitot static failure. ...


Placed in permanent memory.

Quote
From the BEA:

( omitted for brevity )



At the risk of being impertinent, it seems they had lost touch with some of their basic airmanship skills, or perhaps were trained right out of them, or even cheated out of them by the automation.


Or perhaps, as young pilots raised on glass cockpits, without stall/spin training, or out of control flight, they never had those skills to begin with.

I've seen it, the children of the magenta, who are used to following a computer's commands without questioning, and it concerns me.

I fault the Air France guys, but I don't outright blame them.

They were failed by faith in engineering, by reliance on automation, and by training based on those two principles.

I learned to fly on high performance airplanes using only round dials, without automation, and with a feel for the jet and what it was doing. Wasn't easy. Lots of guys couldn't hack it.

The airline standards are completely different. Many of my First Officers have never taken an airplane into a deep stall, or a spin, ever. They've never flown without automation. They've never had serious instrumentation or systems failures.

They've learned, and been trained, to have faith in the automation, to stop worrying about what might happen, because the worst case likely never will.

And yet, for this crash, it's looking more and more like the that's what happened: an instrumentation anomaly, a complex problem, that the crew was unable to resolve...an airplane that was lying to them about one thing; be it airspeed or be it AOA.

They were poorly equipped to handle this aircraft systems fault.

Poor training. Poor screening. Low standards for performance and hiring.

Aircraft manufacturers keep trying to improve safety, to make up for pilot error by making the airplane more responsible for safety. More automation, more limiters, more sophistication.

And when all that technology, all that protection, goes south, you're left with pilots who are ill-equipped to handle the resulting situation. AF-447 is a classic example. This one will be, too.
 
My neighbor which is my age [65years] an ex Naval aviator and retired American Airline pilot said basically what you posted above about round gauges and hands on flying ! We did lots of lunches and went to the airport looking at the aircraft. Military pilots in my opinion are the best trained.
 
Asto. I have been looking up 737s and thank you again for your input as an industry pro.
 
Originally Posted by Astro14
Originally Posted by Danno
Interesting video from a current 777 pilot.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVmoo2dw4oU

An excellent channel, by a pretty cool guy.


Just watched it - he and I agree on many of the points that I made in previous posts...
Astro and JB are pro pilots !!!! Astro would the speed reported be top speed at that altitude?
 
Originally Posted by CT8

Astro would the speed reported be top speed at that altitude?


The speed reported by air traffic control was in excess of 300 knots, reaching about 350 knots as the airplane dove into the ocean.

There are a couple of speeds to consider:

1. Airplane maximum speed - I'm not a 737 pilot, but it's about 350 knots indicated* for most airliners.
2. Regulatory maximum speed - in the US, and many, but not all, countries, you're restricted to 250 knots indicated below 10,000 feet.
3. Best speed - in those countries where you're not restricted, the FMC will calculate a most efficient climb speed, which might be as much as 330 knots indicated.

When looking at Lion Air's profile, they were flying above the regulatory speed, which tells me there was a problem with the airplane. Particularly the instrumentation or the flight controls themselves.

Boeing just issued a bulletin for all 737 operators to treat an AOA** failure the same way that a pitot static failure is treated, and to disconnect the trim.

Here's why. In the 737, the stall protection uses the elevator feel system. That system provides the "neutral" position for the yoke. If the airplane senses an impending stall, then it will both trim the elevator nose down and increase the forward yoke using the elevator feel position. In other words, if the airplane senses a stall, it will push the nose down.

But, what if the stall indication is wrong? It's based on AOA, which is determined by probes on the nose of the airplane. Boeing's bulletin suggests that the probes on this airplane were faulty. The investigation to date has found that the airplane had a history of erroneous AOA indications.

One of those previous failures, in particular, tells you why I would never fly Lion Air - the crew had an AOA failure, struggled for control, and when it cleared up continued on to their destination.

What they should have done was land the airplane immediately. You don't take an airplane that has problems, serious problems, on a long flight, unless you're an idiot, or pressured by management (which makes you a fool) or are just too poorly trained to understand the severity of an instrumentation failure.

So, AOA tells the airplane that there is a stall, and in the 737, airplane responds by pitching down, adding forward elevator feel, which holds the nose down. Full down elevator trim in a 757 takes about 75 pounds of force to overcome. So, when I say "feel", I am not talking about a gentle pull, it's serious force. In this scenario, which might be what caused this crash, the crew was struggling against an airplane that had many pounds of forward/nose down yoke pressure brought on by a faulty AOA reading.

As they analyze the black boxes and wreckage, we will know more.

But like Air France, the airplane gave the pilots bad information. In this case, the 737, that bad information leads to the airplane forcing the nose down, when it really shouldn't force the nose down.

I can see how the crew would have a hard time interpreting what is taking place, and given the magnitude of forces, struggling to control the airplane.

Time for me to go hit the gym...



*Indicated airspeed (abbreviated KIAS for knots or just IAS) is a measure of dynamic pressure; the difference between the pressure at the forward port of the pitot tube and the static port pressure. It's close to true airspeed when at sea level on a standard day. The airframe responds to dynamic pressure, so it's the most used measure of airspeed. At higher altitudes, Indicated airspeed is much lower than true airspeed. The air molecules are hitting the airplane faster, but there are fewer of them, so the pressure difference as measured is lower.

