Ethiopian ET302 Crash.

[ZeeOSix]

Originally Posted by fdcg27
I'd still find it hard to believe that Boeing would offer and the FAA certify an aircraft with deadly handling characteristics in certain flight regimes as a standard feature.


Apparently the hundreds of people involved with the design, test, qualification and certification of the system (per all the documented processes) must not have been overly concerned about the design of the airplane or the automatic systems that help make it fly. Perhaps processes will be changed going forward as a result of all of this ... that's how it usually works in situations like this.

 

[fdcg27]

Perhaps those without the qualifications to operate airliners shouldn't be operating them.
Silk Air and Ethiopian pay next to nothing while there are many slots available to qualified expat pilots in the Arab mid-east as well as in China with extravagant compensation.
What do you suppose that leaves for Third World airlines?

 

[MolaKule]

Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by fdcg27
I'd still find it hard to believe that Boeing would offer and the FAA certify an aircraft with deadly handling characteristics in certain flight regimes as a standard feature.


Apparently the hundreds of people involved with the design, test, qualification and certification of the system (per all the documented processes) must not have been overly concerned about the design of the airplane or the automatic systems that help make it fly. Perhaps processes will be changed going forward as a result of all of this ... that's how it usually works in situations like this.


Here is the usual High-Level and documented process, albeit somewhat simplified:

Aircraft Concept (General Requirements) > Detailed Requirements (written in DOORS or SysML) > Requirements Flowdown (to Hardware and Software Groups) > Design of Hardware and Software > Flight Simulation of Software > Simulation of Integrated MetaHardware and Software > Wind Tunnel Testing of Model > Structural Testing of completed structure > Hardware and Software Integration in aircraft > Instrumented Ground Testing > Instrumented Flight Testing > Modify Detailed Requirements if any anomalies are found in software, hardware, or flight characteristics.

Each of these steps are monitored either by the On-Site FAA rep or a DER (Designated Engineering Representative).

In addition to, and during all of the above steps, the Flight and Technical Manuals are being developed and modified.

A Documented and Strict peer review process is maintained during each step above.

I would conjecture that at this time the FAA, Boeing, and the NTSB are examining every Detailed Requirement and looking very closely at each and every modification done to the Hardware and Software during the complete development process.

I would also conjecture that there may be some process changes made both within Boeing and the FAA to improve flight safety.

With thousands of lines of requirements and tens of thousands of lines of code, it will be a long investigative process.

 

[oil_film_movies]

Originally Posted by MolaKule
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by fdcg27
I'd still find it hard to believe that Boeing would offer and the FAA certify an aircraft with deadly handling characteristics in certain flight regimes as a standard feature.
Apparently the hundreds of people involved with the design, test, qualification and certification of the system (per all the documented processes) must not have been overly concerned about the design of the airplane or the automatic systems that help make it fly. Perhaps processes will be changed going forward as a result of all of this ... that's how it usually works in situations like this.
With thousands of lines of requirements and tens of thousands of lines of code, it will be a long investigative process.

No, the only move, already made, is not to "processes", it is to raising the criticality of runaway trim to a more severe level, requiring more than one sensor failure to trigger the confusing condition. .... Human Factors methods will be looked at over time to find out what could be done in the future to anticipate what things confuse pilots excessively. That said, the old philosophy of training the pilots to turn off electric pitch trim stands. All crews have been told to look for the condition and remember to flip the switches. The likelihood of ever having runaway trim will be reduced via use of redundancy and algorithms supporting fail-operational principles.

 

[ZeeOSix]

Not to side track the discussion, but on a similar but smaller scale I'm envisioning 1000s of self driving cars (in "auto pilot") cruising around with the "driver" sitting there playing with his/her phone. Then some sensor goes bad and the car goes into some uncontrolled status, while the "driver" sits there and wonders WT? Is going on and trys to gain control while it crashes off the road or into other cars. Can't wait.

 

[MolaKule]

Originally Posted by oil_film_movies

No, the only move, already made, is not to "processes", it is to raising the criticality of runaway trim to a more severe level, requiring more than one sensor failure to trigger the confusing condition. .... Human Factors methods will be looked at over time to find out what could be done in the future to anticipate what things confuse pilots excessively...


Not sure what subject of the first sentence is so maybe you could clarify.

Human Factors is certainly a critical input to each step of the process and undoubtedly will be part of a major conversation among the HF community.

Here is what has been "conjectured thus far (i.e., we don't know for sure):"

1) only one AOA is being sampled at any one time,

2) only one FCC processor is active at any one time,

3) the FCC processors are not comparing AOA inputs,

4) the FCC processors are not talking to each other about AOA and other flight parameters inputs.

