I have been in a situation where death by drowning was a real potential outcome. I had plenty of air in my tank, so I had time to calm myself and to think. Had I simply allowed the panic reaction to prevail I probably wouldn't have made it out.
The Air Florida crew had only very limited time to think and act.
The Air France crew had all the time in the world to think and had they touched nothing that A330 would have simply continued on its way.
I agree - but the Air France case is more complex than that.
Yes, the response was totally inappropriate, but training for unreliable airspeed was non-existent at the time. So, when an inexperienced* pilot was confronted with this situation, he misinterpreted the instruments and responded, out of fight/flight instinct in a totally inappropriate manner, causing the stall.
But, once in the stall, as the stress level rose, the fight/flight response became more powerful, and the ability to think through the problem greatly diminished. Again, amygdala hijack.
In the stall - they responded as trained. In the Airbus, stall recovery is “max thrust/full back stick”. That’s how they trained. So, they sank to their level of training. They responded as trained. They weren’t trained to notice the shift to alternate law, and how that prevented recovery by removing the envelope protections.
That, by the way is how human beings respond to stress, they sink to their level of training. Archilochus first observed that 2,500 years ago.
So, the fault then is in a system (Air France, EU flight certification) that allows such raw inexperience on the flight deck of a wide body, and in a system that provides inadequate training for both the airspeed failure and the degradation of the airplane into alternate law.
*He had 1,500 hours total. But hours don’t tell the entire story.
Crossing the ocean, at night, with the autopilot on for 99% of the time is not meaningful experience. Taking off and flying in formation, flying IMC, flying at low level, delivering weapons, performing aerobatics, engaging in mock combat, practicing carrier landings, so that every minute was filled with tasks, responses, and actual stick and rudder flying at the limit of an airplane’s performance is meaningful flying.
On a transatlantic flight in a highly automated airplane, the pilot at many airlines is actively hand flying for around 2-3 minutes of that 10 hours. So, sure 1,500 hours - but if that 1,500 hours represented an actual time of several hours with the autopilot off, then this was a wildly inexperienced pilot.
When I had the airspeed failure, I had around 800 hours. But every minute of every one of those hours was real flying - no autopilot, no “cruise” phase of flight. Every moment was true, high performance flying. At 800 hours, I probably had 100 times the experience of this 1,500 hours youngster at the controls of AF447.