The landing lights look about as bright as birthday candles.
Will This Rob Carrier Pilots Of Stick & Rudder Landing Skills?
- Thread starter billt460
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JHZR2
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Originally Posted by billt460
Just watch his hands and control inputs from the 1:00 point to touchdown. And remember, this is during the day, with beautiful weather, good visibility, and all but calm seas. Now imagine the same thing at night in bad weather, with very low visibility in rough seas, with the boat pitching and rolling, after his automated, "Magic Carpet Ride" takes a dump. Would you want to be in the back seat?
Problem is, you make a very gross unstated assumption regarding what training won't happen with this device installed. So when the controls "take a dump" as you say, this guy is now an imbecile? I find that dubious.
I haven't been to flight school, but I'd assume that the Navy teaches pilots about landing with just one engine, with battle damage, with loss of controls. So if the policy and training involves loss of this control, to a sufficient level, then what's the gripe?
If I understand this paper from 1983 correctly:
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p002709.pdf
The F/A-18 already has fly by wire and an electric control system, which actuated the hydraulics to affect the flight control surfaces. So it would be interesting to understand how the risks or actual operational scenarios are any different between a new control system software build that includes magic carpet, and the builds from the 1980s... a control system failing is a control system failing. Not much new here relative to that specific risk. I'd also assume that already there is some redundancy or backup to actuate the hydraulics if the 1980s controller failed.
Thus in my view, the training for a failed controller is training for a failed controller. Nothing new there. Astro can certainly correct on this if I'm correct; but I'm not seeing that there's a new paradigm here if the new controls "take a dump" versus the old ones. I think your point on that is moot.
What I can see is a variant on automation bias. The logic that some decision making system is smarter, better, or more correct because it has whatever role it has. It's better, it's easier, therefore we should use it more, and the what if scenarios aren't played out, or just routine skill isn't routinely sharpened. When the system lands faster/softer/etc., and it's better for all, and so it gets used too much, the skills are lost.
So long story short, need to deconvolute a system "taking a dump" as you say, from routine overutilization, which prevents training of the adverse scenarios.
Wait until all electric aircraft come out where there are controls and electronics on flight control surfaces, not even hydraulics. You can have double concern then!!
Just watch his hands and control inputs from the 1:00 point to touchdown. And remember, this is during the day, with beautiful weather, good visibility, and all but calm seas. Now imagine the same thing at night in bad weather, with very low visibility in rough seas, with the boat pitching and rolling, after his automated, "Magic Carpet Ride" takes a dump. Would you want to be in the back seat?
Problem is, you make a very gross unstated assumption regarding what training won't happen with this device installed. So when the controls "take a dump" as you say, this guy is now an imbecile? I find that dubious.
I haven't been to flight school, but I'd assume that the Navy teaches pilots about landing with just one engine, with battle damage, with loss of controls. So if the policy and training involves loss of this control, to a sufficient level, then what's the gripe?
If I understand this paper from 1983 correctly:
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/p002709.pdf
The F/A-18 already has fly by wire and an electric control system, which actuated the hydraulics to affect the flight control surfaces. So it would be interesting to understand how the risks or actual operational scenarios are any different between a new control system software build that includes magic carpet, and the builds from the 1980s... a control system failing is a control system failing. Not much new here relative to that specific risk. I'd also assume that already there is some redundancy or backup to actuate the hydraulics if the 1980s controller failed.
Thus in my view, the training for a failed controller is training for a failed controller. Nothing new there. Astro can certainly correct on this if I'm correct; but I'm not seeing that there's a new paradigm here if the new controls "take a dump" versus the old ones. I think your point on that is moot.
What I can see is a variant on automation bias. The logic that some decision making system is smarter, better, or more correct because it has whatever role it has. It's better, it's easier, therefore we should use it more, and the what if scenarios aren't played out, or just routine skill isn't routinely sharpened. When the system lands faster/softer/etc., and it's better for all, and so it gets used too much, the skills are lost.
So long story short, need to deconvolute a system "taking a dump" as you say, from routine overutilization, which prevents training of the adverse scenarios.
Wait until all electric aircraft come out where there are controls and electronics on flight control surfaces, not even hydraulics. You can have double concern then!!
