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Watch: JetBlue Pilot Had To Force A Tailstrike To Avoid Hitting Beechcraft King Air
The pilot thought the oncoming plane would be landing from behind them, not head-on.
simpleflying.com
A320 rotates 24 knots early, tail strike on take off
- Thread starter Just a civilian pilot
- Start date
simpleflying.com
The article is written like the JetBlue pilot did the tailstrike on purpose. "A JetBlue pilot performed a tailstrike to get airborne as quickly as possible" to avoid hitting the oncoming traffic. A tailstrike isn't really a maneuver, it's something that happens inadvertently.
Is there any performance benefit in the Airbus to rotating 25kts early and yanking the stick back so you hit the tail?
Is there any performance benefit in the Airbus to rotating 25kts early and yanking the stick back so you hit the tail?
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No benefit. It’s not mentioned anywhere by Airbus, for obvious reasons ( dangerous ). Probably panicked like KLM Captain in Canary Islands, who tried to rotate early to avoid the Pan Am B747 in front of them.
Not sure why they wouldn’t have rejected if trying to rotate 24 knots early ( never seen V1 reject speed 24 knots below Vr rotation speed ).
I wondered that too. Maybe the captain assumed the King Air that was 2.27 NM away wouldn't see him. However, the Airbus could have easily gotten turned off the runway before the King Air got there. Panic might be the correct feeling the captain had at the time.
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For anyone with sleep problems.
safetyfirst.airbus.com
A Focus on the Takeoff Rotation | Safety First
An appropriate takeoff rotation maneuver is a balance between good takeoff performance and sufficient margin versus tail strike, stall speed, and minimum control speeds. Applying the 3°/s rotation rate requested in the SOPs is the key to ensure that the aircraft meets the expected takeoff...
When I was taking off in the 757 SIM, the first rotation was too slow, but I followed the FD to the correct pitch and all was ok. @Astro14 said something like, "3° rotation/second is where you want to be". The second takeoff rotation was higher than 3°/second, considerably higher, to which my trusty copilot said something like, "something closer to 3°/second would be a lot better, that was a bit aggressive". The 757 is considerably heavier on the controls than the 767, which is a light as a Cessna 172. I was trying to find the feel of the rotation and think I found it the third time, much closer to 3°/second. 
Looked like a panic move to me. Started the roll, realized that the traffic was in front of him. Panicked. Planted the stick full back.
Hailed as a hero for his bad situational awareness, poor decision making, and panicking response.
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Flying similar, but different , planes.When I was taking off in the 757 SIM, the first rotation was too slow, but I followed the FD to the correct pitch and all was ok. @Astro14 said something like, "3° rotation/second is where you want to be". The second takeoff rotation was higher than 3°/second, considerably higher, to which my trusty copilot said something like, "something closer to 3°/second would be a lot better, that was a bit aggressive". The 757 is considerably heavier on the controls than the 767, which is a light as a Cessna 172. I was trying to find the feel of the rotation and think I found it the third time, much closer to 3°/second.
I mostly fly the A319 ( types of routes I bid ) , and it’s much lighter on stick during Vr than the A321. During the busier summer months, I usually fly the A321 and get used to the heavier rotation. When the summer is over, I have to watch not easing back to much during Vr, once back on the A319.
Company monitors rotation rates and issues bulletins at times.
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Well said.Looked like a panic move to me. Started the roll, realized that the traffic was in front of him. Panicked. Planted the stick full back.
Hailed as a hero for his bad situational awareness, poor decision making, and panicking response.
It seems like there isn't much that they don't log and analyze. Is it a company bulletin saying, "hey you guys, there have been some aggressive rotation rates lately, use a lighter weight when you go to the gym"? Or, is it a personal bulletin, "Captain Smith, we were analyzing the rotation rates on your last 25 flights and you need to chill a bit on the weights at the gym"?
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Company bulletin.
