Another Aussie Tesla battery blaze

[UncleDave]

Where has that been problematic, showcasing this apparent stupidity? Like any structure, a nuke can be hardened against seismic events, like the ones in Japan have been, due to the glut of seismic activity there. The problem was not the quake at Fukushima Daiichi, it was the tsunami.

Weren't they also oversubscribed with onsite storage of spent fuel?

 

[OVERKILL]

Weren't they also oversubscribed with onsite storage of spent fuel?

Don't think so, they had the standard spent fuel pools like any other plant, the problem was that they couldn't move any water to make up for evaporation, since there was no circulation, because they had no backup generators and the pumps were all damaged by the tsunami due to the inadequate seawall.

 

[UncleDave]

Don't think so, they had the standard spent fuel pools like any other plant, the problem was that they couldn't move any water to make up for evaporation, since there was no circulation, because they had no backup generators and the pumps were all damaged by the tsunami due to the inadequate seawall.

I knew they couldn't move water, but I had also read that they expanded on site storage to way beyond what was originally planned.

 

[UncleDave]

On these giant battery farms there must be a fairly quick ROI to justify these gigantic installation.

I had read Hornsdale was making a fortune, but concise clear data is a bit elusive.

 

[OVERKILL]

I knew they couldn't move water, but I had also read that they expanded on site storage to way beyond what was originally planned.

That definitely wasn't in the official account of the events, which I've read. Spent storage pools are standard sized, anything in casks wouldn't have been affected by the event, it was only reasonably fresh fuel that's a problem for thermal management, and, IIRC, the one unit was in the middle of refuelling, so there was a lot of "fresh from the reactor" fuel in the SFB.

 

[PimTac]

I knew they couldn't move water, but I had also read that they expanded on site storage to way beyond what was originally planned.

 

[UncleDave]

You might be thinking of the post quake construction which includes all the waste water tanks that they are now draining in order to recoup capacity for future storage.

No it was well before all that. I have many friends in Tokyo and was inundated with all kinds of info and like always some good some bad.

I trust OK to give the straightest scoop on all things nuclear.

 

[PimTac]

trust OK to give the straightest scoop on all things nuclear.

OK

 

[OVERKILL]

On these giant battery farms there must be a fairly quick ROI to justify these gigantic installation.

I had read Hornsdale was making a fortune, but concise clear data is a bit elusive.

Electricity prices in Australia are high, so that certainly helps, as do the incentives. For example, the Vic big battery, $160 million of its cost was provided by the government. How much was privately funded has not been disclosed.

Also, "backup services" contracts are signed (the Vic battery is paid $12.5 million per year for this role) which also help.

One can get a rough idea of how much the plant would have to cycle to pay for itself based on the capacity and CAPEX, which is available for many of the Aussie projects.

Hornsdale:
Phase 1 (2017): $90,000,000.00
Nameplate: 100MW/129MWh
Price per MW: $900,000.00
Price per MWh: $697,674.42

Phase 2 (2020): $82,000,000.00
Nameplate: 50MW/65MWh
Price per MW: $1,640,000.00
Price per MWh: $1,261,538.46

Blended: $172,000,000.00
Nameplate: $150MW/194MWh
Price per MW: $1,146,666.67
Price per MWh: $886,598.00

Kwinana (2023):
Cost: $184,000,000.00
Nameplate: 100MW/200MWh
Price per MW: $1,840,000.00
Price per MWh: $920,000.00

Bouldercombe (2023):
Cost: $60,000,000.00
Nameplate: 50MW/100MWh
Price per MW: $1,200,000.00
Price per MWh: 600,000.00

Assuming a 70% discharge cycle, twice a day for the morning/evening ramps (wildly optimistic), Kwinana could provide 280MWh/day; 102,200MWh/year. 10 years, that's 1,022,000MWh. That's $180/MWh to cover CAPEX alone, or $0.18/kWh. That's $18.4 million/year, but we know Vic is getting $12.5 million per year just for being available. So, the total kWh cost the facility to ratepayers is likely much higher.

 

[Opelman]

One went up just over a week ago in Valley Center, CA. For the second time.