Originally Posted by JHZR2
Problem is, you make a very gross unstated assumption regarding what training won't happen with this device installed. So when the controls "take a dump" as you say, this guy is now an imbecile? I find that dubious. I haven't been to flight school, but I'd assume that the Navy teaches pilots about landing with just one engine, with battle damage, with loss of controls. So if the policy and training involves loss of this control, to a sufficient level, then what's the gripe?
The "gripe" as you call it, is that this has nothing to do with training, and everything to do with saving money by reducing it. It's the classic example of something designed primarily as a cost saving measure, being sold as "better", in order to help sell it.
We have plenty of examples of what happens when pilots become overly dependent on automation. The evidence and accidents as a direct result of it are everywhere. Their stick and rudder skills deteriorate. Some, as evidenced by the Asiana Air pilot, all but forget how to fly. Then, as was already stated, if and when the system goes down, like they all do, the skill level is no longer there. This is bad enough in commercial aviation. Now it appears it is going to be incorporated into the military as well.
These type of systems are all fine and well, IF the skill level of the pilot is maintained to the same degree it was before the automation was incorporated. But we see evidence everywhere that is rarely, if ever the case. Sully was the rare exception, not the rule. The same with Al Haynes and crew. And the United Sioux City crash took place in 1989, 3 decades ago. Much of these type of systems didn't even exist then.
It has been all but proven, as dependence on automated systems increase, the stick and rudder skill level of pilots decrease. No, the pilot does not become an, "imbecile". He simply will not have the skill level he might have had, and needs, at a very critical time. Because of a lack of practice, along with an increased dependence on an automated system.
Problem is, you make a very gross unstated assumption regarding what training won't happen with this device installed. So when the controls "take a dump" as you say, this guy is now an imbecile? I find that dubious. I haven't been to flight school, but I'd assume that the Navy teaches pilots about landing with just one engine, with battle damage, with loss of controls. So if the policy and training involves loss of this control, to a sufficient level, then what's the gripe?
The "gripe" as you call it, is that this has nothing to do with training, and everything to do with saving money by reducing it. It's the classic example of something designed primarily as a cost saving measure, being sold as "better", in order to help sell it.
We have plenty of examples of what happens when pilots become overly dependent on automation. The evidence and accidents as a direct result of it are everywhere. Their stick and rudder skills deteriorate. Some, as evidenced by the Asiana Air pilot, all but forget how to fly. Then, as was already stated, if and when the system goes down, like they all do, the skill level is no longer there. This is bad enough in commercial aviation. Now it appears it is going to be incorporated into the military as well.
These type of systems are all fine and well, IF the skill level of the pilot is maintained to the same degree it was before the automation was incorporated. But we see evidence everywhere that is rarely, if ever the case. Sully was the rare exception, not the rule. The same with Al Haynes and crew. And the United Sioux City crash took place in 1989, 3 decades ago. Much of these type of systems didn't even exist then.
It has been all but proven, as dependence on automated systems increase, the stick and rudder skill level of pilots decrease. No, the pilot does not become an, "imbecile". He simply will not have the skill level he might have had, and needs, at a very critical time. Because of a lack of practice, along with an increased dependence on an automated system.
I've talked with current LSOs about Magic Carpet. It leverages existing flight control architecture by simply re-writing the control response with gear down.
I don't know the dependencies, i.e. does it need ACLS or other ship's data? Without knowing the ship's dependencies, I can't tell you if the "take a dump" criticism is a small risk, or a large one. I've got a lot of confidence in the Hornet flight control system. It's a good system with a proven track record. Ship's systems, and in particular, interface with aircraft, have a less reassuring record.
The LSOs love Magic Carpet. They rave about how easy it makes flying aboard. Trust me when I tell you that the F/A-18 was already easy to bring aboard. This is an order of magnitude better than the existing method of hand-flown corrections.
I've got concerns because, frankly, if you don't have Magic Carpet, and you have to go back to the old way, without ever having trained to the old way, then you're in trouble...
The 20% estimate of time/cost on training for carrier landings is a rough number. But it's not far off. We used to spend a ton of money on FCLP (Field Carrier Landing Practice) and on CQ (Carrier Quals). As the thinking goes, if those skills are no longer needed, then that money can be spent elsewhere (on training for other missions, for example) or simply saved. The USAF spends zero dollars on FCLP, of course, and it used to be that their fighter pilots weren't even allowed to practice landings at the end of a mission. Full-stop only.
