Flt 214 Landing Accident at SF Airport

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Originally Posted By: Astro14
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic


What???? You mean you didn't get one of the new FAA approved Ipad with the approach plates on it?


Sigh....

The approach plate is on the Ipad...do you know what I mean by brief and verify an approach?


Hey, I was joking about the Ipad.

The thing here is that you are blaming the FMS for being slow but the reality is that it is not. It is everything else that you have to do that is time consuming, not programming the FMS like you have alluded to earlier. That is why I couldn't understand you earlier about taking too much time programming (typing??) the FMS for a simple lateral and/or vertical Direct To.
 
Yes, a very interesting discussion and I learned a lot.

It will probably come down to a failure in CRM.

But somehow, for whatever reason, I bet 757 and Astro are in touch with the soul of their planes and the Koreans weren't. FLY THE PLANE. Three words. It means so much. Ever see Bob Hoover perform in an F-86, P-51, or Shrike? He FLEW THE PLANE. He danced in the sky. Maybe a skill lost but for the enlightened.
 
Originally Posted By: MolaKule


Understood, but there is usually a process defined in an Aerospace or Avionic's company for making changes.



Flight Control is level A software so there are processes in everything that we do. The first thing we do when we do anything is to write a process for it. Then the process gets reviewed, approved, configured, and taught to everyone. The bottom line is unless Boeing or Airbus is willing to pay for it, you get what you get.
 
I never blamed the FMS for being slow. I said that it was the slowest way to get the airplane to respond. That's simply a fact of airplanes.

I also said that the FMS would not have saved this crew. That still remains my considered, professional opinion. The FMS is one of many tools in the cockpit. What doomed this crew was the lack of resource management to correctly handle a demanding approach. One resource, the FMS, was no more or less important than any other resource, but it was the aggregate resource management that failed.

Finally, we don't own the airplane...you're right...but we ARE the final authority as to its operation. Not the airline, not the FAA, not the engineers, not the mechanics...

Under U.S. FAA FAR 91.3, "Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command", the FAA declares:

The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.

Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.
 
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Originally Posted By: Astro14

Finally, we don't own the airplane...you're right...but we ARE the final authority as to its operation. Not the airline, not the FAA, not the engineers, not the mechanics...

Under U.S. FAA FAR 91.3, "Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command", the FAA declares:

The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.

Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.


Spoken like a true pilot.

You just confirmed what I have said earlier. You quoted an FAA regulation that "gave" you the authority as a pilot to do what is necessary. But, it is not a free ride because they can still mess up your career with that written report to the Administrator.
 
Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
Originally Posted By: sleddriver
I don't think for a minute 757's point of 'owning the airplane' means he has the right to pull such a stunt.


Apparently those pilots did so someone must have thought they own the plane. Bottom line is the airlines pilots own nothing and he has to fly according to company policy and within FAA rules. But, feel free to brown nose anyone you like, don't bother me none.


The pilot's pulled that stupid stunt because they thought they were being cute, not because they thought they owned it.

The last comment about brownnosing has nothing to do with the discussion at hand, and I think you made that comment because you dislike pilots and you want to be combative in defference to the facts at hand.

Quote:
In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.

Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.


So, you think a pilot would get canned for deviating in an emergency situation?

Your logic amazes me.
 
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Originally Posted By: MolaKule


So, you think a pilot would get canned for deviating in an emergency situation?

Your logic amazes me.


NO, I said you confirm my statement that you as a pilot fly according to company policy or get fired. You fly within FAA regulation or you get your license taken away and or jail time. How many times do I have to make it clear to everyone here? The examples I have posted proved my point.

How can I dislike pilots when I am one? Your logic is messed up.
 
Originally Posted By: MolaKule

The pilot's pulled that stupid stunt because they thought they were being cute, not because they thought they owned it.


Well, you must have missed the part in this thread when a pilot claimed he owns the plane and I called him on it. Ask any pilot and she will tell you that nothing they do in the air is cute (discounting stunt pilots, of course). Bottom line is you don't know pilots like I do because I have to work with them every day. Some are great and some are just certified you know what. I fly for the Army so I have a lot of enemies, some even put a bounty on us. There are peace lovers that work at my company that will put me on trial if they can so I am pretty much immune to any personal attack, especially on the web.
 
Quote:
Bottom line is you don't know pilots like I do because I have to work with them every day. Some are great and some are just certified you know what.



I have worked with pilots from all over the world and my experience differs from yours.



Quote:
I fly for the Army so I have a lot of enemies, some even put a bounty on us. There are peace lovers that work at my company that will put me on trial if they can so I am pretty much immune to any personal attack, especially on the web.


Huh?
 
