Originally Posted By: Astro14
DFCS helped with all of this. But we used to maneuver the airplane in a way the designers never anticipated... That's what fighter pilots do...
That's what Navy Pax River said.
In:
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p011127.pdf
"Case in point, if the engineers think it is a
great idea to design an airplane to be flown with
"reckless" abandon by providing superior departure
resistance in the flight control system automatically,
they may actually (and probably will be) taking away
some of the tactical utility of the aircraft. There was
(and is) a lot of truth to the fighter pilots view of the
world that you have to fly "to the edge of the envelope", the point just prior to a departure, in order to maximize the effectiveness of your aircraft in combat."
Looking at what the F-14 Tomcat went through in departure spin resistance (or lack thereof...), and comparing to the F/A-18 program, gives a glimpse into the collective minds of Navy fighter pilots of the past 30 years.
Conversations I had in McDonnell-Douglas in the 1980's with Roger Berger there, and his team of flight control engineers, about the value of sideslip (beta and beta rate) feedback were doomed to collect dust as it turned out. A better presentation of the facts might have helped, looking back. Failure of the sideslip idea came in 1990, even though the Navy knew Hornets were departing, and killing pilots in some cases. The idea should have been sold, yet no sale was made until the Super Hornet program almost 10 years later. About 20 or so Hornets have been lost due to Falling Leaf (not spin departure, another crazy kind of dutch roll).
About the F/A-18 departure resistance and tactical performance colliding:
"One of the first reports that sought to improve the departure resistance of the
aircraft was released in 1990. This investigation was produced by McDonnell Douglas to
propose FCC changes in response to a Navy request to improve known Falling Leaf
departure issues with the F/A-18 B/ D aircraft. Those two-seat aircraft required
significant AOA limitations above 0.7 Mach number and still were more susceptible to
departure (NATOPS, prior to IC79). That 1990 report recommended adding sideslip and
sideslip rate feedback to FCC gains when responding to pilot roll commands. The report
was well received by the NAWCAD engineering community. However, there was
substantial resistance from F/A-18 aircrew. The pilots were concerned that increased
departure resistance would necessitate reduced high AOA maneuverability and roll
performance. NAVAIR interest in support for this program was finally withheld in 1993,
as funding was re-centered around the development of the Super Hornet Program."
F-14 Tomcats of course got somewhat saved by getting the GE F110 engines, yet earlier efforts should have solved its departure (flat spin) problems. The full story of the F-14 control system development program may resemble what the F/A-18 went through: Engineering disagreeing with pilots and project management. Myself being an engineer, I think engineers should win all those debates. Super Hornet control laws prove the compromise between departure resistance and crazy-tactical-flying can be done.