Flt 214 Landing Accident at SF Airport

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Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: 757guy
Iron Mike,

Can you confirm a systems question: On the 777, when using FLCH for a descent on approach (Not that I would ever use FLCH on approach, but we can save that for another time), will the A/T's become automatically disarmed if there is no glide slope capture, i.e, no Alpha Floor protection like on other aircraft types? When/how do the A/T's arm during the approach phase?


I can answer this one since we are the builder of the 777 FMS. No, the AT will not automatically disarmed if there is no glide slope. I don't have all the details but I do know that the aircraft overshot the TOD and then tried to recapture the descent path. I believe they were OK until final approach. There should be warnings galore when speed is that low even with the AP and AT disarmed.


Azsynthetic,

No disrespect intended, but your references to TOD and overshooting are only speculation since you were not on the flight deck for Asiana 214. You yourself admitted you don't have all the details. Secondly, it is obvious from this discussion (and other discussions you have participated in the past), that you are an engineer for Bendix/Honeywell and not a pilot for a major airline. There would not be "Warnings Galore" but merely a stick shaker and a possible GPWS warning for sink rate. Knowing what the system capabilities "should do" is not the same as flying the aircraft into high density airports where we know from experience as to what works and what doesn't when given a short approach, or held up higher for lower crossing traffic, i.e., Oakland departures while SFO conducts the Bay visual.

While I agree Bendix/Honeywell makes fine products, and you are without question a fine engineer, you do not understand what really happens with ATC in day to day flight operations when flying into major airports. Many times we are slam dunked into SFO and sometimes it works best just to look out the window and fly the airplane to the runway. The airplanes have fine capabilities, but going heads down trying to program the FMC when you are high and hot only leads to further distractions when the FMC doesn't respond like you thought it would (or wasn't programmed correctly by the non-flying pilot). Last thing I want is the Non-flying pilot to start typing a bunch of changes into the FMC when we are configuring for landing in a high traffic/density location. The only change sometimes needed would be to maybe draw me a line into the FAF or runway end on the LEGS page of the FMC when given a short vector or runway change from approach or tower.


My original question directed to Iron Mike relates to his 777 Flight Operations experience, specifically this:

The 777 can catch you with what is known as the 'FLCH trap.'

When you are above the descent path and need to get down in a hurry Flight Level Change (FLCH) is a useful mode to use with speed intervention. Once in the terminal area, you normally transfer to another mode like glideslope for the ILS, VNAV for a non-precision approach, or if VFR, you can even switch off the flight directors and fly the approach using raw data.

However, in this situation the glideslope was OTS so the ILS would not have been selected or armed. If the flight directors were left on and the plane was descending at a high rate in FLCH the autothrottle would have been inhibited and so the thrust levers would have stayed at idle- 777 Flight Idle vs. Approach Idle depends on flap position.

If the Asiana was a bit high (quite normal for SFO) then regained the approach path, the rate of descent would have decreased and the speed would have started slowly reducing. With the thrust levers staying at idle, the 777 would now be in the same situation as the Turkish 737 at AMS, i.e., speed decreasing below Vref+5 and not being noticed.

The 777 has autothrottle wake up, i.e., when the aircraft approaches a stall the A/T's arm automatically and will provide up to full thrust. This gives pilots great confidence however, autothrottle wake up is inhibited while in FLCH.

So 777 pilots will be looking at this scenario and wondering if Asiana were in FLCH with flight directors on, too high, stabilized late and did not notice they were still in FLCH and that the A/T's were not keeping up to Vref plus 5 until it was too late. (The Airbus family of aircraft can also do this very thing if trying to descend to the approach path from above.)

Iron Mike, any comments on your experience would be appreciated.

757 Guy
 
Originally Posted By: 757guy

No disrespect intended, but your references to TOD and overshooting are only speculation since you were not on the flight deck for Asiana 214. You yourself admitted you don't have all the details.


I plugged the flight plan of Asiana 214 on Saturday into the 777 simulator here at Honeywell FCS and that is why I know he overshot the TOD according to the FMS. I don't have all the PERF INIT data so I took the average based on passenger loading. You don't have to be a pilot to know what the aircraft suppose to do because 95% of the time the FMS is flying the aircraft.