Neither you nor I nor anyone here were involved in the development process of the 737 MAX so we don't know what was done or not done.

And neither Boeing, the FAA, nor the NTSB should be releasing any tidbits until the investigation has been completed and the final report submitted.

Media reports and armchair quarterbacking are ALL conjecture at this point, and when we do submit theories, we should state it IS pure conjecture or opinion.

 

[MNgopher]

The Seattle Times article is not a good look for Boeing or the FAA . Even more [censored] they posed the info to both parties days before the Etheopian accident.

We can blame pilots in these accidents till the cows come home, but on its face allowing one sensor to have the level of authority it did seems unwise. On top of that, certifying it had a certain amount of movement that turns out to have increased significantly without revisiting the level of danger seems to be questionable.

The FAA not grounding these earlier was fine in my book as a non knee jerk, fact based decision. Problem is all of this now makes the FAA less trustworthy worldwide.

 

[MolaKule]

Originally Posted by MNgopher
The Seattle Times article is not a good look for Boeing or the FAA . Even more [censored] they posed the info to both parties days before the Etheopian accident.

We can blame pilots in these accidents till the cows come home, but on its face allowing one sensor to have the level of authority it did seems unwise. On top of that, certifying it had a certain amount of movement that turns out to have increased significantly without revisiting the level of danger seems to be questionable.

The FAA not grounding these earlier was fine in my book as a non knee jerk, fact based decision. Problem is all of this now makes the FAA less trustworthy worldwide.


Again, unless the author of the ST article was part of the design team for Boeing's FCC (and there is no indication he was) it still remains conjecture.

 

[Astro14]

Originally Posted by fdcg27
Perhaps those without the qualifications to operate airliners shouldn't be operating them.
Silk Air and Ethiopian pay next to nothing while there are many slots available to qualified expat pilots in the Arab mid-east as well as in China with extravagant compensation.
What do you suppose that leaves for Third World airlines?



While I completely agree, it wasn't until recently (2009) that you had to have more than a commercial license (200+ hours) to fly in the right seat of an airliner in the US. That was the year that the regulatory environment changed in the aftermath of Colgan 3407.

A major US airline did not have to hire ATPs, they could, if they chose, hire only commercial pilots. But the market was so competitive that they didn't have to, they could hire only high-time, very experienced pilots.

Ironically, those high standards (ATP) are part of the reason for a pilot shortage right now.

 

[MolaKule]

Originally Posted by DeepFriar
Ethiopia News item today (apologies if someone has already contributed it): Pitch trim jackscrew found to have been in the fully down position. Just a quote, can't vouch for accuracy.

Cheers

Larry



Only the FDR readout can tell us what positions it might have been in before and leading up to the crash.

 

[Astro14]

Full nose down at the time of impact, however, leads us to believe that the MCAS was involved. No other system would trim full nose down when the airplane was clean, and full nose down on a clean airplane would make it very hard to control. On other Boeings, it takes about 75 lbs of pull on the yoke to keep the airplane in level flight with full nose down trim. It ain't easy.

Ironically, one of the things that I loathe about the 737: the anachronistic trim wheel on the pedestal that whirs and bangs the entire flight, is a GIANT clue of MCAS operation. As MCAS is constantly trimming, that stupid wheel will be spinning and thumping...

Further, MCAS operation ceases when manual trim is used, or the trim cut-out switches are thrown. Not hard to wrest control of the airplane from MCAS if you know how the airplane works and you understand what flight regime you're in...

 

[MNgopher]

Originally Posted by MolaKule


Again, unless the author of the ST article was part of the design team for Boeing's FCC (and there is no indication he was) it still remains conjecture.


While true, a properly sourced and researched article, where the author also gave a heads up to Boeing and the FAA over a week before the second accident happened to give them a chance to rebut, is not a good look.

 

[Brigadier]

Originally Posted by fdcg27
..
I'd still find it hard to believe that Boeing would offer and the FAA certify an aircraft with deadly handling characteristics in certain flight regimes as a standard feature.


Boeing is an ODA. They self certify in house.

 

[MolaKule]

Originally Posted by Astro14


...Ironically, one of the things that I loathe about the 737: the anachronistic trim wheel on the pedestal that whirs and bangs the entire flight, is a GIANT clue of MCAS operation. As MCAS is constantly trimming, that stupid wheel will be spinning and thumping...

Further, MCAS operation ceases when manual trim is used, or the trim cut-out switches are thrown. Not hard to wrest control of the airplane from MCAS if you know how the airplane works and you understand what flight regime you're in...


