FAA issues AD: A220

I have zero flight experience, but it seems to me that whatever your chosen profession, automation would aide in uptimes, efficiency, cost reduction and/or safety. BUT it (automation) is not equipped to deal with all the many variables that can arise and if you're too reliant on it, then when things go wrong, the can go REALLY wrong because you're not equipped mentally to deal with the sudden adversity. Truly seems a double edged sword - automation CAN improve safety in an airplane in daily conditions but with degradation of skills (use it or lose it?) when things go south, everyone is in for a ride.
 
I have zero flight experience, but it seems to me that whatever your chosen profession, automation would aide in uptimes, efficiency, cost reduction and/or safety. BUT it (automation) is not equipped to deal with all the many variables that can arise and if you're too reliant on it, then when things go wrong, the can go REALLY wrong because you're not equipped mentally to deal with the sudden adversity. Truly seems a double edged sword - automation CAN improve safety in an airplane in daily conditions but with degradation of skills (use it or lose it?) when things go south, everyone is in for a ride.
Yep. The classic conundrum how to achieve the benefits that automation can provide without the drawbacks.

There's a difference in perspective toward pilot training. One perspective is that automation can be useful, but you can't rely on it or become dependent on it, so the most important thing to know is how to turn it off and fly the airplane yourself. Another perspective is that the automation can fly the airplane better than you can, so learn how to use it - the pilot as "automation systems operator". I'm firmly in the first camp, but then I only fly simple small airplanes.
 
In defense of pilots, I feel there’s a big difference between hand-flying when you planned on it vs. not.

You’re just in a different mental state if the autopilot (let’s say) shuts off when you’re not expecting it. Call it a startle factor or whatever, but it’s gonna take you some time to get your head-in-the-game.
 
In defense of pilots, I feel there’s a big difference between hand-flying when you planned on it vs. not.

You’re just in a different mental state if the autopilot (let’s say) shuts off when you’re not expecting it. Call it a startle factor or whatever, but it’s gonna take you some time to get your head-in-the-game.
Agreed to a point, but in the end isn’t that why we encourage so much hand flying in US? Imagine a AWE1549 type event in a foreign country that lives on automation. Every single thing Sully did after autopilot disconnect was with instinct and feel.
 
The more dependant a pilot is with automation, the more stressed they will be when it’s not available due to system failures.

Its very rare in real life to not have full automation available but it’s very likely in the simulator due to , usually, unrelated system failures that render parts , or all of it, unavailable ( dual hydraulics failure, dual FMGC failure, electrical emergency configuration, etc ).

I cannot recall , ever ,not having full automation working on any airplane I have flown ( AP, auto thrust , etc ).

It’s extremely rare to fail in flight but very common in the simulator.
 
Agreed to a point, but in the end isn’t that why we encourage so much hand flying in US? Imagine a AWE1549 type event in a foreign country that lives on automation. Every single thing Sully did after autopilot disconnect was with instinct and feel.
Agreed.

When he lost both engines though, the AP automatically turned off because the aircraft went into emergency electrical configuration ( ram air turbine drops out below ).

He lost the AP, flight directors and auto thrust ( obviously ).

The FO lost both front instrument EFIS screens ( until the APU came online ).

Sully was smart to start the APU ( but, it won’t start until after 45 seconds in EEC and then takes another 1 full minute to start and come online…1:45 seconds total time ) which would have brought the two FO screens back ( did not need them ) and allowed the AP to be put back on but this is situation better flown by hand.

As a direct result of this incident, Airbus published a new procedure ( loss of trust near the ground ) and our airline has a laminated checklist beside both pilots lower legs that can be referred to if it happens. I remind pilots about it on every flight even though it’s not part of our pre flight emergency review.

First item on the checklist is, start the APU ( do not put APU bleed on as it will cause problems when push ditching push button switch on ).