No disrespect taken but I doubt any pilot on this board knows more about the FMS or FC on the 777/787/747 than I do. You ask a question about the FMS operation and I answered it.

This was your question:

"Can you confirm a systems question: On the 777, when using FLCH for a descent on approach (Not that I would ever use FLCH on approach, but we can save that for another time), will the A/T's become automatically disarmed if there is no glide slope capture, i.e, no Alpha Floor protection like on other aircraft types?"

The answer is still no, the A/T will not automatically disarmed.
 
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Oh yeah, I forgot to add. The annunciations, warnings, etc. on the MCDUs, EICAS, and NDs are all routed through the FMS. There should be warning galores, but any operator can choose to ignore them or do something about it.

Disclaimer, I have never flown a 777 as a pilot or copilot. I have hundreds of hours on the simulator both at Boeing and at Honeywell. The only jet that I have ever co-piloted was the G650 as a test engineer. I can fly any helicopter though, military or civilian.
 
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: 757guy

No disrespect intended, but your references to TOD and overshooting are only speculation since you were not on the flight deck for Asiana 214. You yourself admitted you don't have all the details.


I plugged the flight plan of Asiana 214 on Saturday into the 777 simulator here at Honeywell FCS and that is why I know he overshot the TOD according to the FMS. I don't have all the PERF INIT data so I took the average based on passenger loading. You don't have to be a pilot to know what the aircraft suppose to do because 95% of the time the FMS is flying the aircraft.

No disrespect taken but I doubt any pilot on this board knows more about the FMS or FC on the 777/787/747 than I do. You ask a question about the FMS operation and I answered it.

This was your question:

"Can you confirm a systems question: On the 777, when using FLCH for a descent on approach (Not that I would ever use FLCH on approach, but we can save that for another time), will the A/T's become automatically disarmed if there is no glide slope capture, i.e, no Alpha Floor protection like on other aircraft types?"

The answer is still no, the A/T will not automatically disarmed.


No disrespect intended, you may know more about FMS systems in an engineering world, but there is a world of difference about what happens in the real flight operations world.

Watch the above video - I want a guy that can fly - not program the FMC all day long. Task saturation is very real threat when using advanced autoflight systems.

We're Pilots; Captains and First Officers - Not Automation Managers. That's the difference between Pilots and Engineers.

Again, watch the video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3kREPMzMLk
 
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The FMCs do fly during 95% of the flight...but not during the most critical 5%...particularly on a visual approach, particularly when the automation becomes a burden, as in the slam dunk approach in SFO, when the experienced pilot simply turns it all off rather than let it do any more harm.

The most important piece of glass in the modern all glass airliner cockpit?

The big one in front of the pilot flying...
 
Originally Posted By: 757guy


We're Pilots; Captains and First Officers - Not Automation Managers. That's the difference between Pilots and Engineers.



That was not the question that was asked, so what is your point? Who do you think is the author of the pilot flight manual? Certainly not a bunch of pilots.

BTW, I am an Army pilot so I do play on both sides.
 
Originally Posted By: Astro14

The big one in front of the pilot flying...


I know that both you and I have been trained to flight in zero visibility and also with night vision so that big piece of glass is really irrelevant, right?
 
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: Astro14

The big one in front of the pilot flying...


I know that both you and I have been trained to flight in zero visibility and also with night vision so that big piece of glass is really irrelevant, right?


Your question points out when the modern automation is useful (by the way, my landings in the 320 are far smoother than the way the autopilot pounds it into the runway on an autoland). Certainly, that capability for CAT III is useful, but it's something that I seldom need...and it is not always useful...it can become a distraction that ADDS to pilot workload in a dynamic situation. It puts the pilot heads down and programming when he can, and should, take manual control and simply fly the airplane.

If you have flown a glass airplane, you know that the autopilot and autothrottles are not capable of recovering from engine failure, from upset attitudes, stalls, and you know that programming the FMC to direct the autopilot is the SLOWEST way to get the airplane moving on an intended flight path - for visual approach, for clearance changes, for traffic avoidance. Those type of dynamic situations require a change in flight path and aircraft energy and the pilot is best served by being a pilot, not a typist, because while typing, the airplane continues on an unintended path, with undesired energy...and the situation becomes more untenable.