Unit burns at Terra-Gen Battery Storage - Valley Roadrunner

One of the units at the Terra-Gen battery storage facility in Valley Center at Vesper & VC Road caught fire Monday night and burned for several hours. The fire started shortly after 5 p.m. Firefighters from the Valley Center Fire Protection District kept the fire under control. Or rather...

www.valleycenter.com

 

[goingplacesanddoingstuff]

Where has that been problematic, showcasing this apparent stupidity? Like any structure, a nuke can be hardened against seismic events, like the ones in Japan have been, due to the glut of seismic activity there. The problem was not the quake at Fukushima Daiichi, it was the tsunami.

It’s inherently problematic on the timescales for which nuclear reactors need to be designed. Reactor design must balance initial investment cost with likelihood of given events. The lower the perceived likelihood, the less likely the cost will be undertaken. Regulatory measures can be implemented, forcing mitigations, and driving up the costs. Reactors must amortize over decades, often on the order of a half century, in order to be profitable. That’s a lot of time to accrue chances of multitudes of various unlikely large magnitude events.

Engineering can only reliably mitigate for most seismic events. Mitigating for the unlikely extreme-magnitude events is often costly and outright challenging. The problem is that while, for example, a 8-9 magnitude quake is unlikely, they will with 100% certainty eventually happen in many populated places. Your question regarding previous instances echoes the mistake humans tend to make on these timescales: if it hasn’t happened yet, why worry about it? Frankly, that’s not the right way to think here when the timescales are so long.

While mitigation for nuclear plants relies on detection and shutdown, no buildings can be engineered to perfectly withstand these events past about 8.0, and even with technology the margins of safety become slim.

Fukushima’s tsunami and earthquake were caused by the same thing: fault movement in a tectonically active location. It’s a great example of engineering for one contingency and failing to anticipate another. Diablo Canyon in California is another example of poor planning: it was built in close proximity (
Note, I’m not anti-nuclear, I just think there is great potential for underestimating the true necessary investment cost in certain places.

 

[OVERKILL]

It’s inherently problematic on the timescales for which nuclear reactors need to be designed. Reactor design must balance initial investment cost with likelihood of given events. The lower the perceived likelihood, the less likely the cost will be undertaken. Regulatory measures can be implemented, forcing mitigations, and driving up the costs. Reactors must amortize over decades, often on the order of a half century, in order to be profitable. That’s a lot of time to accrue chances of multitudes of various unlikely large magnitude events.

I can't think of a single reactor that was amortized over 50 years, usually the max is around 30. The oldest plants operating are between 50 and 60 years and none of these events you are alluding to have happened, that's the reality here. Plants have experienced, and survived, earthquakes, proving the seismic qualifications for the facility to be adequate.

Engineering can only reliably mitigate for most seismic events. Mitigating for the unlikely extreme-magnitude events is often costly and outright challenging. The problem is that while, for example, a 8-9 magnitude quake is unlikely, they will with 100% certainty eventually happen in many populated places. Your question regarding previous instances echoes the mistake humans tend to make on these timescales: if it hasn’t happened yet, why worry about it? Frankly, that’s not the right way to think here when the timescales are so long.

"These timescales", the planned operating life of a plant is around 80 years. We have massive amounts of seismic data going back for over a century (direct) and inferred from geographic evidence, millennia.

The reality is that, despite this fear mongering, engineering HAS reliably mitigated for all seismic events since we started building commercial reactors.

While mitigation for nuclear plants relies on detection and shutdown, no buildings can be engineered to perfectly withstand these events past about 8.0, and even with technology the margins of safety become slim.

And yet the entire Japanese fleet shutdown successfully during the 9.0-9.1 magnitude quake that triggered the devastating tsunami, as they had with all previous quakes.

Fukushima’s tsunami and earthquake were caused by the same thing: fault movement in a tectonically active location. It’s a great example of engineering for one contingency and failing to anticipate another.

No, it's not. It's a great example of a company (Tepco) using a grandfathering clause in a captured regulator to avoid building an adequate seawall. Tepco was advised to increase the height of the seawall, based on an abundance of tsunami modelling data that predicted such an event. They were able to avoid doing so only because they were part of the regulating body who supported grandfathering regulation that allowed older plants, like Fukushima Daiichi, from being subject to regulation that applied to newer plants.

 

[goingplacesanddoingstuff]

I can't think of a single reactor that was amortized over 50 years, usually the max is around 30. The oldest plants operating are between 50 and 60 years and none of these events you are alluding to have happened, that's the reality here. Plants have experienced, and survived, earthquakes, proving the seismic qualifications for the facility to be adequate.