Side note:
In addition to the bulletin, GE has some amazing software (I’m blanking on the name) that allows pilots to review dozens of parameters on every flight. Not sure which airlines do/don’t use it. I’m sure it’s terribly expensive.
A pilot can look over the entire flight. Max taxi speed, rotation speed, rotation rate, liftoff speed, how many minutes hand flown, touchdown distance, touchdown speed, touchdown attitide, etc. etc. Its amazing. It’ll even compare the pilot’s data to all the other pilots on that fleet. So you can compare things like how far down the runway you touchdown on average vs. everyone else.
It’ll also “flag” excessive values so they’re easier to find and review. I’d assume rotation rate would be one.
Every flight at my company is monitored by a digital recorder (not the flight data recorder, which runs continuously and is hardened for crash, but a separate device for our own internal analysis). It gets downloaded every day by maintenance and the data gets forwarded to an “event review committee” consisting of company and ALPA reps. Exceedences (like, flap limit speeds, rotation rates, stabilized approach criteria) and warnings are analyzed.
An exceedence of note merits a phone call, at least, “Hey Captain, what happened on that morning arrival into Newark 22L, where you got 16 knots above target speed?”. An egregious event can lead to grounding, and retraining. For example, a GPWS warning going into Mexico City because of an altitude deviation.
It’s a non-punitive process that seeks to analyze errors, identify trends and correct behaviors through training.
I'm mildly surprised flight envelope protection allowed him to tail strike at all regardless of where he put the stick.
By some counts airbus aggressively training wheels the plane by others its a fantastic aid allowing marginal pilots a greater window of control.
By some counts airbus aggressively training wheels the plane by others its a fantastic aid allowing marginal pilots a greater window of control.
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I only fly to two uncontrolled airports ( one has a FSS operator , the other has just a mandatory frequency ). One of the airports is VFR only , so the lowest Miami Oceanic will clear us to is, FL30 ( 3000 ) , and we have to either cancel IFR, hold, or divert.
I did take off out of KLAS March, 2020 with no Tower in operation due to COVID.
I wouldn’t be crazy about operating out of a fairly busy , uncontrolled airport like Hayden ( report said, King Air crew was not using proper communication procedures on the radio ).
I did take off out of KLAS March, 2020 with no Tower in operation due to COVID.
I wouldn’t be crazy about operating out of a fairly busy , uncontrolled airport like Hayden ( report said, King Air crew was not using proper communication procedures on the radio ).
That’s fascinating.
Do you know if any of the regionals (SkyWest, Republic, Horizon, JetBlue, etc) do this?
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Passenger video of the take off.
airlinegeeks.com
From The Aviation Herald:
The NTSB analysed:
JetBlue Airways flight 1748 incurred a tail strike on takeoff from runway 10 at Yampa Valley Airport (HDN) resulting in substantial damage to the airplane.
About 1148 mountain standard time JetBlue’s 1748 flight crew announced on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that they were leaving the ramp area to taxi to runway 10 for departure. A few seconds later, a Beechcraft B300 King Air, N350J, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan reported on the local CTAF that they were “about 9 minutes out, for ten, coming in from the east, descending out of 17,000 ft”. The Universal Communications Frequency (UNICOM) operator responded to N350J stating that there were “multiple aircraft inbound” and winds were calm and provided the altimeter setting. After this exchange, the JetBlue crew began discussing the active runway and the multiple inbound airplanes using runway 10.
Two minutes later, the JetBlue flight crew contacted Denver air route traffic control center (ARTCC) and reported that they were at HDN, preparing for engine start and would be ready for departure in about 6 or 7 minutes. The Denver controller asked the flight crew if they were planning on departing from runway 10, to which the crew concurred, and the Denver ARTCC controller instructed them to contact him when they were ready for departure.