If this makes landing on the Carrier as simple as landing on a runway, the bean counters will certainly argue for full stop only, and no more money for carrier landing training.
It's a radical shift in perspective, that's for certain.
What used to separate Naval Aviators from everyone else was the hand-eye precision of landing a fighter on a carrier. The F-14 was the hardest of those, and many young pilots did not make it through training because of their inability to achieve the necessary level of skill. There were a notable few who did make it through training on the F-14 who should not have, but Kara Hutlgreen, et. al. is a discussion for another time.
Perhaps my concerns are visceral. The technology is taking away what made us special. If the technology is reliable, and makes carrier landings easier, it clearly improves safety.
But even then, I feel like we are losing something, and getting one step further from the pilot who is able to bring the airplane aboard under difficult circumstances.
I talked about one of those times, in my youth, here:
https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/5020028/26
I talked about the anatomy of a carrier landing here:
https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/2911273/6
A bit more here:
https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/2911273/20
The parameters are similar. It's still a carrier. But, with Magic Carpet, the control of those parameters is fundamentally changed.
I don't know the dependencies, i.e. does it need ACLS or other ship's data? Without knowing the ship's dependencies, I can't tell you if the "take a dump" criticism is a small risk, or a large one. I've got a lot of confidence in the Hornet flight control system. It's a good system with a proven track record. Ship's systems, and in particular, interface with aircraft, have a less reassuring record.
The LSOs love Magic Carpet. They rave about how easy it makes flying aboard. Trust me when I tell you that the F/A-18 was already easy to bring aboard. This is an order of magnitude better than the existing method of hand-flown corrections.
I've got concerns because, frankly, if you don't have Magic Carpet, and you have to go back to the old way, without ever having trained to the old way, then you're in trouble...
The 20% estimate of time/cost on training for carrier landings is a rough number. But it's not far off. We used to spend a ton of money on FCLP (Field Carrier Landing Practice) and on CQ (Carrier Quals). As the thinking goes, if those skills are no longer needed, then that money can be spent elsewhere (on training for other missions, for example) or simply saved. The USAF spends zero dollars on FCLP, of course, and it used to be that their fighter pilots weren't even allowed to practice landings at the end of a mission. Full-stop only.
If this makes landing on the Carrier as simple as landing on a runway, the bean counters will certainly argue for full stop only, and no more money for carrier landing training.
It's a radical shift in perspective, that's for certain.
What used to separate Naval Aviators from everyone else was the hand-eye precision of landing a fighter on a carrier. The F-14 was the hardest of those, and many young pilots did not make it through training because of their inability to achieve the necessary level of skill. There were a notable few who did make it through training on the F-14 who should not have, but Kara Hutlgreen, et. al. is a discussion for another time.
Perhaps my concerns are visceral. The technology is taking away what made us special. If the technology is reliable, and makes carrier landings easier, it clearly improves safety.
But even then, I feel like we are losing something, and getting one step further from the pilot who is able to bring the airplane aboard under difficult circumstances.
I talked about one of those times, in my youth, here:
https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/5020028/26
I talked about the anatomy of a carrier landing here:
https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/2911273/6
A bit more here:
https://www.bobistheoilguy.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/2911273/20
The parameters are similar. It's still a carrier. But, with Magic Carpet, the control of those parameters is fundamentally changed.
Last edited:
JHZR2
Staff member
Originally Posted by Astro14
I've got concerns because, frankly, if you don't have Magic Carpet, and you have to go back to the old way, without ever having trained to the old way, then you're in trouble...
...
If this makes landing on the Carrier as simple as landing on a runway, the bean counters will certainly argue for full stop only, and no more money for carrier landing training.
...
But even then, I feel like we are losing something, and getting one step further from the pilot who is able to bring the airplane aboard under difficult circumstances.
So these three quotes are where Im getting at.
Isn't "the old way", where controls are broken/failed/compromised, a standard part of training? Either because the control computer/electronics have failed in some way, or because the ability to actuate is similarly unavailable.. battle damage or otherwise. What I quoted as section #1 seems to opine that they won't train the old way or for bad circumstances.
I get it that bureaucrats and bean counters may do what's best for the bottom line versus the pilot. That said, the risk assumed from loss of life, aircraft and/or host platform needs to be accepted. There are indeed standard risk acceptance processes that delineate what levels have to accept risk. Not training is a risk that could do big damage to a CVN if an armed plane crashes.