On the order of. Costs are higher now.

"These timescales", the planned operating life of a plant is around 80 years. We have massive amounts of seismic data going back for over a century (direct) and inferred from geographic evidence, millennia.

Yes, humans have trouble thinking on timescales more than about 5-10 years.

The reality is that, despite this fear mongering, engineering HAS reliably mitigated for all seismic events since we started building commercial reactors.

No, it has not. The Diablo Canyon reactor in California is designed for a 7.5 quake and sits less than a mile from the Shoreline fault. In the (however unlikely) event of a >7.5 quake, there could be major issues. I am not fear mongering, I am pointing out that the real costs are much higher in certain places than others, and in these places the chances for "dropping the ball" in contingency planning are also higher.

nd yet the entire Japanese fleet shutdown successfully during the 9.0-9.1 magnitude quake that triggered the devastating tsunami, as they had with all previous quakes.

Thank goodness.

No, it's not. It's a great example of a company (Tepco) using a grandfathering clause in a captured regulator to avoid building an adequate seawall. Tepco was advised to increase the height of the seawall, based on an abundance of tsunami modelling data that predicted such an event. They were able to avoid doing so only because they were part of the regulating body who supported grandfathering regulation that allowed older plants, like Fukushima Daiichi, from being subject to regulation that applied to newer plants.

Semantics on the definition of "anticipated." The mitigation failed to be applied. The risk was not deemed high enough for the cost.

 

[PimTac]

Magnitude 9 or greater earthquakes are very rare and especially in or near populated areas. The difference between magnitude readings is a lot more than most people realize. The Great East Japan Earthquake was cataclysmic.


BWDIK

"How Much Bigger…?" Calculator

USGS Earthquake Hazards Program, responsible for monitoring, reporting, and researching earthquakes and earthquake hazards

earthquake.usgs.gov

 

[OVERKILL]

On the order of. Costs are higher now.

As are rates. Provide an example please.

Yes, humans have trouble thinking on timescales more than about 5-10 years.

Again, see the evidence.

No, it has not. The Diablo Canyon reactor in California is designed for a 7.5 quake and sits less than a mile from the Shoreline fault. In the (however unlikely) event of a >7.5 quake, there could be major issues. I am not fear mongering, I am pointing out that the real costs are much higher in certain places than others, and in these places the chances for "dropping the ball" in contingency planning are also higher.

*could be* in the context here, is fear mongering, given there is no historical facts upon which to base this argument. Your claim to knowledge that supersedes that of the teams of engineers, regulators, consultants and their massive amount historical data, how do you plan on substantiating that? Particularly given your apparent inclination to fabricate circumstances in order to further your agenda as evidenced by your previous response.

Thank goodness.

So you aren't going to acknowledge your obvious use of hyperbole then?

Semantics on the definition of "anticipated." The mitigation failed to be applied. The risk was not deemed high enough for the cost.

No.

How am I supposed to take anything seriously from somebody so willing to flagrantly misrepresent the facts and data surrounding an event (claiming they failed to anticipate the tsunami) to further their own narrative on the matter? Either you are willfully ignorant on the event in question and don't care, or? Well, the alternative is worse still.

I don't care if your knowledge of nuclear power, its history, or the history of any of its events is non-existent. But if you are going to make claims about the circumstances surrounding one, that's going to be problematic for you.

 

[goingplacesanddoingstuff]

As are rates. Provide an example please.

Correct, that's a significant variable too. There are many variables involved. Arguing over whether the amortization of a nuclear power plant takes 30 years vs. "on the order of 50 years" is peak semantics.

Again, see the evidence.

*could be* in the context here, is fear mongering, given there is no historical facts upon which to base this argument. Your claim to knowledge that supersedes that of the teams of engineers, regulators, consultants and their massive amount historical data, how do you plan on substantiating that? Particularly given your apparent inclination to fabricate circumstances in order to further your agenda as evidenced by your previous response.

Well, my master's degree in geology and my decade and a half of experience as a professional in the energy industry working energy infrastructure and geophysical technology helps.

All I am saying is that it is more cost and more risk putting nuclear power plants in tectonically active areas, and my opinion is that some questionable decisions have been made. There is nothing particularly controversial or inaccurate about this. Also, what the heck is my "agenda"? I think you're reading more into what I am saying than I actually am. I am not anti-nuclear. I am anti-nuclear-in-dumb-places-with-foresight-lacking-regulators-at-the-helm.

