737 max... what now?

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Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by edyvw
But, 737 never flew OK. If it did, there would be no need for MCAS.


My original comment meaning was that the 737 MAX flew fine with a properly operating MCAS. The crashes were a result of system hardware failure and subsequent over reaction of the MCAS along with under reaction of the pilots.

Like said, the MCAS needs to be enhanced to not be so over reactive and have some good system failsafe redundancy. Also more MCAS educated pilots. Once that's done and certified, then the plane will be as good as any in the sky.

Will see what happens. There was rush to catch up with A320 NEO family. There could be more issues than just MCAS that not known to the public. FAA apparently will have a hard look at it, and Boeing is probably making sure to deliver rock sold plane (or I hope so they are making sure).
As Astro14 said, plane never flew fine as stall characteristics were not desirable. If it flew fine, there would be no need for MCAS. It is also against philosophy of Boeing where more control over the plane was given to the pilot.
 
Originally Posted by edyvw
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by edyvw
But, 737 never flew OK. If it did, there would be no need for MCAS.

My original comment meaning was that the 737 MAX flew fine with a properly operating MCAS. The crashes were a result of system hardware failure and subsequent over reaction of the MCAS along with under reaction of the pilots.

Like said, the MCAS needs to be enhanced to not be so over reactive and have some good system failsafe redundancy. Also more MCAS educated pilots. Once that's done and certified, then the plane will be as good as any in the sky.

Will see what happens. There was rush to catch up with A320 NEO family. There could be more issues than just MCAS that not known to the public. FAA apparently will have a hard look at it, and Boeing is probably making sure to deliver rock sold plane (or I hope so they are making sure).
As Astro14 said, plane never flew fine as stall characteristics were not desirable. If it flew fine, there would be no need for MCAS. It is also against philosophy of Boeing where more control over the plane was given to the pilot.


Again, you're taking my "flew fine" comment out of context ... I never said or implied it flew fine without MCAS.
 
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by edyvw
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by edyvw
But, 737 never flew OK. If it did, there would be no need for MCAS.

My original comment meaning was that the 737 MAX flew fine with a properly operating MCAS. The crashes were a result of system hardware failure and subsequent over reaction of the MCAS along with under reaction of the pilots.

Like said, the MCAS needs to be enhanced to not be so over reactive and have some good system failsafe redundancy. Also more MCAS educated pilots. Once that's done and certified, then the plane will be as good as any in the sky.

Will see what happens. There was rush to catch up with A320 NEO family. There could be more issues than just MCAS that not known to the public. FAA apparently will have a hard look at it, and Boeing is probably making sure to deliver rock sold plane (or I hope so they are making sure).
As Astro14 said, plane never flew fine as stall characteristics were not desirable. If it flew fine, there would be no need for MCAS. It is also against philosophy of Boeing where more control over the plane was given to the pilot.

Again, you're taking my "flew fine" comment out of context ... I never said or implied it flew fine without MCAS.


Anyway, the basic aircraft does fly just fine.
The unwanted MCAS inputs had nothing to do with the aircraft's stall behavior and everything to do with stick force gradients under conditions that would rarely if ever be found in airline flying. That MCAS intruded when it shouldn't have was an outcome of a hurried development process. That it proved lethal on two flights is a result of inadequate notice from Boeing as well as inadequate development to preclude erroneous activation.
That the pilots could override MCAS using the thumb switches was demonstrated by one crew. Two others weren't given this information and didn't figure it out themselves so lost their aircraft and all aboard.
This whole debacle has opened a large can of worms with questions even being asked about the manual trim wheel forces of the 737NG, a proven safe aircraft.
Rest assured that when the MAX next flies, it will be as safe as anything ever put out there.
We did fly on a MAX-8 last February and I have no fear that we somehow cheated death.
A good airline with fully competent crew removes any element of luck from the equation.
 