I have flown with a HUD and NVGs in both the Hornet and Tomcat...and I would be happy to fly to zero zero with those pieces of gear should an airliner ever get them. But I flew an airplane (the Tomcat) without an autopilot during my early years...I can fly a jet when it needs to be flown, and despite the best efforts of ATC and other external influences (like Bay Approach) to set me up for failure with an unstable and/or dangerous approach, the quick response of manual control (flying) to respond to those situations was far more effective than going heads down and programming a box to get it to respond some 15 - 30 seconds later.

An example - while turning base to 24R at 3,000 in LAX I was PF in a 747-400 coming back from NRT, a 12 hour flight. I got a TCAS advisory, and LA Approach control called traffic with an unknown altitude. I got sight of a piston twin, co-altitude (FMCs can't see non mode C targets) rapidly converging. Autopilot off, autothrottles off, power added, wings leveled just enough to both keep sight of this guy on my right and put the lift vector up as I maneuvered to avoid him...and avoid him by enough not to roll him over with our wake...now, we were two dots above glideslope as we turned final...so, did I reconnect and begin programming the FMC and MCP? No! To do so would have kept me even higher and more unstable...I pulled power, called for gear and next flaps (20), lowered the nose and with that nearly instant correction, got the airplane on profile manually...and was stable by 1,000 feet AFE...even an FMC wizard would still have been typing and setting MCP parameters...

Look, I was an instructor on the 747-400...In the simulator, I could do an entire FMC load for a new flight (all the pages) by typing before the pages even presented themselves because I had the routine memorized. One of my students called it "demoralizing" to see the FMC continue to flash and load while I briefed so that when the brief was done, the box was programmed and we could do another maneuver. I can program the box, and quickly, but even at that level of proficiency (which line pilots found demoralizing), the FMC was still the slowest way to get an airplane to do something new or dynamic, like sidestep a runway, change an arrival, or change an approach. The MCP was quicker. The throttles and flight controls the quickest of all.
 
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: 757guy


We're Pilots; Captains and First Officers - Not Automation Managers. That's the difference between Pilots and Engineers.



That was not the question that was asked, so what is your point? Who do you think is the author of the pilot flight manual? Certainly not a bunch of pilots.

BTW, I am an Army pilot so I do play on both sides.


We have many manuals. There is the Aircraft Operating Manual - Aircraft Specific usually written by the Airplane Manufacturer, but at my airline, the Aircraft Operating Manual is written by Flight Procedure Managers who are line pilots. Each aircraft also has a Cockpit Operating Manual that defines step by step procedures for EICAS warnings, cautions, and advisory messages.

We also have a Flight Operations Manual, again written by pilots working in Flight Operations which specifies exact flight operations policies for all aircraft, i.e., Ops specs, Standardized callouts and approach procedures, de-icing, oceaninc procedures, etc.

We also have a QRM, or quick reference manual specific to each aircraft type, written by management pilots, or flight instructors for often used procedures for non-precision approaches, CAT III approaches, de-icing procedures, x-wind quick reference charts, etc.

I did get an FMC guidebook once that was presumebly written by engineers, but do not carry that manual, and in fact, haven't had the need to look at it in over 12 years.

So, Pilots are writing our manuals. Sorry to inform you otherwise. I want my procedures written by someone who has flown the airplane, and the airline agrees.

My point on the statement: "We're Pilots and First Officers - Not Automation Managers" is exactly that. We are flying in a dynamic environment, using all of the tools we have to manage the aircraft safely and efficiently. Those tools include our years of flight experience and knowing when to "Fly the Airplane" and when to use the automation wisely. I want a pilot flying with me who can fly - not program the FMC 10 different ways. Someone who gets it (Team Player), has great situational awareness, watches my back, is smooth on the controls, is way ahead of the airplane, and relaxed yet confident. We work together as a team - no room for prima donnas. I don't care where you came from, what you flew before. Today we are fly together as a team with one goal - getting there safely. I don't care how long it takes - we do it safely or not at all. Tha's my point.

