Air France Flight 66 engine failure
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MolaKule
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Originally Posted By: nthach
Just seeing the fan case - the honeycomb looking material take the brunt of the failed fan instead of having it strike the wing and fuselage meant it did its job and kept an engine failure from turning into a major disaster.
I've seen a few of the bird test or fan failure videos, and it's amazing to see how engineers plan for safety in failure, so to speak.
In the aersospace vernacular, we call it the "Fan Containment Ring" and it is usually a composite of various layered materials.
Just seeing the fan case - the honeycomb looking material take the brunt of the failed fan instead of having it strike the wing and fuselage meant it did its job and kept an engine failure from turning into a major disaster.
I've seen a few of the bird test or fan failure videos, and it's amazing to see how engineers plan for safety in failure, so to speak.
In the aersospace vernacular, we call it the "Fan Containment Ring" and it is usually a composite of various layered materials.
Originally Posted By: 4WD
Is that their "XX Days Since a Lost-time Accident" sign?
Is that their "XX Days Since a Lost-time Accident" sign?
Originally Posted By: billt460
Originally Posted By: Astro14
It missed its design weight goal by 100,000 pounds...I'd call that overweight...and if it's similar to the JT-9 747, well, the congratulations, Airbus, your new flagship has matched a fifty year old design with archaic power plants.
And it's built for a market that is rapidly dying.
AB can't give them away now...
Astro, Why do European aircraft companies go after dying markets, (A-380), or markets that never really existed in the first place, (Concorde)? It doesn't make sense. How many routes actually "need" a plane that holds more people than a 747? As far as supersonic, we bailed out of that market in the 70's. Because Boeing could see it was both a financial, as well as a practical disaster. Supersonic travel can only occur over oceans or desolate terrain. That's too limiting.
But Europe went ahead anyway, full bore right off the cliff. Concorde never made a dime. Then Russia copied it. With the exception of changing a few things to make it more dangerous. And wound up with the TU-144, that dumped money out the back end. Now Europe's got this giant dog with fleas, (A-380), they can't sell. I think a lot of this has to do with these socialist countries subsidizing their big corporations. That would normally have trouble standing on their own 2 financial feet. It would appear Europe builds their airplanes, the way we build our NFL football stadiums. Both leave taxpayers holding the financial bag.
I missed this question earlier, so please forgive the delayed response.
My take on it is this; the SST was the future, until the oil embargo quadrupled the price of fuel and took it from a minor consideration to the most the largest single cost in airline operations. Concorde made perfect sense...right up until 1973... It was a brilliantly designed machine. It performed flawlessly in service (the crash was the result of a fuel tank rupture due to debris on the runway that took out TWO engines, and there is no 4 engine airliner that can climb on just two remaining engines) and when it was retired from service, the airplanes had zero corrosion (due to supersonic heating) and were still meeting all of their design performance goals.
Don't forget that the US government forever damaged the future of supersonic travel in about 1973 when they banned supersonic flight over the country. With more than 50% of the world market for air travel, the continental United States market was, and remains, vital to the success of ANY airliner. That supersonic flight ban was a stake right in the heart of Concorde, and it coincided with the fuel price shocks.
Airbus and Boeing did an analysis of the future airliner market 20 years ago. Airbus thought that the limited number of slots in major airports created a market for ever-larger airplanes in those slots. Suber-jumbos going hub to hub was the future in their eyes. Boeing saw that as a dead end, and already had THE definitive airplane in that market: the 747. Boeing saw the future as point to point service between hub and other cities (e.g. Tokyo-Denver) and developed the "Sonic Cruiser" - a high speed (0.95 IMN vs. 0.84 IMN for the 777 or the A-380), medium-sized, very long range airplane to fit that market. When oil prices spiked again in the early 2000s, airlines were clamoring for efficiency, and the Sonic Cruiser became the 7E7 (E = Efficiency), which became the 787. They backed off the high speed design goal in favor of maximum efficiency.