About the time the JetBlue flight crew was starting their second engine and conducting engine checks, the King Air flight crew was contacting Denver ARTCC to cancel their IFR flight plan because they had visually acquired HDN and intended to land on runway 28. The Denver ARTCC controller acknowledged the IFR cancellation, instructed them to squawk 1200 in the aircraft’s transponder and approved a radio frequency change. The King Air’s flight crew subsequently announced, about 1153 on CTAF that they were “going to go ahead and land two eight” and were “straight-in two eight right now”. About 10 seconds later, the JetBlue flight crew announced on CTAF they were leaving the ramp area and were taxiing to runway 10 for departure. HDN UNICOM reported that multiple airplanes were inbound, and the winds were calm.
While the JetBlue flight crew was performing an after-start checklist, the King Air announced on CTAF they were on a “12-mile final two eight straight-in”. About 45 seconds later, the King Air asked on CTAF if anyone was about to depart from runway 10, and the JetBlue flight crew replied that they intended to hold on the taxiway near the end of runway 10 and wait for a clearance from Denver ARTCC. The King Air replied they were on a "10-mile final, two eight, straight-in”. The JetBlue flight crew said “alright, copy” and that they would keep an eye out for them.
About 1155, the JetBlue flight crew contacted Denver ARTCC and reported they were ready for departure on runway 10 at HDN. The Denver center controller cleared them to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, as filed, with a 2-minute clearance void time. The flight crew read back the clearance including the 2-minute void time restriction.
According to the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), a pilot may receive a clearance, when operating from an airport without a control tower, which contains a restriction for the clearance to be void if not airborne by a specific time. A pilot who does not depart before the clearance void time must advise air traffic control (ATC) as soon as possible of their intentions.
At 1156, the JetBlue flight crew announced on CTAF that they had received their clearance and would be departing on “runway one zero”. Within 5 seconds, the King Air’s flight crew reported they “had a king air on final two eight” and that they “had been calling.” JetBlue’s flight crew replied on CTAF that they thought the King Air was “8 or 9 miles out”, to which the King Air replied they were 4 miles out, “even less than that.”
The JetBlue first officer, (pilot monitoring (PM)) stated that they looked for the airplane both visually and on their onboard traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) and did not see any air traffic. JetBlue flight crew acknowledged the King Air, looked for traffic approaching runway 10, and announced on CTAF that they were beginning their takeoff from runway 10 at HDN. The King Air’s flight crew replied that they were on a short final and “I hope you don’t hit us.” According to ADS-B data, when JetBlue taxied onto runway 10 the King Air was on a reciprocal course 4.91 nautical miles from JetBlue.
JetBlue’s crew increased thrust for takeoff about 1157. About 11 seconds later, just prior to the 80 knots call out, the PM asked the PF if the King Air was on runway 28. The captain (pilot flying (PF)) asked “is he?” to which the PM said “Yes, he is on 28, do you see him?” to which the PF said no. After the event, the JetBlue first officer explained that he observed traffic directly ahead on the TCAS during the takeoff run and pointed it out on the display to the captain.
About 20 seconds after JetBlue started their take off on runway 10, the flight crew of the King Air asked JetBlue if they were going to do a quick turn-out, to which they replied, “yes sir.”
Concurrent to this conversation, JetBlue’s captain pitched the airplane up, 24 knots before rotation speed, to avoid the approaching King Air and subsequently struck the tail of the airplane on the runway’s surface. He began a climbing right turn away from the traffic indicated on the TCAS. JetBlue’s captain and first officer both stated they never visually acquired the approaching King Air. According to ADS-B data, when JetBlue began its right turn after departure from runway 10 the King Air was on a reciprocal course with 2.27 nautical miles of separation between the converging airplanes.
Based on FDR data, the tail strike occurred about 1157, the crew continued their departure procedures and discussed if they experienced a tail strike, initially deciding to continue the flight to FLL. At 1203, they asked the flight attendants what they felt in the back of the airplane, to which the flight attendants stated they felt a tail strike. At this time, the aircraft was about 16,000 feet in altitude. Within 2 minutes of getting the flight attendant feedback, about 20,000 feet altitude, they contacted the airline’s maintenance controller for guidance although the aircraft had not annunciated any warnings regarding a pressurization issue. About 5 minutes later, when climbing through 26,000 feet, the maintenance controller recommended they land immediately so the airplane could be inspected for damage. They leveled the aircraft at FL310 and decided to divert to DEN, where they made a safe landing.