It is disingenuous to construe what I am saying as being counter to "teams of engineers, regulators, consultants, and their massive amount of historical data" when Diablo Canyon was constructed without even knowing there was a large fault within 1 mile of the facility. An assessment found it in 2008, 40 years after construction was started, and the NRC concluded, essentially, "We looked into it and it probably wont generate enough g-forces to exceed the limits of the plant." In fact, the system could produce a magnitude of quake up to or exceeding the supposed 7.5 limit for Diablo Canyon.

This margin of safety is not good enough for me, nor other knowledgeable scientists (see pdf below). The subsurface has tremendous uncertainty, especially in such highly complex fault systems. The methods by which we determine the maxima of possible events are highly susceptible to error. Humans make mistakes, the first one being the location of Diablo Canyon in the first place. The fact that the facility was even constructed in its location in the first place is evidence in favor of what I am saying: humans are fallible, and there are costlier/riskier places than others, even if mitigation technologies are available. Every time we build a nuclear facility in a tectonically active area, we multiply the factors that must be considered by a very large amount - to such a degree that I, as a geologist, am uncomfortable with the uncertainty.

Coming back full circle, this is why the Australian craton is a great place for nuclear.

References:

https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/diablo-canyon-earthquake-risk.pdf

Revised seismotectonic model for California Central Coast: More complex than previously thought

A new catalog of earthquake locations and focal mechanisms for the California Central Coast underscores the fault complexity of the region and identifies newly observed features offshore near San Luis Obispo.

www.sciencedaily.com

Geometry and Earthquake Potential of the Shoreline Fault, Central CaliforniaGeometry and Earthquake Potential of the Shoreline Fault, Central California | Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America | GeoScienceWorld

Abstract. The Shoreline fault is a vertical strike‐slip fault running along the coastline near San Luis Obispo, California. Much is unknown about the

pubs.geoscienceworld.org

No.

How am I supposed to take anything seriously from somebody so willing to flagrantly misrepresent the facts and data surrounding an event (claiming they failed to anticipate the tsunami) to further their own narrative on the matter? Either you are willfully ignorant on the event in question and don't care, or? Well, the alternative is worse still.

Geeze. All this from the phrase "fail to anticipate"? You're using some pretty aggressive techniques here to, again, focus on word choice rather than substance. There was a failure to recognize and mitigate for the risk of tsunami - if you don't like the word "anticipate" as shorthand for this, and if you think that one, single word means I am ignorant of the events, then you're not engaging in good faith.

I don't care if your knowledge of nuclear power, its history, or the history of any of its events is non-existent. But if you are going to make claims about the circumstances surrounding one, that's going to be problematic for you.

Is it though?

 

[OVERKILL]

Correct, that's a significant variable too. There are many variables involved. Arguing over whether the amortization of a nuclear power plant takes 30 years vs. "on the order of 50 years" is peak semantics.

Not really.

Nuclear plants, after their CAPEX is run-down, are extremely cheap to operate. That's important. The amortization period determines when this happens. So, going from 30 to 50 years is a huge jump there, that's not semantics. That's why I asked you to cite an example.

Pickering A, here in Ontario, was required to pay for itself in 15 years, it's 51. IIRC, Vogtle 3/4 are using a 30-year period.

Well, my master's degree in geology and my decade and a half of experience as a professional in the energy industry working energy infrastructure and geophysical technology helps.

All I am saying is that it is more cost and more risk putting nuclear power plants in tectonically active areas, and my opinion is that some questionable decisions have been made. There is nothing particularly controversial or inaccurate about this. Also, what the heck is my "agenda"? I think you're reading more into what I am saying than I actually am. I am not anti-nuclear. I am anti-nuclear-in-dumb-places-with-foresight-lacking-regulators-at-the-helm.

It is disingenuous to construe what I am saying as being counter to "teams of engineers, regulators, consultants, and their massive amount of historical data" when Diablo Canyon was constructed without even knowing there was a large fault within 1 mile of the facility. An assessment found it in 2008, 40 years after construction was started, and the NRC concluded, essentially, "We looked into it and it probably wont generate enough g-forces to exceed the limits of the plant." In fact, the system could produce a magnitude of quake up to or exceeding the supposed 7.5 limit for Diablo Canyon.