Boeing saw the future better than Airbus. Were it not for the Middle East carriers making heavily subsidized purchases of the A-380 for prestige reasons (a stroke of luck for Airbus), the A-380 would have been a horrible money-loser instead of the moderate money-loser that it is... Airbus could've required a bailout had they only sold to carriers outside of the ME3 airlines. FedEx and many other companies quite famously and publicly canceled their order for the A-380 when it was delayed for years and was 100,000# over its weight target. Airbus failed to anticipate the engineering and technical challenges of an airplane that big. Joe Sutter's team on the 747 50 years ago was genuinely brilliant - they had vision, they made key decisions that resulted in success,
but those decisions came at personal and professional risk. Joe Sutter himself had a meeting with the board of directors in which he told them that if they cut his engineering staff to give more resources to the 2707 (Boeing's SST), the project would fail and he would resign.
That kind of blunt courage, integrity and engineering insight is rare. It's my opinion that during the decision to produce the A-380, Airbus simply looked at the 747 and said, "They did it 35 years ago, so we can do it better now"...without realizing that the successful engineering and manufacturing of the 747 was largely the result of a brilliant engineer who led his team with aplomb. A highly bureaucratic, hierarchical conglomerate organization simply could never match that success.
The A400M airlifter was a similar disaster. Costing nearly twice what it was projected, with fewer orders than anticipated, and several years delayed in delivery promises, it's another bureaucratic nightmare program. A failure.
Now, the A-350 was an all-hands-on-deck effort by Airbus. With the A-380 failing, and the A400M grossly behind and about to lose more money, Airbus put a ton of resources and talent into the A-350. They were influenced heavily by Steven Udvar-Hazy, CEO of ILFC, one of Airbus' largest customers. He basically told them that the original design intent of the A-350 was a loser, that he couldn't sell them and that they needed to expand the size of the airplane. Following that design shift, the A-350 was known as the A-350XWB (eXtra Wide Body) while still in development.
A big shift in vision, forced upon the company by one the largest lease companies in the world, and their largest single customer, on what the future market wanted, coupled with a "we're doomed if we get this wrong" sense of urgency at Airbus has resulted in an excellent airplane.
Airbus is a big, multi-national conglomerate now, that has to respond to national interests, governmental pressures from across Europe, and those factors make it slow to respond, unable to reach consensus in vision or direction, and too hierarchical and rigid to make good engineering decisions. Without the vision that was imposed upon them by ILFC, I think they would've screwed it up again in the A-350...
Originally Posted By: Astro14
It missed its design weight goal by 100,000 pounds...I'd call that overweight...and if it's similar to the JT-9 747, well, the congratulations, Airbus, your new flagship has matched a fifty year old design with archaic power plants.
And it's built for a market that is rapidly dying.
AB can't give them away now...
Astro, Why do European aircraft companies go after dying markets, (A-380), or markets that never really existed in the first place, (Concorde)? It doesn't make sense. How many routes actually "need" a plane that holds more people than a 747? As far as supersonic, we bailed out of that market in the 70's. Because Boeing could see it was both a financial, as well as a practical disaster. Supersonic travel can only occur over oceans or desolate terrain. That's too limiting.
But Europe went ahead anyway, full bore right off the cliff. Concorde never made a dime. Then Russia copied it. With the exception of changing a few things to make it more dangerous. And wound up with the TU-144, that dumped money out the back end. Now Europe's got this giant dog with fleas, (A-380), they can't sell. I think a lot of this has to do with these socialist countries subsidizing their big corporations. That would normally have trouble standing on their own 2 financial feet. It would appear Europe builds their airplanes, the way we build our NFL football stadiums. Both leave taxpayers holding the financial bag.
I missed this question earlier, so please forgive the delayed response.
My take on it is this; the SST was the future, until the oil embargo quadrupled the price of fuel and took it from a minor consideration to the most the largest single cost in airline operations. Concorde made perfect sense...right up until 1973... It was a brilliantly designed machine. It performed flawlessly in service (the crash was the result of a fuel tank rupture due to debris on the runway that took out TWO engines, and there is no 4 engine airliner that can climb on just two remaining engines) and when it was retired from service, the airplanes had zero corrosion (due to supersonic heating) and were still meeting all of their design performance goals.