To mitigate , if I see lots of birds ( not just mentioned on the ATIS ) or hear a report by ATC taxiing out, I leave the APU running ( remember, once it’s off, it takes 1:45 secs to come on if lose both engines ) until climbing above 3000 after flap retraction.
 
Last edited:
In my opinion, the hardest part was ruling out coming back to LGA or trying to make it to that other airport that ATC suggested. Once you rule out that, it’s clear you only have one option, ditch ( and obviously taking control ).

Normal idle glide is three times the altitude but only twice once RAT is out ( drag ).

They had 6 miles gliding distance, max. Tetoboro is 10 miles away and they took off on runway 04 at LGA which put them even further from Tetoboro.

That sounds easy but it’s not an easy quick decision to make unless your experienced OR have great judgement as many would try and turn back or stretch the glide ( look what happened to the Airbus pilots who lost bother engines in Pakistan…..everyone got killed ).

Extremely calm, professional and decisive.

Pilots do not have many options at 3000 after losing both engines.

Things could have got real complicated but they kept it as simple as possible and ditched, safely.

Good thing the weather was clear and daylight helped.
 
Last edited:
Extremely calm, professional and decisive.

Pilots do not have many options at 3000 after losing both engines.

Things could have got real complicated but they kept it as simple as possible and ditched, safely.

Good thing the weather was clear and daylight helped.
He was (is, I assume) a glider pilot and glider instructor; I credit much of his action to that experience.
 
This isn’t a button ergonomics question, though the reflexive answer is to blame button location, this is a cultural question - why are pilots trying to re-engage autoflight systems during the takeoff roll?

Sure, with thousands of hours of experience on the airplane, I can hit the right button every time.

Point is: I don’t need to hit the button at all.

I can fly the jet just fine without whatever autoflight mode/aid the button was going to provide.

I see this a lot in training new pilots - over reliance on autoflight. They like having the autopilot do the work of intercepting the localizer, and glideslope, on a visual approach. I prefer to accomplish lateral and vertical profile management by looking out the windscreen and flying the airplane.

They like letting the airplane trim and set power through the landing configuration changes. I like moving the yoke (stick for you, Lurker) throttles and trim switch (again, none for you Lurker…😎) through the configuration changes.

Developing the feel for the airplane, knowing how it flies, comes from flying it, not from observing the autopilot. When Approach Control gives you a “slam dunk” high energy problem on approach, you have to be really good with the autoflight to fix it - or you can simply fly the airplane.

This over-reliance on autoflight is what led to Asiana 214. They relied on autoflight to handle a high energy approach. Didn’t understand the system (in particular: thrust response in Flight Level Change), forgot about some flight manual warnings on the use of certain autoflight modes (FLCH), failed to fly the airplane, and crashed.

They blamed Boeing.

I blame them.

I find fault with pilots who are trying to engage autoflight during takeoff. Just fly the airplane. Be a pilot, not a button pusher.
My friend that is a pilot sounds just like you ! It must be the Naval Aviator mind set.
 
He was (is, I assume) a glider pilot and glider instructor; I credit much of his action to that experience.
Yes, he was a glider pilot.

Same with the Captain of the Air Transat A330 that ran out of fuel over the ocean and safely glided to a runway in the Azores ( amazing pilot skill but should have known they had a serious fuel leak and not open the fuel cross feed ).
 
I'd be in big trouble, I usually hand fly until FL180 on my legs. Thats insane, you're their to fly the plane, fly it!
You would be both in big trouble and broke.

There are foreign carriers that fine their pilots if they make a tiny mistake hand flying. $500 each infraction, based on the flight data recorder. Off altitude by 50 feet? Fine. Off heading by a degree? Fine. Off the flight director by a fraction? Fine.

By the end of the month, the total could well add up to your salary. And you’d be fired.

No Union. No seniority. No protection.

Fired.
 
You would be both in big trouble and broke.

There are foreign carriers that fine their pilots if they make a tiny mistake hand flying. $500 each infraction, based on the flight data recorder. Off altitude by 50 feet? Fine. Off heading by a degree? Fine. Off the flight director by a fraction? Fine.