So my quote #3 comes Mack to the same. To me there's a difference between training for the worst and having to always be stuck in it. I'm sure being forced to deal with it is indeed the best way to stay sharp and ready. But systems that make pilots life easier, if training still occurs... isn't that a good thing?
Contingency and bad situation training of well vetted pilots still needs to still occur though...
I've got concerns because, frankly, if you don't have Magic Carpet, and you have to go back to the old way, without ever having trained to the old way, then you're in trouble...
...
If this makes landing on the Carrier as simple as landing on a runway, the bean counters will certainly argue for full stop only, and no more money for carrier landing training.
...
But even then, I feel like we are losing something, and getting one step further from the pilot who is able to bring the airplane aboard under difficult circumstances.
So these three quotes are where Im getting at.
Isn't "the old way", where controls are broken/failed/compromised, a standard part of training? Either because the control computer/electronics have failed in some way, or because the ability to actuate is similarly unavailable.. battle damage or otherwise. What I quoted as section #1 seems to opine that they won't train the old way or for bad circumstances.
I get it that bureaucrats and bean counters may do what's best for the bottom line versus the pilot. That said, the risk assumed from loss of life, aircraft and/or host platform needs to be accepted. There are indeed standard risk acceptance processes that delineate what levels have to accept risk. Not training is a risk that could do big damage to a CVN if an armed plane crashes.
So my quote #3 comes Mack to the same. To me there's a difference between training for the worst and having to always be stuck in it. I'm sure being forced to deal with it is indeed the best way to stay sharp and ready. But systems that make pilots life easier, if training still occurs... isn't that a good thing?
Contingency and bad situation training of well vetted pilots still needs to still occur though...
Originally Posted by JHZR2
But systems that make pilots life easier, if training still occurs... isn't that a good thing?
It's a very good thing. It's the "IF" part where all the problems come into play. What always seems to happen with all of these automated systems, (this one included), is that the training becomes compromised, because it is performed to a much lesser degree.
When an automated system is developed and employed in order make something easier and quicker to learn, it no longer requires the same type of extensive, and expensive training as it did before. If it did there would be no point in employing it. So you end up with pilots controlling aircraft who don't have those well developed stick and rudder flying skills, because their training is performed to a much lesser degree. It's fine as long as the system works all the time, every time the way it was designed.
It's when it doesn't that dangerous problems surface. And they surface fast. And many times are deadly. As I mentioned, there are accidents all through commercial aviation that have shown this to be the case far more often than not. There is no reason to believe this would not be much the same. No system is perfect.
But systems that make pilots life easier, if training still occurs... isn't that a good thing?
It's a very good thing. It's the "IF" part where all the problems come into play. What always seems to happen with all of these automated systems, (this one included), is that the training becomes compromised, because it is performed to a much lesser degree.
When an automated system is developed and employed in order make something easier and quicker to learn, it no longer requires the same type of extensive, and expensive training as it did before. If it did there would be no point in employing it. So you end up with pilots controlling aircraft who don't have those well developed stick and rudder flying skills, because their training is performed to a much lesser degree. It's fine as long as the system works all the time, every time the way it was designed.
It's when it doesn't that dangerous problems surface. And they surface fast. And many times are deadly. As I mentioned, there are accidents all through commercial aviation that have shown this to be the case far more often than not. There is no reason to believe this would not be much the same. No system is perfect.
Originally Posted by JHZR2
Originally Posted by Astro14
I've got concerns because, frankly, if you don't have Magic Carpet, and you have to go back to the old way, without ever having trained to the old way, then you're in trouble...
...
If this makes landing on the Carrier as simple as landing on a runway, the bean counters will certainly argue for full stop only, and no more money for carrier landing training.
...
But even then, I feel like we are losing something, and getting one step further from the pilot who is able to bring the airplane aboard under difficult circumstances.
So these three quotes are where Im getting at.
Isn't "the old way", where controls are broken/failed/compromised, a standard part of training? Either because the control computer/electronics have failed in some way, or because the ability to actuate is similarly unavailable.. battle damage or otherwise. What I quoted as section #1 seems to opine that they won't train the old way or for bad circumstances.