Don't forget that the US government forever damaged the future of supersonic travel in about 1973 when they banned supersonic flight over the country. With more than 50% of the world market for air travel, the continental United States market was, and remains, vital to the success of ANY airliner. That supersonic flight ban was a stake right in the heart of Concorde, and it coincided with the fuel price shocks.
Airbus and Boeing did an analysis of the future airliner market 20 years ago. Airbus thought that the limited number of slots in major airports created a market for ever-larger airplanes in those slots. Suber-jumbos going hub to hub was the future in their eyes. Boeing saw that as a dead end, and already had THE definitive airplane in that market: the 747. Boeing saw the future as point to point service between hub and other cities (e.g. Tokyo-Denver) and developed the "Sonic Cruiser" - a high speed (0.95 IMN vs. 0.84 IMN for the 777 or the A-380), medium-sized, very long range airplane to fit that market. When oil prices spiked again in the early 2000s, airlines were clamoring for efficiency, and the Sonic Cruiser became the 7E7 (E = Efficiency), which became the 787. They backed off the high speed design goal in favor of maximum efficiency.
Boeing saw the future better than Airbus. Were it not for the Middle East carriers making heavily subsidized purchases of the A-380 for prestige reasons (a stroke of luck for Airbus), the A-380 would have been a horrible money-loser instead of the moderate money-loser that it is... Airbus could've required a bailout had they only sold to carriers outside of the ME3 airlines. FedEx and many other companies quite famously and publicly canceled their order for the A-380 when it was delayed for years and was 100,000# over its weight target. Airbus failed to anticipate the engineering and technical challenges of an airplane that big. Joe Sutter's team on the 747 50 years ago was genuinely brilliant - they had vision, they made key decisions that resulted in success,
but those decisions came at personal and professional risk. Joe Sutter himself had a meeting with the board of directors in which he told them that if they cut his engineering staff to give more resources to the 2707 (Boeing's SST), the project would fail and he would resign.
That kind of blunt courage, integrity and engineering insight is rare. It's my opinion that during the decision to produce the A-380, Airbus simply looked at the 747 and said, "They did it 35 years ago, so we can do it better now"...without realizing that the successful engineering and manufacturing of the 747 was largely the result of a brilliant engineer who led his team with aplomb. A highly bureaucratic, hierarchical conglomerate organization simply could never match that success.
The A400M airlifter was a similar disaster. Costing nearly twice what it was projected, with fewer orders than anticipated, and several years delayed in delivery promises, it's another bureaucratic nightmare program. A failure.
Now, the A-350 was an all-hands-on-deck effort by Airbus. With the A-380 failing, and the A400M grossly behind and about to lose more money, Airbus put a ton of resources and talent into the A-350. They were influenced heavily by Steven Udvar-Hazy, CEO of ILFC, one of Airbus' largest customers. He basically told them that the original design intent of the A-350 was a loser, that he couldn't sell them and that they needed to expand the size of the airplane. Following that design shift, the A-350 was known as the A-350XWB (eXtra Wide Body) while still in development.
A big shift in vision, forced upon the company by one the largest lease companies in the world, and their largest single customer, on what the future market wanted, coupled with a "we're doomed if we get this wrong" sense of urgency at Airbus has resulted in an excellent airplane.
Airbus is a big, multi-national conglomerate now, that has to respond to national interests, governmental pressures from across Europe, and those factors make it slow to respond, unable to reach consensus in vision or direction, and too hierarchical and rigid to make good engineering decisions. Without the vision that was imposed upon them by ILFC, I think they would've screwed it up again in the A-350...
Last edited:
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Originally Posted By: MolaKule
Some group at Engine Alliance or AB is going to get a kick in the butt if cracks were not detected during X-ray analysis.
For stage 1 fan disks the NDT methods of inspection are submersion ultrasonic and fluorescent penetrant. Radiography isn't used for crack detection on these components.
Some group at Engine Alliance or AB is going to get a kick in the butt if cracks were not detected during X-ray analysis.
For stage 1 fan disks the NDT methods of inspection are submersion ultrasonic and fluorescent penetrant. Radiography isn't used for crack detection on these components.
Thanks Astro. I always learn a lot from your insight.