If you ever have a chance to get a third-seater position in a KC-135, watch and listen to the"whirr-bang"

of that trimwheel. The 737 is quiet compared to that one.

 

[oil_film_movies]

An old friend of mine at Boeing now is talking to the Seattle Times. Among other people of course. https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ ... I called him over the weekend and he says fingers are being pointed inside Boeing & bidirectionally Boeing-FAA as well. Its a political mess. He says every time Boeing sends another memo around saying to hush-up in general, some of the engineers are finding more reason to go to a bar at night and talk to reporters in the back seat of cars. I know that sounds creepy. He doesn't want to be seen with reporters! We joked he needs a "deep throat" nickname if this goes on that way. Its hard to laugh right now though. Crying inside most of the time.

He says what the Seattle Times is getting wrong is that the FAA is pretending the Flight Control Law block diagrams were not available to them to review. Not just FTA/FMEA document issues. ..... The FAA is pulling desperate stunts to blame Boeing here. It is stupid, it won't work, since every time I worked on these kinds of things the block diagrams were studied by all, the FAA, the airframe maker, and my own avionics company --- 3 audiences for taking a look at how it works. It's common knowledge block diagrams are available per software implementation changes for the Max. ....No excuses, FAA. Or for Boeing for that matter.

 

[Win]

And now, reports are ...

"that a subpoena has been issued by a grand jury in Washington seeking "documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages" from at least one person involved in the development of the 737 Max planes."

 

[PimTac]

Originally Posted by oil_film_movies
An old friend of mine at Boeing now is talking to the Seattle Times. Among other people of course. https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ ... I called him over the weekend and he says fingers are being pointed inside Boeing & bidirectionally Boeing-FAA as well. Its a political mess. He says every time Boeing sends another memo around saying to hush-up in general, some of the engineers are finding more reason to go to a bar at night and talk to reporters in the back seat of cars. I know that sounds creepy. He doesn't want to be seen with reporters! We joked he needs a "deep throat" nickname if this goes on that way. Its hard to laugh right now though. Crying inside most of the time.

He says what the Seattle Times is getting wrong is that the FAA is pretending the Flight Control Law block diagrams were not available to them to review. Not just FTA/FMEA document issues. ..... The FAA is pulling desperate stunts to blame Boeing here. It is stupid, it won't work, since every time I worked on these kinds of things the block diagrams were studied by all, the FAA, the airframe maker, and my own avionics company --- 3 audiences for taking a look at how it works. It's common knowledge block diagrams are available per software implementation changes for the Max. ....No excuses, FAA. Or for Boeing for that matter.




Sounds like a good way to lose your job and your career to boot.

 

[oil_film_movies]

Originally Posted by Win
And now, reports are ... "that a subpoena has been issued by a grand jury in Washington seeking "documents, including correspondence, emails and other messages" from at least one person involved in the development of the 737 Max planes."
Interesting. My old friend didn't mention that subpeona yesterday.... I guess Boeing's legal department is delaying it for as long as they can and limiting knowledge of it inside Boeing to a few, at least initially. Not any more I guess. Public now. I just hope the lawyer sharks and managers at Boeing haven't been able to change or destroy records. They'd be silly to assume they could get away with that.

From the looks of this, I think they will eventually get some green young engineer and/or experienced one to testify, matching internal emails, that they noted runaway trim due to MCAS stab trim movement could pester a pilot enough to confuse them in flight, as it did with the lightly-trained Lion Air and Ethiopian pilots. I know the thought was pilots would "simply" hit the trim cutout switches if they didn't like pitch behavior, so don't worry about this MCAS mode. Their defense.

 

[oil_film_movies]

Originally Posted by PimTac
Sounds like a good way to lose your job and your career to boot.
Boeing would need to fire a lot of engineers. Once 1 or 2 had drinks with Seattle Times reporters and said stuff, many more came forward. Momentum, since each engineer wants to get their side of the story out. Seattle Times still screwed the story up a little anyway --> Follow the Flight Control Law block diagrams, they didn't get how important that is, even though at least one reporter was told to.

 

[Win]

You are assuming it went to Boeing.

It could have gone to the FAA, DOT, or some other government department.

It could have gone to a vendor.

It could have gone to a consultant.

It could have gone to Boeing.

It could have gone to multiple firms.

It could be that the report is completely false or a half truth; grand jury proceedings are supposed to be secret, so, really, all one can do is speculate right now, and wait for more leaks. Which may or may not be true.

Hopefully there are not a lot of shredders running at subpoena speed right now.