Near Miss Led to 2022 JetBlue Tail Strike Incident | AirlineGeeks.com
The NTSB published its final report on a near-miss incident involving a King Air and JetBlue A320, which resulted in substantial damage to the Airbus aircraft.
airlinegeeks.com
From The Aviation Herald:
The NTSB analysed:
JetBlue Airways flight 1748 incurred a tail strike on takeoff from runway 10 at Yampa Valley Airport (HDN) resulting in substantial damage to the airplane.
About 1148 mountain standard time JetBlue’s 1748 flight crew announced on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that they were leaving the ramp area to taxi to runway 10 for departure. A few seconds later, a Beechcraft B300 King Air, N350J, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan reported on the local CTAF that they were “about 9 minutes out, for ten, coming in from the east, descending out of 17,000 ft”. The Universal Communications Frequency (UNICOM) operator responded to N350J stating that there were “multiple aircraft inbound” and winds were calm and provided the altimeter setting. After this exchange, the JetBlue crew began discussing the active runway and the multiple inbound airplanes using runway 10.
Two minutes later, the JetBlue flight crew contacted Denver air route traffic control center (ARTCC) and reported that they were at HDN, preparing for engine start and would be ready for departure in about 6 or 7 minutes. The Denver controller asked the flight crew if they were planning on departing from runway 10, to which the crew concurred, and the Denver ARTCC controller instructed them to contact him when they were ready for departure.
About the time the JetBlue flight crew was starting their second engine and conducting engine checks, the King Air flight crew was contacting Denver ARTCC to cancel their IFR flight plan because they had visually acquired HDN and intended to land on runway 28. The Denver ARTCC controller acknowledged the IFR cancellation, instructed them to squawk 1200 in the aircraft’s transponder and approved a radio frequency change. The King Air’s flight crew subsequently announced, about 1153 on CTAF that they were “going to go ahead and land two eight” and were “straight-in two eight right now”. About 10 seconds later, the JetBlue flight crew announced on CTAF they were leaving the ramp area and were taxiing to runway 10 for departure. HDN UNICOM reported that multiple airplanes were inbound, and the winds were calm.
While the JetBlue flight crew was performing an after-start checklist, the King Air announced on CTAF they were on a “12-mile final two eight straight-in”. About 45 seconds later, the King Air asked on CTAF if anyone was about to depart from runway 10, and the JetBlue flight crew replied that they intended to hold on the taxiway near the end of runway 10 and wait for a clearance from Denver ARTCC. The King Air replied they were on a "10-mile final, two eight, straight-in”. The JetBlue flight crew said “alright, copy” and that they would keep an eye out for them.
About 1155, the JetBlue flight crew contacted Denver ARTCC and reported they were ready for departure on runway 10 at HDN. The Denver center controller cleared them to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, as filed, with a 2-minute clearance void time. The flight crew read back the clearance including the 2-minute void time restriction.
According to the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), a pilot may receive a clearance, when operating from an airport without a control tower, which contains a restriction for the clearance to be void if not airborne by a specific time. A pilot who does not depart before the clearance void time must advise air traffic control (ATC) as soon as possible of their intentions.
At 1156, the JetBlue flight crew announced on CTAF that they had received their clearance and would be departing on “runway one zero”. Within 5 seconds, the King Air’s flight crew reported they “had a king air on final two eight” and that they “had been calling.” JetBlue’s flight crew replied on CTAF that they thought the King Air was “8 or 9 miles out”, to which the King Air replied they were 4 miles out, “even less than that.”