I get it that bureaucrats and bean counters may do what's best for the bottom line versus the pilot. That said, the risk assumed from loss of life, aircraft and/or host platform needs to be accepted. There are indeed standard risk acceptance processes that delineate what levels have to accept risk. Not training is a risk that could do big damage to a CVN if an armed plane crashes.
So my quote #3 comes Mack to the same. To me there's a difference between training for the worst and having to always be stuck in it. I'm sure being forced to deal with it is indeed the best way to stay sharp and ready. But systems that make pilots life easier, if training still occurs... isn't that a good thing?
Contingency and bad situation training of well vetted pilots still needs to still occur though...
Simply: I think the Naval Aviator of the future will be a lot more like the FO on Air France 447 than the Naval Aviator of the past.
We will have given him all the fancy tools, removed the requirement for him to fly/understand airplanes. Provided him just enough emergency training to meet requirements.
Exactly as Air France did with their pilots.
Then, when we have Naval Aviators crash, or eject, because they can't handle the degradation of systems on which they've been trained to rely, we will criticize them for not knowing how to fly.
When we removed the requirement of flying by "designing" it out...
Originally Posted by Astro14
I've got concerns because, frankly, if you don't have Magic Carpet, and you have to go back to the old way, without ever having trained to the old way, then you're in trouble...
...
If this makes landing on the Carrier as simple as landing on a runway, the bean counters will certainly argue for full stop only, and no more money for carrier landing training.
...
But even then, I feel like we are losing something, and getting one step further from the pilot who is able to bring the airplane aboard under difficult circumstances.
So these three quotes are where Im getting at.
Isn't "the old way", where controls are broken/failed/compromised, a standard part of training? Either because the control computer/electronics have failed in some way, or because the ability to actuate is similarly unavailable.. battle damage or otherwise. What I quoted as section #1 seems to opine that they won't train the old way or for bad circumstances.
I get it that bureaucrats and bean counters may do what's best for the bottom line versus the pilot. That said, the risk assumed from loss of life, aircraft and/or host platform needs to be accepted. There are indeed standard risk acceptance processes that delineate what levels have to accept risk. Not training is a risk that could do big damage to a CVN if an armed plane crashes.
So my quote #3 comes Mack to the same. To me there's a difference between training for the worst and having to always be stuck in it. I'm sure being forced to deal with it is indeed the best way to stay sharp and ready. But systems that make pilots life easier, if training still occurs... isn't that a good thing?
Contingency and bad situation training of well vetted pilots still needs to still occur though...
Simply: I think the Naval Aviator of the future will be a lot more like the FO on Air France 447 than the Naval Aviator of the past.
We will have given him all the fancy tools, removed the requirement for him to fly/understand airplanes. Provided him just enough emergency training to meet requirements.
Exactly as Air France did with their pilots.
Then, when we have Naval Aviators crash, or eject, because they can't handle the degradation of systems on which they've been trained to rely, we will criticize them for not knowing how to fly.
When we removed the requirement of flying by "designing" it out...
We could then aim an electronic pulse/jammer of sorts at the hostile aircraft and take it out.
Of course they would do the same.
Of course they would do the same.
Originally Posted by cjcride
We could then aim an electronic pulse/jammer of sorts at the hostile aircraft and take it out.
Of course they would do the same.
I'm not worried about that. The F/A-18 flight control system is hardened.
The rest of the system set (ACLS) is already built for the ECM environment...
We could then aim an electronic pulse/jammer of sorts at the hostile aircraft and take it out.
Of course they would do the same.
I'm not worried about that. The F/A-18 flight control system is hardened.
The rest of the system set (ACLS) is already built for the ECM environment...
What of some sort of signal interrupt or hack like the Iranians claim they used on the CIA drone?
Originally Posted by DoubleWasp
What of some sort of signal interrupt or hack like the Iranians claim they used on the CIA drone?
I can't go into technical details, but no, that's not a concern.
ACLS isn't vulnerable to that.
Neither are the F/A-18 flight controls.
You can't hack a Hornet flight control system. Magic carpet is a flight control software change. It resides on the FCCs inside the airplane.
What of some sort of signal interrupt or hack like the Iranians claim they used on the CIA drone?
I can't go into technical details, but no, that's not a concern.
ACLS isn't vulnerable to that.
Neither are the F/A-18 flight controls.
You can't hack a Hornet flight control system. Magic carpet is a flight control software change. It resides on the FCCs inside the airplane.
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