This margin of safety is not good enough for me. The subsurface has tremendous uncertainty, especially in such highly complex fault systems. The methods by which we determine the maxima of possible events are highly susceptible to error. Humans make mistakes, the first one being the location of Diablo Canyon in the first place. The fact that the facility was even constructed in its location in the first place is evidence in favor of what I am saying: humans are fallible, and there are costlier/riskier places than others, even if mitigation technologies are available. Every time we build a nuclear facility in a tectonically active area, we multiply the factors that must be considered by a very large amount - to such a degree that I, as a geologist, am uncomfortable with the uncertainty.

OK, and I appreciate your experience, but you are one guy, who is disagreeing with a whole collective of people on this particular issue, and it would appear, as it applies to a single facility. The design basis considerations for the plants in Japan, which is an extremely seismically active place, are obviously much more aggressive, yet it didn't drive costs into the "unobtanium" territory that you previously alluded to.

Coming back full circle, this is why the Australian craton is a great place for nuclear.

References:

Revised seismotectonic model for California Central Coast: More complex than previously thought

A new catalog of earthquake locations and focal mechanisms for the California Central Coast underscores the fault complexity of the region and identifies newly observed features offshore near San Luis Obispo.

www.sciencedaily.com

Geometry and Earthquake Potential of the Shoreline Fault, Central CaliforniaGeometry and Earthquake Potential of the Shoreline Fault, Central California | Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America | GeoScienceWorld

Abstract. The Shoreline fault is a vertical strike‐slip fault running along the coastline near San Luis Obispo, California. Much is unknown about the

pubs.geoscienceworld.org

There are many places where it's a "duh" situation with next to no seismic activity. I think the crux of this issue is when we discuss places like California and Japan, where there is a great degree of seismic activity, is there a history of seismic events directly damaging these facilities and causing disasters? In California, the answer is of course no. In Japan, there is the indirect issue of Fukushima Daiichi, but that wasn't a plant design issue, that was an operator/regulator issue.

Geeze. All this from the phrase "fail to anticipate"? You're using some pretty aggressive techniques here to, again, focus on word choice rather than substance. There was a failure to recognize and mitigate for the risk of tsunami - if you don't like the word "anticipate" as shorthand for this, and if you think that one, single word means I am ignorant of the events, then you're not engaging in good faith.

Words have meanings, you mis-framed or mischaracterized the event to suit the angle you appeared to be pushing. I took issue with that.

Japan has an incredible volume of seismic data and tsunami modelling work that they've done. They were WELL AWARE of the very real risk of a tsumani of that magnitude happening. There was no failure to anticipate the event, let's be clear on that point.

What DID happen was that due to the regulator being captured by industry, despite the presentation of this modelling showing that a massive tsunami was inevitable, and that sea wall height should be upgraded at places like Fukushima Daiichi to prepare for that, AND despite Tepco being told by GE, the designer of the bloody plant, that the backup generators should be moved to behind the facility (from shore level in front of it), as they were at high risk from flooding, Tepco was able to avoid doing both of those things under the grandfather clause because they were part of the regulatory body making the decisions.

It's not that nobody was aware, or anticipated it, it was a deliberate act of avoidance. Not spending money they didn't have to because the regulator lacked the teeth to be able to force the issue, due to it being captured by industry.

Is it though?

To which point are you responding?

- Your knowledge of nuclear power facilities being low? So far you haven't demonstrated anything to make me think otherwise. I've made this judgement based on your mischaracterization of what transpired at Fukushima Daiichi. If I'm wrong, I'd welcome it, I generally enjoy these sorts of discussions when they are based on facts that we agree on.

Due to this, this conversation hasn't been overly productive so far, because it's hard to have a meaningful and fruitful dialogue when one side is having to make corrections about what the circumstances surrounding the event actually were, rather than both parties working with the same facts and being able to delve into the meat and potatoes of the matter so to speak.

And yes, so far that has been problematic, because you are now having to bring up your credentials to defend and explain yourself.

If you'd like to agree that you were erroneous in your characterization of what transpired at Fukushima:

It’s a great example of engineering for one contingency and failing to anticipate another.

Then I think we can move on and discuss your broader point, which I'm generally in agreement with, that efforts to avoid building plants on faults where history dictates there may be problems in the future, should be made.

I think you and I would also agree on regulatory capture being a massive problem that should never have been allowed to happen.