I am sorry if I offended you. I'm the pilot - it's my airplane, and I will fly it as safely as I can using automation, or not.

757 Guy
 
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Originally Posted By: Astro14

Look, I was an instructor on the 747-400...In the simulator, I could do an entire FMC load for a new flight (all the pages) by typing before the pages even presented themselves because I had the routine memorized. One of my students called it "demoralizing" to see the FMC continue to flash and load while I briefed so that when the brief was done, the box was programmed and we could do another maneuver. I can program the box, and quickly, but even at that level of proficiency (which line pilots found demoralizing), the FMC was still the slowest way to get an airplane to do something new or dynamic, like sidestep a runway, change an arrival, or change an approach. The MCP was quicker. The throttles and flight controls the quickest of all.


And this is where the problem occurred as evident by Flt 214. The co-pilot is a newbie and not an instructor. If he had followed the FMS guidance at all time, I certainly believe that this particular accident can be avoided.
 
Originally Posted By: 757guy


We have many manuals. There is the Aircraft Operating Manual - Aircraft Specific usually written by the Airplane Manufacturer, but at my airline, the Aircraft Operating Manual is written by Flight Procedure Managers who are line pilots. Each aircraft also has a Cockpit Operating Manual that defines step by step procedures for EICAS warnings, cautions, and advisory messages.
...
I am sorry if I offended you. I'm the pilot - it's my airplane, and I will fly it as safely as I can using automation, or not.


All aircraft operating manuals go back to or reference the Aircraft Operating Manual - Aircraft Specific from the airplane manufacturers or the warranty is voided. This is a fact that you might not know. The Aircraft Operating Manual is written by engineers that might or might not be pilot, and reviewed/approved by flight test engineers and pilots.

You are a commercial pilot and it is not your airplane. You were hired to fly it per the company policy stated in the manuals. Whether you can fly it as safely as you can or not is yet to be determined. No, I am not offended at all because pilots think that they are a rare breed. I have trained many pilots in the Army and some thought that they were the best until they crashed.
 
Originally Posted By: Astro14
It puts the pilot heads down and programming when he can, and should, take manual control and simply fly the airplane.


I don't understand this statement. All of this should be done preflight or in cruise prior to descent. There is also a co-pilot so why do you have to do everything? Flt 214 was not in an emergency situation so what is the programming that you are thinking off?
 
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: Astro14

Look, I was an instructor on the 747-400...In the simulator, I could do an entire FMC load for a new flight (all the pages) by typing before the pages even presented themselves because I had the routine memorized. One of my students called it "demoralizing" to see the FMC continue to flash and load while I briefed so that when the brief was done, the box was programmed and we could do another maneuver. I can program the box, and quickly, but even at that level of proficiency (which line pilots found demoralizing), the FMC was still the slowest way to get an airplane to do something new or dynamic, like sidestep a runway, change an arrival, or change an approach. The MCP was quicker. The throttles and flight controls the quickest of all.


And this is where the problem occurred as evident by Flt 214. The co-pilot is a newbie and not an instructor. If he had followed the FMS guidance at all time, I certainly believe that this particular accident can be avoided.


I am sorry, I completely disagree with your assessment. You've missed the point that the quickest way to get an airplane to change flight path and energy state is to fly it. The slowest way the change those things is to reprogram the FMS.

FMS guidance is great, if, and only if, ATC puts you in a position for it to work. But that rarely happens on a VFR day. You get multiple runway changes, speed deviations from published values, altitudes based on convenience and traffic that ATC assigns. All of those require the FMC to be reprogrammed for its guidance to be valid...that doesn't always happen.

In fact, in the year since Washington Center started RNAV STARs, I have NEVER been allowed to fly it as published, so, the FMC path prediction has no bearing on reality, because ATC has modified the speeds and/or altitudes, requiring reprogramming to make the FMC keep up with the real world. LA Center does the same thing and so does NORCAL. And Bay Approach. VNAV becomes a meaningless abstraction quite often, and programming the FMC takes a pilot OUT of the loop, buried heads down in the keypad, not seeing the Nav or primary flight displays...