Ditto, I thought Astro's analysis was excellent.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Originally Posted By: Astro14
Without the vision that was imposed upon them by ILFC, I think they would've screwed it up again in the A-350...
I think SQ and maybe United/American or one of the European carriers pressured Airbus to rethink the A350 or they wouldn't buy it, or that was pressure from ILFC?
Without the vision that was imposed upon them by ILFC, I think they would've screwed it up again in the A-350...
I think SQ and maybe United/American or one of the European carriers pressured Airbus to rethink the A350 or they wouldn't buy it, or that was pressure from ILFC?
Last edited:
Pretty certain that it was ILFC - Aviation Week had a big write-up on the redesign. ILFC featured prominently.
4WD
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Delta is the US major that switched to Airbus …
Originally Posted By: 4WD
Delta is the US major that switched to Airbus …
Many US carriers are on order for the A350. DAL already has a couple of A350 on property, but they initially got Airbus airplanes from NWA, and they've kept the 330 for long haul work. UAL is taking delivery of 45 A350 (with options for more) but the first airplane has been delayed from 2018 to 2020.
DAL didn't really "switch" to Airbus. They've got lots of 777, for example, and Boeing makes up more than half of their fleet, but their future long haul airplane orders are now all Airbus, with 330 NEO and 350 orders. Their 321orders are more mid-range.
What shocked the industry was United airlines ordering 100 A320 (later to be 165) in the early 1990s.
United Airlines started as Boeing Air Transport, a venture of William Boeing to use his new products. As the company bought Varney Air Transport and three other airlines, along with Pratt & Whitney, it became United Air Transport, with United Airlines operating the airline portion of the business.
In 1934, the Mail legislation broke up airplane manufacturers and airlines, so, United Air Transport became United Airlines, and spun off the Boeing Aircraft Company, and all the companies East of the Mississippi became United Technologies.
Given that history, it was unthinkable, and frankly shocking, that United, which once owned Boeing, or was owned by Boeing, depending on your perspective, would buy Airbus airplanes. That news rocked the industry.
Delta has an old fleet, about 60% Boeing, about 20% MD, and about 20% Airbus. I still wouldn't say that they "switched to Airbus" with those numbers.
The question here is, "who pressured Airbus to change the A350 from a medium size to slightly bigger than a 777?"
And the answer is ILFC...the A350 is now the "XWB" - the "Extra Wide Body"
Delta is the US major that switched to Airbus …
Many US carriers are on order for the A350. DAL already has a couple of A350 on property, but they initially got Airbus airplanes from NWA, and they've kept the 330 for long haul work. UAL is taking delivery of 45 A350 (with options for more) but the first airplane has been delayed from 2018 to 2020.
DAL didn't really "switch" to Airbus. They've got lots of 777, for example, and Boeing makes up more than half of their fleet, but their future long haul airplane orders are now all Airbus, with 330 NEO and 350 orders. Their 321orders are more mid-range.
What shocked the industry was United airlines ordering 100 A320 (later to be 165) in the early 1990s.
United Airlines started as Boeing Air Transport, a venture of William Boeing to use his new products. As the company bought Varney Air Transport and three other airlines, along with Pratt & Whitney, it became United Air Transport, with United Airlines operating the airline portion of the business.
In 1934, the Mail legislation broke up airplane manufacturers and airlines, so, United Air Transport became United Airlines, and spun off the Boeing Aircraft Company, and all the companies East of the Mississippi became United Technologies.
Given that history, it was unthinkable, and frankly shocking, that United, which once owned Boeing, or was owned by Boeing, depending on your perspective, would buy Airbus airplanes. That news rocked the industry.
Delta has an old fleet, about 60% Boeing, about 20% MD, and about 20% Airbus. I still wouldn't say that they "switched to Airbus" with those numbers.
The question here is, "who pressured Airbus to change the A350 from a medium size to slightly bigger than a 777?"
And the answer is ILFC...the A350 is now the "XWB" - the "Extra Wide Body"
4WD
$50 site donor 2024
Was a referral to new orders … Delta order is huge … I realize nobody that size “switched” an entire fleet …
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