 

[PandaBear]

No, it's not. It's a great example of a company (Tepco) using a grandfathering clause in a captured regulator to avoid building an adequate seawall. Tepco was advised to increase the height of the seawall, based on an abundance of tsunami modelling data that predicted such an event. They were able to avoid doing so only because they were part of the regulating body who supported grandfathering regulation that allowed older plants, like Fukushima Daiichi, from being subject to regulation that applied to newer plants.

IMO you should never grandfather any safety related problem.

Island nations really need nuclear, as are nations with no energy security and had to buy fuel from hostile opponents (i.e. Europe from Russia, China from the 1st island chain blockade of US, Taiwan and Japan from a possible war (with Russia or China) that would blockade their gas and oil import).

They need nuclear. It is easy for people in mainland US to say oil is cheap and plentiful, but that doesn't mean other nation can say the same if their homeland is blockaded in a possible war.

 

[goingplacesanddoingstuff]

OK, and I appreciate your experience, but you are one guy, who is disagreeing with a whole collective of people on this particular issue, and it would appear, as it applies to a single facility. The design basis considerations for the plants in Japan, which is an extremely seismically active place, are obviously much more aggressive, yet it didn't drive costs into the "unobtanium" territory that you previously alluded to.

I never said that. I said the costs and risks are higher, and the unknown unknowns are sufficient to give concern.

And it's multiple people: https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/diablo-canyon-earthquake-risk.pdf

There are many places where it's a "duh" situation with next to no seismic activity. I think the crux of this issue is when we discuss places like California and Japan, where there is a great degree of seismic activity, is there a history of seismic events directly damaging these facilities and causing disasters? In California, the answer is of course no. In Japan, there is the indirect issue of Fukushima Daiichi, but that wasn't a plant design issue, that was an operator/regulator issue.

There does not need to be a record of an incident from the past ~50 years in order for there to be an unacceptable probability for an incident on a multiple-decades-long future timescale. If that's our basis for safety, that's a very shortsighted and frankly incorrect method of modeling risk.

It doesn't matter where the failure occurs in the "mitigation chain" - if it happens, it happens. The higher the geological complexity, the more likely for failures in the mitigation chain.

Are you going to acknowledge that Diablo Canyon is an example of a poor choice for a nuclear facility? Or are you going to continue ignoring what I am showing you?

Words have meanings, you mis-framed or mischaracterized the event to suit the angle you appeared to be pushing. I took issue with that.

Or, you remain latched on to a single word choice because you don't want to talk about Diablo Canyon?

To which point are you responding?

- Your knowledge of nuclear power facilities being low? So far you haven't demonstrated anything to make me think otherwise. I've made this judgement based on your mischaracterization of what transpired at Fukushima Daiichi. If I'm wrong, I'd welcome it, I generally enjoy these sorts of discussions when they are based on facts that we agree on.

Interesting devices you're using here. We're talking about whether poor decisions have been made on putting nuclear facilities on active tectonic areas, you asked for an example, I gave it to you. C'mon. I see what you're doing.

I have not made comments on your knowledge of seismology, but maybe I should.

Due to this, this conversation hasn't been overly productive so far, because it's hard to have a meaningful and fruitful dialogue when one side is having to make corrections about what the circumstances surrounding the event actually were, rather than both parties working with the same facts and being able to delve into the meat and potatoes of the matter so to speak.

You are latched on to Fukushima in an attempt to steer the conversation away from the Diablo Canyon facts I am presenting. You asked for other examples, and I presented Diablo Canyon, and then you steered the conversation back to arguing about minutiae of the Fukushima event that I never contradicted or commented on. It's disingenuous.

And yes, so far that has been problematic, because you are now having to bring up your credentials to defend and explain yourself.

You called my credentials into question when you asked, "how do you plan on substantiating that?"

Then I think we can move on and discuss your broader point, which I'm generally in agreement with, that efforts to avoid building plants on faults where history dictates there may be problems in the future, should be made.

No. Not where history dictates. Where sound geoscientific inquiry, imaging, and modeling dictates.

I think you and I would also agree on regulatory capture being a massive problem that should never have been allowed to happen.

Definitely.

 

[OVERKILL]

I never said that. I said the costs and risks are higher, and the unknown unknowns are sufficient to give concern.