The newbie was flying, so the guy programming the FMS WAS an instructor. If we accept your supposition that the FMS was programmed correctly, then the instructor would have been monitoring the newbie - right? So WHY did that instructor let him get so low and so slow? How did the FMS not keep him on and on? Because this wasn't a sterile, ideal scenario in which FMS guidance actually works...or the instructor was focusing on getting the FMS to work by being heads down and missed the fact that the newbie was off...because he was looking at the least important piece of glass: the FMC.

Instead of being at 1,800 feet at DUYET on the RNAV 28L, I am willing to bet that he was at 3,000, as is common there. Now, how does he get to FMS calculated path? He's a newbie, so, he selects a lower altitude? FLCH? Autopilot off? We don't know, but the overly simplistic "follow FMS" is often terrible advice...it simply doesn't reflect what actually works in the real world.

The FMS wouldn't have saved this airplane. The optimization of human performance, the use of the SA already in the cockpit in those three other pilots not flying, would have. It's called CRM, and it's something that this crew will be found to have lacked.
 
Originally Posted By: Astro14
The newbie was flying, so the guy programming the FMS WAS an instructor. If we accept your supposition that the FMS was programmed correctly, then the instructor would have been monitoring the newbie - right? So WHY did that instructor let him get so low and so slow?


We don't know what happened but on approach there should not be that much programing. How hard is it to enter a predetermined approach or a STARS or a transition? I can do it with less than 10 push buttons. If he followed the FMS guidance like any previous approaches by his coworker it would have been a smooth landing (OK, smooth is objective). The pilot could have just hit the TOGA button instead of asking for more speed. There are several options to get out of this. Why is the pilot not on the ball will be determined soon enough, but there is precedence of pilot errors such as:

http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/northwest-p...91#.UdugFEBYm14
 
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: Astro14

Look, I was an instructor on the 747-400...In the simulator, I could do an entire FMC load for a new flight (all the pages) by typing before the pages even presented themselves because I had the routine memorized. One of my students called it "demoralizing" to see the FMC continue to flash and load while I briefed so that when the brief was done, the box was programmed and we could do another maneuver. I can program the box, and quickly, but even at that level of proficiency (which line pilots found demoralizing), the FMC was still the slowest way to get an airplane to do something new or dynamic, like sidestep a runway, change an arrival, or change an approach. The MCP was quicker. The throttles and flight controls the quickest of all.


And this is where the problem occurred as evident by Flt 214. The co-pilot is a newbie and not an instructor. If he had followed the FMS guidance at all time, I certainly believe that this particular accident can be avoided.


You don't have your facts straight. There is no such thing as a co-pilot. There are Captains and First Officers. The Captain, who was flying that approach into SFO that day, had the least 777 time on the Asiana flight that day, but was no newbie. The Captain was on OE, and being supervised by the acting First Officer in the right seat, also a Captain on the 777 (who is a line check airman or "instructor" or he wouldn't be sitting to the right of the Captain on OE.)

You said: "If he had followed the FMS guidance at all (sic) time, I certainly believe this accident can be avoided." You are under the opinion that pilots follow the FMC commands, i.e., VNAV and LNAV at all times. You are wrong. In the terminal approach area, we usually use the ILS if available, or if not build a VNAV descent path from the FAF to the Runway end. Your statements infers that once the FMS is programmed prior to takeoff that we follow the LNAV/VNAV all the way to landing. We do not, and I never have had, one flight where FMC changes weren't made multiple times in runways, approaches,crossing restrictions or the filed flight plan.

It is apparent you have no real world experience in flying transport type aircraft. I have no problem with your experience as an engineer, I have a problem when you mis-state the facts or try to represent yourself as someone who claims to know everything about the commercial flight operations. Go fly for a commercial carrier for 10 years, then come back and we can talk about what happens during arrivals into SFO, LAX, JFK, PDX, DTW, LHR, AMS, CDG and many others.

You claim to be a pilot, but your many inaccuracies and misleading statments about flight operations have left you with zero credibility.

