Airbus A320 electrical failures

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Originally Posted By: MinusPrevious
Thats good news, as I am a Boeing (BA) stock holder

Joe


They already found the problem and FAA / Europe requested them to fix it by 2014. Most of them also are already fixed (90% on United and all but 2 on Delta). It will not affect stock price.

Also wishing plane malfunction so your stock will get better price seems at least not politically correct.
 
Komonews is trying way too hard to "Oh god, might have to shoot down the plane, 9/11, 9/11..."

I sincerely hate the fearmongering going on.
 
Originally Posted By: PandaBear
They already found the problem and FAA / Europe requested them to fix it by 2014. Most of them also are already fixed (90% on United and all but 2 on Delta). It will not affect stock price


Still, that's a long time. Look at how fast Airbus got around to fixing the pitot heat. That's primarily what brought down Air France 447.
 
Pilots are trained to deal with situations like this. Granted, it's not ideal in an all-glass flight deck like the A320, but there are ways to get the plane on the ground successfully. As long as the engines are turning, you've got options.

There are planes out there with no instrumentation at all, like the old Piper Cub. Perhaps the airline pilots just need to work on their stick and rudder skills
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I don't think that the poster was wishing that an A320 would crash as a result of cockpit display problems.
I think he just means that the recent bad press that Airbus has had with the A380 and AF 447 along with the recent A320 electrical glitch may temper airline enthusiasm for the maker to the benefit of Boeing.
 
Ugh...so much misinformation...

First, while the pitot probe problem on the A-330 was well-known, it was pilot error (deep stall) that brought down AF 447. It took basic stick and rudder skills to recognize the pitch/power/performance of that jet...to see the deep stall that they had created by pulling up sharply in cruise flight to silence the overspeed warning...but unfortunately, no one on that flight deck knew how to really fly...

Next, the displays on the A-320 are all redundant...that information can be put on another display, and is switched automatically by a separate computer called the DMC, or manually by pilot action....this is not a display problem, but an electric power distribution problem...and most of the UAL A-320/319 fleet has the updated power distribution...with one screen working, the Captain has flight instruments. With no screens working, he has standby flight instruments.

The "we could have crashed" is a bit of hyperbole...and the FO should know better than to be giving those kind of statements to the press...

I got $20 that says the FO wasn't prior Navy...or he would have said something like..."yeah, we lost everything...so we just flew the plane anyway..."
 
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Originally Posted By: Astro14
First, while the pitot probe problem on the A-330 was well-known, it was pilot error (deep stall) that brought down AF 447. It took basic stick and rudder skills to recognize the pitch/power/performance of that jet...to see the deep stall that they had created by pulling up sharply in cruise flight to silence the overspeed warning...but unfortunately, no one on that flight deck knew how to really fly...


Accidents happen because errors accumulate. If the pitot had't iced up they wouldn't have had the problem that led to the pilots error.

Remember EAL401?

By itself an electrical problem should not cause any disruption to the flight but if the flightcrew fails to "fly the airplane first" then accidents can (and will) happen.
 
Originally Posted By: Astro14
Ugh...so much misinformation...

First, while the pitot probe problem on the A-330 was well-known, it was pilot error (deep stall) that brought down AF 447. It took basic stick and rudder skills to recognize the pitch/power/performance of that jet...to see the deep stall that they had created by pulling up sharply in cruise flight to silence the overspeed warning...but unfortunately, no one on that flight deck knew how to really fly...

Next, the displays on the A-320 are all redundant...that information can be put on another display, and is switched automatically by a separate computer called the DMC, or manually by pilot action....this is not a display problem, but an electric power distribution problem...and most of the UAL A-320/319 fleet has the updated power distribution...with one screen working, the Captain has flight instruments. With no screens working, he has standby flight instruments.

The "we could have crashed" is a bit of hyperbole...and the FO should know better than to be giving those kind of statements to the press...

I got $20 that says the FO wasn't prior Navy...or he would have said something like..."yeah, we lost everything...so we just flew the plane anyway..."


According to the report on TV at cruse at altitude, those jets are something like 30 knots under the speed that would cause major damage because of the turbulence of the sound barrier, and something like 30 knots above a stall.

Not a whole lot of room / and speed sensing for someone to try to do seat of the pants flying in a monster of an aircraft where exposure to the true winds, temperatures, and lack of pressure, going on outside of the aircraft would be something the crew could not tolerate.