Originally Posted by fdcg27


Anyway, the basic aircraft does fly just fine.
The unwanted MCAS inputs had nothing to do with the aircraft's stall behavior and everything to do with stick force gradients under conditions that would rarely if ever be found in airline flying. That MCAS intruded when it shouldn't have was an outcome of a hurried development process. That it proved lethal on two flights is a result of inadequate notice from Boeing as well as inadequate development to preclude erroneous activation.
That the pilots could override MCAS using the thumb switches was demonstrated by one crew. Two others weren't given this information and didn't figure it out themselves so lost their aircraft and all aboard.
This whole debacle has opened a large can of worms with questions even being asked about the manual trim wheel forces of the 737NG, a proven safe aircraft.
Rest assured that when the MAX next flies, it will be as safe as anything ever put out there.
We did fly on a MAX-8 last February and I have no fear that we somehow cheated death.
A good airline with fully competent crew removes any element of luck from the equation.



That is more complex question than engineering capability of Boeing to resolve an issue. It is the question of culture that led to this debacle not whether Boeing could develop perfectly functioning plane or not.
Case study of NASA and two space shuttle disasters are great reminder that institutional culture does not change easily.
 
Last edited:
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by edyvw
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by edyvw
But, 737 never flew OK. If it did, there would be no need for MCAS.

My original comment meaning was that the 737 MAX flew fine with a properly operating MCAS. The crashes were a result of system hardware failure and subsequent over reaction of the MCAS along with under reaction of the pilots.

Like said, the MCAS needs to be enhanced to not be so over reactive and have some good system failsafe redundancy. Also more MCAS educated pilots. Once that's done and certified, then the plane will be as good as any in the sky.

Will see what happens. There was rush to catch up with A320 NEO family. There could be more issues than just MCAS that not known to the public. FAA apparently will have a hard look at it, and Boeing is probably making sure to deliver rock sold plane (or I hope so they are making sure).
As Astro14 said, plane never flew fine as stall characteristics were not desirable. If it flew fine, there would be no need for MCAS. It is also against philosophy of Boeing where more control over the plane was given to the pilot.


Again, you're taking my "flew fine" comment out of context ... I never said or implied it flew fine without MCAS.

It did not fly good with MCAS too. There were complaints by Boeing test pilots as well as AA pilots about MCAS too.
 
Originally Posted by edyvw
Originally Posted by fdcg27


Anyway, the basic aircraft does fly just fine.
The unwanted MCAS inputs had nothing to do with the aircraft's stall behavior and everything to do with stick force gradients under conditions that would rarely if ever be found in airline flying. That MCAS intruded when it shouldn't have was an outcome of a hurried development process. That it proved lethal on two flights is a result of inadequate notice from Boeing as well as inadequate development to preclude erroneous activation.
That the pilots could override MCAS using the thumb switches was demonstrated by one crew. Two others weren't given this information and didn't figure it out themselves so lost their aircraft and all aboard.
This whole debacle has opened a large can of worms with questions even being asked about the manual trim wheel forces of the 737NG, a proven safe aircraft.
Rest assured that when the MAX next flies, it will be as safe as anything ever put out there.
We did fly on a MAX-8 last February and I have no fear that we somehow cheated death.
A good airline with fully competent crew removes any element of luck from the equation.

That is more complex question than engineering capability of Boeing to resolve an issue. It is the question of culture that led to this debacle not whether Boeing could develop perfectly functioning plane or not.
Case study of NASA and two space shuttle disasters are great reminder that institutional culture does not change easily.


The culture of design, engineering, test flying and manufacturing in the State of Washington is probably just fine.
The problem may be that the management decision makers moved way off-site to Chicago and can no longer hear directly what the engineers and the test pilots have to say, which makes them easy to ignore.
A crucial part of Boeing's long-term plan must include bringing senior management back to the location of those elements that actually make the company and its products.
We aren't talking about an automotive level supplier here, after all.
 
Originally Posted by fdcg27
Originally Posted by edyvw
Originally Posted by fdcg27


Anyway, the basic aircraft does fly just fine.
The unwanted MCAS inputs had nothing to do with the aircraft's stall behavior and everything to do with stick force gradients under conditions that would rarely if ever be found in airline flying. That MCAS intruded when it shouldn't have was an outcome of a hurried development process. That it proved lethal on two flights is a result of inadequate notice from Boeing as well as inadequate development to preclude erroneous activation.
That the pilots could override MCAS using the thumb switches was demonstrated by one crew. Two others weren't given this information and didn't figure it out themselves so lost their aircraft and all aboard.
This whole debacle has opened a large can of worms with questions even being asked about the manual trim wheel forces of the 737NG, a proven safe aircraft.
Rest assured that when the MAX next flies, it will be as safe as anything ever put out there.
We did fly on a MAX-8 last February and I have no fear that we somehow cheated death.
A good airline with fully competent crew removes any element of luck from the equation.