Again, watch the video by a real pilot talking about automation complacency: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3kREPMzMLk
 
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Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: 757guy


We have many manuals. There is the Aircraft Operating Manual - Aircraft Specific usually written by the Airplane Manufacturer, but at my airline, the Aircraft Operating Manual is written by Flight Procedure Managers who are line pilots. Each aircraft also has a Cockpit Operating Manual that defines step by step procedures for EICAS warnings, cautions, and advisory messages.
...
I am sorry if I offended you. I'm the pilot - it's my airplane, and I will fly it as safely as I can using automation, or not.


All aircraft operating manuals go back to or reference the Aircraft Operating Manual - Aircraft Specific from the airplane manufacturers or the warranty is voided. This is a fact that you might not know. The Aircraft Operating Manual is written by engineers that might or might not be pilot, and reviewed/approved by flight test engineers and pilots.

You are a commercial pilot and it is not your airplane. You were hired to fly it per the company policy stated in the manuals. Whether you can fly it as safely as you can or not is yet to be determined. No, I am not offended at all because pilots think that they are a rare breed. I have trained many pilots in the Army and some thought that they were the best until they crashed.


You have no idea what your talking about. Look up the definition of Pilot in Command then tell me it's not my airplane: Pilot in command means "the person who has the final authority for the operation and safety of the flight".
 
Originally Posted By: Hokiefyd
Article posted on USAToday regarding go-arounds:

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/09/asiana-crash-safety-landings/2501415/


That's actually a pretty good article...though they miss the parameter of "engines spooled up", that parameter is dependant on the individual airplane and its powerplant response from flight idle, but it aligns with the points I was making on unstable approaches. Pilots get "set up" for unstable approaches all the time by air traffic controllers who are under pressure to get traffic spacing close. We fix their mistakes every day, and I think that this crash investigation will take a hard look at how controllers do things. When everyone knows about the "San Fran Slam Dunk"...then it's systemic, not an anomaly...and SFO is not the only airport where this is common...

The article makes the point that I was making in my first post: the psychology. Why don't pilots like to go around? The reasons are complex, and at this point, speculative, but fundamentally, it's the ability to accept the "failure" that's perceived in a go-around...so, with only 3% going around when unstable, how likely was it that a go around would happen with an airline that has a culture that precludes the admission of error? Where "saving face" and the hierarchy of command is so rigid?
 
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Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: Astro14
It puts the pilot heads down and programming when he can, and should, take manual control and simply fly the airplane.


I don't understand this statement. All of this should be done preflight or in cruise prior to descent. There is also a co-pilot so why do you have to do everything? Flt 214 was not in an emergency situation so what is the programming that you are thinking off?


You don't understand because you've never been in line operations. I've been trying to get you to understand this: the FMC is programmed for the ideal world. The airplane is flown in the real world. Things in the real world change at the last minute. It's not the sterile, ideal world in which the airplane was designed...it never is...

E.G. at 6 miles, at 3,000 feet, you get a change in clearance, cleared to fly the ILS to 28L. The FMC had been programmed for 28R. So, what to do? Go heads down and start typing while the airplane is leveled off and heading in the wrong direction? Hoping that the typing is complete, and then the MCP can be adjusted, and then the autopilot and FMC guidance will catch up with the real world? Or fly it while the PM/PNF changes the FMC. Typing will get you so far off parameters that you would never land.

OR, at 1,000 feet, SFO tower says, "United 285, can you sidestep to 28L?" Now, the FMC is programmed with vertical and lateral guidance to 28R, the ILS (tuned by the FMC) is tuned to 28R...at 90 seconds from touchdown, I can fly the airplane safely, visually, to 28L. But the FMS guidance is useless at that point....it will now start squawking all sorts of warnings about how I am off...because it doesn't yet know that we're cleared to land on a different runway.

And the last thing on Earth that I want the PM (or PNF) doing at that point is going heads down and typing [censored] into a computer (so that it can be happy) instead of looking at things, like, oh, airspeed, descent rate, PAPI, gear and flap position, traffic on the runway, the windsock or even listening to Tower on the radio. WE both need to be heads up and flying, not lost in making a computer happy.

The FMS can be a black hole of situational awareness...

And by the way, sometimes the "co-pilot" is the one flying...and the Captain becomes the typist...
 
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