**AOA - Angle of Attack. The angle between the relative wind (the direction from which the air is hitting the airplane) and the mean chord line (a reference line based on the wing shape)... The wing performs exactly the same based on AOA, not necessarily airspeed. You could be going straight up in an F-14, at zero AOA, or at maximum AOA, it depends on what you're doing with the pitch controls and how much indicated airspeed you have to work with. You could have your nose on the horizon, and be deeply stalled (high AOA) or you could be flying at near zero AOA. Again, it depends on what you're doing with the pitch controls, and how much energy is on the airplane.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angle_of_attack
 
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There has been a lot of time since the last post on this. I know we're all waiting for some more official findings but other matters regarding this bear discussion. The one on my mind is the, what I felt was a very poorly considered, statement by the UAL Airline Pilots Union Rep that said (paraphrased) there is no need for pilots to know every safety routine on the aircraft and, therefore, Boeing has done no wrong in not even making pilots aware of the speed slow/flaps up/nose trim repeatedly down routine in the AFCS control laws. What! And this unknown "safety system" apparently requires a two step process to turn off (you know, if you knew it existed) neither of which includes pulling a breaker like a normal runaway! Amazing if true and it's looking more and more like it is with Boeing canceling any public response to explain it so far. Makes you wonder if Boeing has hired Airbus software people or their subs.
 
Children of the Magenta Line

Since there has been (strangely) no further discussion on this, it may be the time to consider automation once again. Somewhere along the line the following may have been seen by some but it's such a good and seminal bit of teaching it deserves to be seen again. Get another cup of coffee and give a look. This is on the Vimeo site but it is on YouTube also.

https://vimeo.com/159496346

Apologies for any Spell check madness
 
You saying the pilot must exert upwards of 75 pounds … similar in the 737 ?
 
Originally Posted by DeepFriar
There has been a lot of time since the last post on this. I know we're all waiting for some more official findings but other matters regarding this bear discussion. The one on my mind is the, what I felt was a very poorly considered, statement by the UAL Airline Pilots Union Rep that said (paraphrased) there is no need for pilots to know every safety routine on the aircraft and, therefore, Boeing has done no wrong in not even making pilots aware of the speed slow/flaps up/nose trim repeatedly down routine in the AFCS control laws. What! And this unknown "safety system" apparently requires a two step process to turn off (you know, if you knew it existed) neither of which includes pulling a breaker like a normal runaway! Amazing if true and it's looking more and more like it is with Boeing canceling any public response to explain it so far. Makes you wonder if Boeing has hired Airbus software people or their subs.


Geez!

That is, in fact, the exact OPPOSITE, of what the UAL MEC chairman said.

"The Air Line Pilots Association, which represents United Continental Holdings Inc.'s flight crews, wrote to Federal Aviation Administration Acting Administrator Dan Elwell Thursday saying it was "concerned that a potential, significant aviation system safety deficiency exists" and asking for more details.

"There appears to be a significant information gap, and we want to ensure that pilots operating these aircraft have all of the information they need to do so safely," wrote Captain Tim Canoll, ALPA's president."

https://www.chicagotribune.com/busi...ilots-union-concerns-20181115-story.html

I've received several ALPA emails on this, and I'm not certain that I can share them, but I assure you that as a pilot group, we are deeply concerned, many are outraged, that Boeing didn't disclose the full set of flight control changes in the 737 MAX.

That deep concern is shared by United itself, up to, and including, the CEO.
 
Originally Posted by 4WD
You saying the pilot must exert upwards of 75 pounds … similar in the 737 ?


Yeah, on a fully runaway nose down trim, it will take up to 75 lbs of force on the yoke to keep the airplane in level flight.

Depends on speed and configuration, but it's not a little, gentle pull to keep the plane level with full nose down trim.

It's some serious, weightlifting exertion.

So, pitch control in that scenario tends to be crude.

And, as a result, when you have full nose down trim, you see sinusoidal altitude and airspeed excursions.

Which, perhaps not coincidentally, is what was recorded with Lion Air's flight before water impact.
 
No offense and I recognize the sensitivity but the following quote from Tod Insler, in response to the ALPA President's request for data from Boeing, is not the "opposite" of what was earlier reported. I am in no position to defend the reporting and if you can direct me to film or audio that disagrees with what was reported I'm more than open to it.

Breaking ranks with two other pilot unions and his own Air Line Pilots Association leadership, Todd Insler, chairman of the United Airlines ALPA unit, questioned why ALPA publicly pushed Boeing to provide more information on the auto trim system, insisting that pilots are already well trained to handle any uncommanded trim events. Unions for Southwest and American Airlines and ALPA's national leadership have been critical of Boeing for failing to provide pilots with documentation on MCAS as they transitioned to the MAX.

"We're the only U.S. ALPA operator of the airplane," Insler told Forbes. "We weren't consulted by ALPA prior to their putting the letter out." Insler said although MCAS isn't specifically described in United training manuals, runaway trim procedures are: "You have to manually take control—that is one of the early things they teach you when you fly jets. The procedure is there in our manual, and we practice this over and over again. The first time I see an adverse event, I want to see it in a simulator, not with 300 people behind me," Insler said in the Forbes report. In an interview with the Seattle Times, Insler compared automated background systems on airliners to watching television. "I don't need to know how it works," he said.

So the question in my mind is why Insler is de facto, post accident, supporting this non-knowledge of how a system operates that is not even known as being on the aircraft? And why is he castigating the National Alpa president for asking Boeing for information on an apparently unknown "safety" system? Poo-Pooing is not too strong a description. And apparently the training routine is not the same as in other 737's given that the pilots fought it all the way to the ground unsuccessfully. "I don't need to know how it works" is Ill considered as I said earlier and snacks of trying to cover Boeing's rear.
 
Have not flown that airline … but several times on Garuda Indonesia … doubt those pilots weighed 75 lbs
 
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