I was thinking an inertia speed indicator with an input of existing speed sensing so as to keep it properly zeroed (displaying the proper speed before failure of external speed sensors) with an alarm that the inertia speed indicator was in total disagreement with all current external speed sensors so the pilots would have something to indicate 1) a total fault of external speed sensing, 2) a backup speed indicator (including if required an indication of usable time before drift error over time renders the inertia speed sensor useless).

Keep in mind that an inertia speed sensing is hard to do with three dimensions, and drift over time, however if GPS could be tied into it, then it may be a very good system that would maintain a valid display of speed during any brief drop out of GPS signals.
 
JimPghPA - you're right about most airliners near optimum altitude...you're about 30 knots above stall (IAS...closer to 60 TAS) and you're about 30 knots below mach buffet.

But the pilot at the controls held FULL BACK STICK ALL THE WAY TO WATER IMPACT.

In normal law, the A-320 cannot be stalled, with full back stick, it will hold a maximum angle of attack just slightly below stall AOA...that happens to correspond to max performance for terrain avoidance or windshear recovery...that's all good, except that the pilot can't over-ride it...ever...

In the case of AF447, the airplane went into alternate control law (and the degradation was displayed) when the pitot-static system delivered faulty information. The airplane can be stalled in alternate law...

So, when the system iced over, the airspeed showed a huge increase in speed, the overspeed warning sounded...note that this happened with the engines reducing thrust and the airplane in level flight...any pilot will tell you that an airliner at altitude will not accelerate in level flight with thrust at idle...if they know how airplanes work...

The crew responded by pulling up, adding back stick...the airplane was still showing overspeed (pitot-static error)...and now, it began to descend...

Rapidly.

Eventually, they added thrust...while still holding full back stick...but the airplane was at an AOA greater than stall...so, the engines could not accelerate it to flying speed with the horizontal stabilizer fully deflected...

The pitot static system started showing accurate information: stall airspeed, full thrust, rapid descent. The crew was yelling that they could not understand why they were descending...(because, in normal law, it would recover to optimum AOA and begin climbing...but it was not in normal law...and the pilot had to fly it like every other airplane...not the magic bus they were used to...).

All that was required to recover the airplane was to push forward on the stick, allow the airplane to accelerate to a flying speed and level off at some lower altitude.

Pitot static failure, followed by pilot failure to identify flight conditions and pilot failure to fly a perfectly flyable airplane.

The short version: pilot error
 
I should add that I have flown a lot of different airplanes, and I have formal training/qualification and flight experience in the following airplanes: T-34C, T-2C, TA-4J, F-14A, F-14B, F/A-18C/D, E-2C, B-747-400, B-757/767 and yes, A-320.
 
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To clarify Astro's comments regarding Normal and alternate control laws.
In Normal mode the Primary Flight Control Computers are in the loop, in effect helping the pilot fly the plane using imputs from the ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) among other sensors and LRU's.
In Alternate (or direct) mode, the yoke,wheel, and pedals are linked directly to the control surfaces, albeit electronically, with minimal limiting and scheduling.
At least on the systems I work on.
 
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Astro14, I only have a few hours in full scale, enough to take a single engine aircraft up and back down without the instructor touching or having to say anything, and that was more years ago than I would want to admit. But I do have literally something like a couple of thousand hours flying RC. While I prefer flying the ones I have built because they are warp free, balanced, built with reliable control systems, and have reliable and proper amount of power, some of the beginners aircraft I have flown over the years have been, to say the least interesting. I do have a background in electronics, and have read many books on full scale. So now having put my true aeronautical background (or the lack of same) on the table, I hope my questions are not off base or offensive, but:

Astro14, I wonder if it was more of a case of "PILOT PANIC", but yes it was Pilot Error.

I wonder weather the pilots who flew AF 447 were ever trained in aerobatic and or combat flying. And there is the old debate about weather more pilots are killed in real spin recovery training, or being allowed to fly without real spin recovery training. I do not know if the country the AF 447 pilots came from do real spin recovery training?

What do you think of the idea of using a speed indicator system based on inertia, with zeroing based on other systems including GPS?


When I say inertia, I mean laser light timing systems, mass force systems, along with gyros. Not the PO system.
 
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Jim - There is some discussion about using the Airbus ADIRU (Air-Data/Inertial Reference Unit) inputs to provide a "pseudo" airspeed in the event of pitot static loss...the ring laser gyros in the ADIRUs (there are 3) are tight...very little drift.