You said:

Regulatory measures can be implemented, forcing mitigations, and driving up the costs. Reactors must amortize over decades, often on the order of a half century, in order to be profitable. That’s a lot of time to accrue chances of multitudes of various unlikely large magnitude events.

Engineering can only reliably mitigate for most seismic events. Mitigating for the unlikely extreme-magnitude events is often costly and outright challenging.

In the same block, you also mentioned the 50-year amortization period. Gen III+ and IV plants contain passive elements that were, ironically, designed to both improve safety and reduce cost, but, due to an atrophied manufacturing sector and the red tape of the NRC, still ended up producing more expensive plants, as we see from Vogtle 3/4.

And it's multiple people: https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/diablo-canyon-earthquake-risk.pdf

Do you have any examples that aren't from the UCS? They are vehemently anti-nuclear:
Nuclear Power | Union of Concerned Scientists (ucsusa.org)

I'm not dismissing what you are saying, but I'd prefer something unbiased. It's a bit like somebody bringing up Jacobson or Lovins.

There does not need to be a record of an incident from the past ~50 years in order for there to be an unacceptable probability for an incident on a multiple-decades-long future timescale. If that's our basis for safety, that's a very shortsighted and frankly incorrect method of modeling risk.

That's not what I'm saying. My point is that the data used to design the plants that have been running for the past 50-60 years, free from incident due to seismic causes, makes a very strong case for the validity of that process.

It doesn't matter where the failure occurs in the "mitigation chain" - if it happens, it happens. The higher the geological complexity, the more likely for failures in the mitigation chain.

OK, but it hasn't happened, right? We can both agree on that. So that needs to be acknowledged.

Are you going to acknowledge that Diablo Canyon is an example of a poor choice for a nuclear facility? Or are you going to continue ignoring what I am showing you?

What exactly am I ignoring? My desire was to get the mischaracterization of what transpired at Fukushima cleared up. As I said, if you are willing to cede that, then we can move on, I have no problem with that.

Or, you remain latched on to a single word choice because you don't want to talk about Diablo Canyon?

Just wanted you to acknowledge your mistake. I don't mind talking about Diablo Canyon at all.

Interesting devices you're using here. We're talking about whether poor decisions have been made on putting nuclear facilities on active tectonic areas, you asked for an example, I gave it to you. C'mon. I see what you're doing.

You are reading FAR too much into what you THINK is my motivation here. I simply wanted you to acknowledge your error on characterizing what transpired at Fukushima Daiichi, now you are trying to make this into some psychological exercise. While that might be entertaining, I can assure you, you couldn't be further off-base.

I have not made comments on your knowledge of seismology, but maybe I should.

Go ahead. Where have I professed to be a geologist? My comments on Fukushima Daiichi are factual, I've not commented on the issues surrounding Diablo Canyon, as it wasn't a major component of this discussion until this post.

You are latched on to Fukushima in an attempt to steer the conversation away from the Diablo Canyon facts I am presenting. You asked for other examples, and I presented Diablo Canyon, and then you steered the conversation back to arguing about minutiae of the Fukushima event that I never contradicted or commented on. It's disingenuous.

Are you high? I asked you to acknowledge that you mischaracterized Fukushima, read the bloody thread, very little attention was given to Diablo Canyon until this post. I'm more than willing to discuss that plant, but I'm not going to be baited into some psychological black hole where an alternative version of this thread focused on something completely different.

You did call my credentials into question.

You brought them up because of my comments on your mischaracterization of Fuskushima Daiichi, which I appreciate, and I appreciate your experience, but we still aren't into having a productive discussion at this point because this post has gone into the weeds in multiple areas, including judgement of my character and my motives.

No. Not where history dictates. Where sound geoscientific inquiry, imaging, and modeling dictates.

History is a good predictor of future behaviour and we'd be foolish to ignore it. Japan's history of tsunamis was used in their modelling to predict future activity, which was validated by the 2011 event.

But yes, absolutely, those aspects should be considered as well. It should be a concerted effort to establish the safety of a site, using all available data. And, if the site ends up being less than ideally located (I'm thinking Japan) then sufficient civil accommodations must be made to ensure safety, and this does not exempt the facility from future upgrades being necessitated by emergent data that expands on the knowledge that was used for the initial construction.

Definitely.

Good. Glad we agree.

Now, what specifically would you like to discuss about Diablo Canyon? And should we make that a new thread, because this is a thread about an Australian battery fire and we are so far OT it's laughable.