The JetBlue first officer, (pilot monitoring (PM)) stated that they looked for the airplane both visually and on their onboard traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) and did not see any air traffic. JetBlue flight crew acknowledged the King Air, looked for traffic approaching runway 10, and announced on CTAF that they were beginning their takeoff from runway 10 at HDN. The King Air’s flight crew replied that they were on a short final and “I hope you don’t hit us.” According to ADS-B data, when JetBlue taxied onto runway 10 the King Air was on a reciprocal course 4.91 nautical miles from JetBlue.
JetBlue’s crew increased thrust for takeoff about 1157. About 11 seconds later, just prior to the 80 knots call out, the PM asked the PF if the King Air was on runway 28. The captain (pilot flying (PF)) asked “is he?” to which the PM said “Yes, he is on 28, do you see him?” to which the PF said no. After the event, the JetBlue first officer explained that he observed traffic directly ahead on the TCAS during the takeoff run and pointed it out on the display to the captain.
About 20 seconds after JetBlue started their take off on runway 10, the flight crew of the King Air asked JetBlue if they were going to do a quick turn-out, to which they replied, “yes sir.”
Concurrent to this conversation, JetBlue’s captain pitched the airplane up, 24 knots before rotation speed, to avoid the approaching King Air and subsequently struck the tail of the airplane on the runway’s surface. He began a climbing right turn away from the traffic indicated on the TCAS. JetBlue’s captain and first officer both stated they never visually acquired the approaching King Air. According to ADS-B data, when JetBlue began its right turn after departure from runway 10 the King Air was on a reciprocal course with 2.27 nautical miles of separation between the converging airplanes.
Based on FDR data, the tail strike occurred about 1157, the crew continued their departure procedures and discussed if they experienced a tail strike, initially deciding to continue the flight to FLL. At 1203, they asked the flight attendants what they felt in the back of the airplane, to which the flight attendants stated they felt a tail strike. At this time, the aircraft was about 16,000 feet in altitude. Within 2 minutes of getting the flight attendant feedback, about 20,000 feet altitude, they contacted the airline’s maintenance controller for guidance although the aircraft had not annunciated any warnings regarding a pressurization issue. About 5 minutes later, when climbing through 26,000 feet, the maintenance controller recommended they land immediately so the airplane could be inspected for damage. They leveled the aircraft at FL310 and decided to divert to DEN, where they made a safe landing.
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All true and even worse, the captain had terrible situational awareness and the first officer must have resigned to authority and didn't say anything about taking off with head-on traffic. The King Air was correctly announcing their intentions and had the right of way. The two minutes until the clearance expired was a contributing factor, because the captain just had to get in the air before the clearance expired. Poor airmanship all around on the Jetblue crew's part.
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True.
FO as much the blame as the CA , he was aware of the conflict but never spoke up properly ( the way we are all trained in CRM ). The FO obviously knew the CA wasn’t deliberately taking off with the King Air ahead of them and was only doing so because he lost situational awareness. He should have spoke up more forcefully at 80 knots. Same thing with the KLM in Tenerife ( yes, they did challenge the KLM Captain , but only once , and it was obvious the two other pilots weren’t comfortable with the Captain taking off ).
Yes, the King Air pilots broadcasted they were now going to land straight in but the sloppy radio work didn’t help in the beginning.
That said, it’s up to pilots to clarify stuff that’s unclear.
I am departing from one of those small, busy , uncontrolled airports tomorrow morning ( stuck here for two days because winds too strong for inbound flights ….no plane to depart out ) and it’s very busy listening to the MF while starting engines , taxiing , crossing runways, backtracking / doing tight 180 turn end of narrow runway , getting the IFR clearance and doing the before take off checklist and even worse if pilots use slang on the radio ( “ 10 out for 28”…..10 miles, 10 minutes, ? ).
I hate sloppy radio work. It’s even more of a problem flying in other countries where English is not spoken , except by ATC ( who often only understand , basic, aviation terminology English ….and other pilots listening ).
Edit: If I was the Chief pilot of the King Air operation, I would criticize them for not breaking off the approach ( instead of saying “ I hope you don’t hit us” ) and joining the DW for “ runway 10” for safety reasons.
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