That is more complex question than engineering capability of Boeing to resolve an issue. It is the question of culture that led to this debacle not whether Boeing could develop perfectly functioning plane or not.
Case study of NASA and two space shuttle disasters are great reminder that institutional culture does not change easily.


The culture of design, engineering, test flying and manufacturing in the State of Washington is probably just fine.
The problem may be that the management decision makers moved way off-site to Chicago and can no longer hear directly what the engineers and the test pilots have to say, which makes them easy to ignore.
A crucial part of Boeing's long-term plan must include bringing senior management back to the location of those elements that actually make the company and its products.
We aren't talking about an automotive level supplier here, after all.

May be here, or may be there. In the end, it affects final product, regardless what problem is. There is no doubt short term profit and Airbus pressure led to this. What s the root cause of quality inconsistencies on 787, KC-46 or this issue with MAX, will be investigated for years. However, we have numerous examples (and I think NASA example is probably most fitting) where institutional culture could be detrimental to product, lives etc.
 
The only thing to make the Max safe, and anyother plane with that kind of system is a big red e stop button, that will completely remove any kind of control from that system. If 737's have the old control cables then the big red button needs to remove all sort of computerized electronic control from the manual system.
All the stupid reprogramming is a joke. Its just like the takata airbag deal. No logic involved.
 
Originally Posted by Exhaustgases
The only thing to make the Max safe, and anyother plane with that kind of system is a big red e stop button, that will completely remove any kind of control from that system. If 737's have the old control cables then the big red button needs to remove all sort of computerized electronic control from the manual system.
All the stupid reprogramming is a joke. Its just like the takata airbag deal. No logic involved.


Since MCAS uses the trim system, will your big red button disable the trim as well?

I'm no Guppy fan, but any jet with full trim will take a tremendous amount of force to fly. It's about a 75 lb pull on the yoke to hold it level with flaps down (in the 757, reckon Guppy is similar) if it's trimmed nose down.

That's the same amount of force that caused the crashes.

So I don't see how the big red button will help.

Particularly since Boeing already installed the same thing for trim. Red, guarded, switches for stab trim cutout.

So, what else would the big red button do, that the big red switches don't already do?

Here's the key point: the crews that crashed didn't know how to use the big red switches. Lion Air crew never used them. Ethiopian used them and then re-connected the stab trim.

So, if the crew didn't know when to use the big red switches, why would they know to use the big red button?

It's not as simple as blaming Boeing or the airplane. These crashes happened at the intersection of poor training, new systems, component failure and a startled crew that didn't respond correctly.

No simple fix exists for all of those elements.
 
What it amounts to is something no maker of any new JUNK wants to do. Regress to what worked in the past. And lets not blame air crash problems in the past on the mechanics of the plane. DC-3's did not have an electrical trim system.
 
I'll bet Dan Rather still has two or three of Joe Newman's "energy machines" sitting around somewhere. Seems like he fell for every far out scam that came along. Jumped on any half baked story that came along without checking out the facts. Finally did himself in.
 
Originally Posted by Astro14


Since MCAS uses the trim system, will your big red button disable the trim as well?

I'm no Guppy fan, but any jet with full trim will take a tremendous amount of force to fly. It's about a 75 lb pull on the yoke to hold it level with flaps down (in the 757, reckon Guppy is similar) if it's trimmed nose down.

That's the same amount of force that caused the crashes.

So I don't see how the big red button will help.

Particularly since Boeing already installed the same thing for trim. Red, guarded, switches for stab trim cutout.

So, what else would the big red button do, that the big red switches don't already do?

Here's the key point: the crews that crashed didn't know how to use the big red switches. Lion Air crew never used them. Ethiopian used them and then re-connected the stab trim.

So, if the crew didn't know when to use the big red switches, why would they know to use the big red button?