Pilot panic? You bet it was...that's exactly what happened...they were seeing the problem, but could not think through it as the airplane began a rapid descent in the stall...on the order of several thousand feet per minute.

It's my opinion that pilots should be exposed to stalls and spins to really understand how wings and flight works. The FAA has removed that requirement for a private license, preferring to teach avoidance...well...if you don't know what it is, or how to fly out of it...then how are you expected to respond when the flight controls/instruments fail and place you there?

Naturally, I have a fighter pilot's bias...I have flown airplanes at the extremes of speed (high and low) and AOA...and used the engines (in the F-14B) to accomplish maneuvering when the airspeed was too slow to have any flight control authority...

To understand where theses guys were in the flight envelope, I recommend a copy of "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" - still one of the great primers on how airplanes work, along with "Stick and Rudder" by Langewisch...the AF447 flight was a very high AOA, where C(lift) was very low, induced drag was extreme and the airplane was in extremis...but it was flyable; engines producing full thrust and the elevator had control authority...in fact, the elevator was holding the airplane in that stall.

As commanded by the pilot flying.

You should also know that United has been training upset recovery (including deep stalls and extreme bank angles) since the early 90s...I know because I was once a B-747-400 instructor pilot and used to teach it. We also have taught Pitot-Static loss for many years...and as a result of AF 447, all airlines now teach it...

In a nutshell...the basics of known pitch and power for a gross weight allow you to fly an airplane without pitot static data...not precisely fly it...but keep it in the air...clearly, an intertial back-up airspeed (compensated for altitude to allow for IAS vs. TAS) would help...but it can't substitute for pitot static data because it's only an approximation of the dynamic pressure on the plane at that point...
 
Originally Posted By: tommygunn
Komonews is trying way too hard to "Oh god, might have to shoot down the plane, 9/11, 9/11..."

I sincerely hate the fearmongering going on.

Actually the story was put on the wire from Associated Press and was by David Porter. One of my local TV stations just picked it up and posted it.

While I'm not a pilot, and I don't know squat about cockpit displays, from some past airliner crashes and mishaps it would seem to me that having the display go out could very easily have caused a crash in perhaps more adverse conditions. Not so much because of the loss of display, but because of the SEEMINGLY (my opinion) inadequate training that SOME pilots get combined with perhaps the over-dependance (my opinion) upon technology versus 'seat of the pants' piloting.
Not meant to misinform nor slam Airbus with my post.
 
Andrewg - the performance of the human in the loop is one of the most difficult things to predict. In the case of AF 447, they wre presented a difficult challenge, and for a variety of training, cultural and engineering reasons, failed to meet that challenge. In the case of Al Haynes of UAL flight 232, he flew an airplane with all hydraulics failed, and got it to the runway in Sioux City, IA

In general, if a pilot is trained for it, has seen it in the simulator before he sees it in the airplane, then that pilot is very likely to handle it successfully.... Loss of indicators and displays is trained...so that failure, in and of itself, is unlikely to cause a crash, though the workload on the crew increases dramatically with a loss of displays.

One of the biggest areas of safety innovation is the introduction of Cockpit Resource Management - leadership, by another name....developed by United and known as C/L/R in the company... The resources include the skills, experience, knowledge of the crew in the cockpit and external resources, such as Air Traffic Control, Cabin Crew, and Company communications such as the Dispatcher. The ability of a crew to optimize their performance by managing those resources effectively is critical to a successful outcome in an emergency. Al Haynes demonstrated brilliant resource management of the situation, including leveraging an instructor who was in the back, directing and querying ATC and communicating, prioritising and distributing tasks among the crew.

Clearly, some pilots are better than others, and some companies train pilots better than others...but despite that variability, the error rate that results in a crash is so low that it is difficult to convince the bean counters that advanced pilot training (like United's 3 day immersion course in C/L/R) is worth the investment.

Fortunately for the flying public, the pilot's unions have been able to press for the implementation of better training, like the upset training I referred to in the previous post, or United's C/L/R, at the more enlightened airlines (and there are many good airlines out there)...after all, the cockpit crew is among the least likely to survive an airplane crash...while the bean counters will get in their luxury car and drive home from the office after their airline loses an airplane...

Cheers,
Astro
 
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I was an instructor in the F-14 as well...I taught, among many things like tactics and weapons, carrier landings...and the pressure of night carrier landings really highlighted the variability of human performance under stressful conditions.

I've got some stories on that score...
 
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