What is not reported is that the second Max crash was avoidable and largely the result of crew error. It got very little coverage other than the WSJ, which has been on top of the story with Boeing for a number of years.
More specifically, on the same day the Ethiopian government issued its final findings on the second Max accident in late 2022, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board issued its own “comment” rebuking the Ethiopian air regulator’s report for “inaccurate” statements, for ignoring the crew’s role, for ignoring how readily the accident should have been avoided.
In the US, this was ignored and the press ran with the “profits over people” line. In reality, while the Max’s software could fairly be said to be a band aid that placed too much burden on the crew, overall the industry, including Boeing, reorganized along profit and loss lines about 50 years ago, in the 1970s, and since that time we have seen enormous increases in airplane safety.
None of this means Boeing has nothing to fix, but profits in the airplane industry are based on engineering excellence, and Boeing is now learning that lesson first hand. Making profit a bad word means that you are consigning people to a second class safety environment. See, for example, Aeroflot. Max assembly will be brought in house and fixes will be made to prevent the assembly line “catch up” work that leads to these problems.