It's not as simple as blaming Boeing or the airplane. These crashes happened at the intersection of poor training, new systems, component failure and a startled crew that didn't respond correctly.

No simple fix exists for all of those elements.


The stab trim cutout switches on the 737 are neither RED, nor BIG. They are black, hard to see in the dark, very small, and awkwardly placed. And not only that, the design of the stab trim cutout switches is completely unique to any other guarded switch used elsewhere in the cockpit. Operating them in a panic would be anything but natural.

The 737 cockpit design in general is an absolute mess.
 
As I'm sure this has been discussed before, but remember when Pilots flew? I mean, you had Elevators, Ailerons, Rudder, Stick Up/Down/Left/Right. Throttle, Trim, Flaps, Gear, etc.etc.

There are too many etc.'s etc's. It just seems, as a layman, that you have all these safety switches and overrides, and overrides for overrides that makes the whole system much more complicated and that is now making it more dangerous to fly. If a pilot forgets to flip a switch/button that disables/enables some other safety thing, and causes the plane to crash. What ever happened to K.I.S.S.? There has to be a happy medium where after every air crash, some new doo-dad doesn't have to be made unless it really needs to be. I dunno. It just seems so overly complicated which will lead to further issues. I'm not a pilot, or plane designer/engineer, I just play one on T.V.
 
The new engines on the MAX tend to make it unstable. If it is pitched up enough, it tends to keep going up until it stalls-- unless the pilot makes a very deliberate "down" effort on the controls, much more than the old 737NG does. This is something that pilots could handle with some training and practice, but they weren't told about it or given the opportunity to train and practice.

To make a MAX fly under conventional manual control the same way as other aircraft would require mounting the engines in the right place to begin with. That isn't possible without a major re-design, which would certainly make the FAA consider it a new type of aircraft, and nullify Boeing's marketing strategy that airlines could buy them and not have to retrain their 737 pilots.

So we have Boeing's first effort to stabilize an inherently unstable airliner with some rudimentary fly by wire feedback, and they failed badly.
 
Last edited:
Originally Posted by mk378
The new engines on the MAX tend to make it unstable. If it is pitched up enough, it tends to keep going up until it stalls-- unless the pilot makes a very deliberate "down" effort on the controls, much more than the old 737NG does. This is something that pilots could handle with some training and practice, but they weren't told about it or given the opportunity to train and practice.


Seems to me that every pilot on earth should be trained how to "go manual" on any airplane they fly so they can actually fly it manually by themselves. If an airplane can't be flown manually by a pilot, then something is very wrong.
 
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by mk378
The new engines on the MAX tend to make it unstable. If it is pitched up enough, it tends to keep going up until it stalls-- unless the pilot makes a very deliberate "down" effort on the controls, much more than the old 737NG does. This is something that pilots could handle with some training and practice, but they weren't told about it or given the opportunity to train and practice.


Seems to me that every pilot on earth should be trained how to "go manual" on any airplane they fly so they can actually fly it manually by themselves. If an airplane can't be flown manually by a pilot, then something is very wrong.

Did technology make it 'safer' to NOT fly the aircraft manually ?
 
Originally Posted by ZeeOSix
Originally Posted by mk378
The new engines on the MAX tend to make it unstable. If it is pitched up enough, it tends to keep going up until it stalls-- unless the pilot makes a very deliberate "down" effort on the controls, much more than the old 737NG does. This is something that pilots could handle with some training and practice, but they weren't told about it or given the opportunity to train and practice.


Seems to me that every pilot on earth should be trained how to "go manual" on any airplane they fly so they can actually fly it manually by themselves. If an airplane can't be flown manually by a pilot, then something is very wrong.


There are airlines, particularly in Asia, that do not train their pilots to "go manual" and punish those pilots that do fly without autopilot engaged 100% of the time.

I'm not making this up.

Momentary deviations from parameters with autopilot off result in fines, deducted from their paycheck. Rates vary, but between $100 and $500 for each deviation, of a knot, or a degree, etc. you could lose your entire month's pay in five minutes of hand flying.

They were never taught to go manual. They have no base on which to build skills. They have no opportunity to even maintain what little skill they have.

This is part of the reason that I will never go to an Asian carrier, even for a $300K salary, as I said in this thread.

https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/5294973/1
 
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