By the end of the month, the total could well add up to your salary. And you’d be fired.

No Union. No seniority. No protection.

Fired.
From a layman’s perspective, this seems the opposite of US airlines’ approach to cockpit management over the last 20-30 years, judging from comments I’ve read that you guys on here have made.

Similar to us in the aircraft maintenance world, when you are quick to punish each and every mistake, however non-negligent and inadvertent, making it a punitive environment, you’re encouraging guys to cover up mistakes, which is not only non-productive in the sense that it doesn’t allow people to learn from their mistakes so they don’t repeat them, it’s flat-out dangerous.

At our facility, our policy is transparency - when we make mistakes (Which will happen), we get it out in the open and document it on a bulletin board and share with everyone, with the goal of not repeating the same mistake.
 
I have a friend that works at Raytheon and he had a motto. to design thingsto be idiot proof. He realized that the techs are never trained enough and work under pressure. . Things should be designed to not allow a should push switch next to a should not push switchn or at least cover the should not push swicth. designing a vehicle where the cab needs to be removed to work on the engine for example.
Two buttons in close proximity and the wrong one is pushed, seems to me that this showcases inexperience or sloppiness or both. When I was in the 767 sim, I couldn't figure out which button was auto throttles, I have no experience in the 767. Astro has a ton of experience both flying and teaching the 757/767, he has an amazing command of the entire cockpit and had no problem finding the auto throttles. Inexperience vs. experience. In my case, obviously an extreme example. It does make me wonder, are the regionals suffering from that much inexperience or bad training/lack of discipline?
There are lots of buttons and switches It is easy to understand what they do but putting the whole flying the plane is mind boggling . I got a Christmas call from my retired airline pilot friend and before saying merry Christmas he said I am still flying the Citation. Pilots love to fly.
 
From a layman’s perspective, this seems the opposite of US airlines’ approach to cockpit management over the last 20-30 years, judging from comments I’ve read that you guys on here have made.

Similar to us in the aircraft maintenance world, when you are quick to punish each and every mistake, however non-negligent and inadvertent, making it a punitive environment, you’re encouraging guys to cover up mistakes, which is not only non-productive in the sense that it doesn’t allow people to learn from their mistakes so they don’t repeat them, it’s flat-out dangerous.

At our facility, our policy is transparency - when we make mistakes (Which will happen), we get it out in the open and document it on a bulletin board and share with everyone, with the goal of not repeating the same mistake.
The avaiation industry in my opinion is amazing.
 
I was going to quit ( before possibly getting laid off ) and join a fast-growing Foreign Major International airline in 2004 when my airline went bankrupt ( chapter 11 ) but decided to stay the more I thought about it after being invited over for an interview.

I had lots of experience and would have been a Captain fast ( they do not respect seniority, no union ) on a wide body.

The more I thought about the cultural difference ( big brother watching you, punitive ) of the airline, the less attractive it was despite risking losing my job and paying crazy taxes up here.

In the end, it was well worth taking a chance where I was ( got bumped down to CRJ for 2 years and had a huge pay cut ) despite paying insane taxes and having poor morale at my airline at the time.

Good thing I never went because my late father became very sick with lung cancer and it would have been a family disaster ( I would have quit an came back if I had to ) had I left the country. I actually realized I could never leave my family also.

In the end, family and airline culture (non-punitive) was far more important to me even though I would have made lots more money, paid a lot less tax, had better job security, and been a Captain on a wide body.

Today, I occasionally fly with new HIRE pilots who used to be captains at this other airline but left for a better life and job after the glamour wore off.

That said, if I didn't have any family up here, I would leave for a flying job in the u.s If I was much younger ( yes, it wasn't roses for them either back around the same time my airline went bankrupt . Dark days back then ) even though I am happy where I am.

I love my job and like my airline culture.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top Bottom