Originally Posted By: MolaKule

Quote:
I fly for the Army so I have a lot of enemies, some even put a bounty on us. There are peace lovers that work at my company that will put me on trial if they can so I am pretty much immune to any personal attack, especially on the web.


Huh?


I.e. I am not being combative like you have assumed. I just call it like I see it. You might see it differently and might not agree with me, so like I said before, don't bother me none.
 
Here is a thought I've had, and I'd be interested in your take on it.
PF is in evaluation to be PIC qualified on the 777.
He's flown 40+ hours in the metal plus quite a few in the sim, where every few minutes presented a new emergency.
The guy in the right seat is the instructor pilot. He is presumably a master of the 777.
The capitain candidate is flying the approach.
The instrsuctor pilot knows that it's a bad approach and should be aborted with a go-around.
He allows the PIC candidate time to figure this out and abort the approach.
After all, we learn best when allowed to observe and correct our own mistakes.
The PIC candidate figures that maybe the 777 really can be dragged in.
After all, the instructor pilot in the right seat isn't saying or doing anything, so he figures that the Boeing has capabilities beyond what he's used to in the Airbus metal he's got so many hours in.
Neither instructor nor candidate take action in time, and the result is the accident that we're talking about.
Possible?
 
My experience level pales in comparison with Astro and 757, but I have to agree completely with them. I've never flown into SFO, but with nearly 5 years going in and out of EWR there were numerous times that approach control gave us either a bad vector, left us well above flight path at the FAF, changed runways, or all three.

At that point, roughly 5 miles from touchdown, by the time you take the time to reprogram the FMS to do what you need to do, you will be much too high to descend to the runway in time to land. I flew a turboprop which has much less energy retention than a jet, and we were often hard pressed to make it safely to the runway.

There's no shame in going around, and if necessary a good pilot will make the decision to do so without a second thought.

I now fly single pilot in an air ambulance operation, and I can tell you that messing around with the FMS when ATC gives you a sudden change close to the airport is a recipe for disaster. Single pilot or Part 121 crew, there is very often no substitute for clicking off the autopilot and flying the airplane yourself. As Astro stated, the ability to make near instantaneous changes in maneuvering the aircraft makes a huge difference - IMO between making a safe landing and what happened to Asiana. In fact there is a point at which the autopilot should be taken off and the FMS abandoned. Obviously Asiana's crew did not recognize this moment.

Of course if you absolutely had to use the FMS/autopilot, you could get a vector away from the airport to gain the time to work the system; but taking command of the airplane and making the landing is what we are paid for. Not to mention that if you do go around, you will likely be at the tail end of a line of aircraft and number 30 for landing - which is something you may not have the fuel for.


Originally Posted By: azsynthetic
I just did this on the 777 simulator and it took all 5 seconds plus 2 seconds for the MCP change. Why is it taking you so long?


Because you knew it was coming and did not have to recognize what was happening, then make a decision, request your copilot program it and wait for him to do so.




Originally Posted By: azsynthetic

The trainer asking for more speed 7 seconds before touch down is little tough for the aircraft to do. Even with your ability I don't think you can pull it off at 7 seconds before impact. The problem started way before that last 7 seconds and this is why I believe the FMS could have save them.


This indicates to me that the trainer was heads down trying to program something, or else looking out the window rather than doing what he was supposed to be doing inside. The degradation of approach speed should have been noticed LONG before 7 seconds prior to impact.
 
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Originally Posted By: fdcg27
Here is a thought I've had, and I'd be interested in your take on it.
PF is in evaluation to be PIC qualified on the 777.
He's flown 40+ hours in the metal plus quite a few in the sim, where every few minutes presented a new emergency.
The guy in the right seat is the instructor pilot. He is presumably a master of the 777.
The capitain candidate is flying the approach.
The instrsuctor pilot knows that it's a bad approach and should be aborted with a go-around.
He allows the PIC candidate time to figure this out and abort the approach.
After all, we learn best when allowed to observe and correct our own mistakes.
The PIC candidate figures that maybe the 777 really can be dragged in.
After all, the instructor pilot in the right seat isn't saying or doing anything, so he figures that the Boeing has capabilities beyond what he's used to in the Airbus metal he's got so many hours in.
Neither instructor nor candidate take action in time, and the result is the accident that we're talking about.
Possible?


Could be...you're guessing at their thinking, and your guess is essentially: he let the trainee try to learn by recognizing the unstable/poor approach, and let it go too long.

And that's certainly possible...the CVR and the black box data is going to be very, very interesting...

Fundamentally, the accident can be summed up: crew failure to fly the airplane correctly in a difficult approach that was created by SFO approach parameters and inoperative equipment (ILS).

Cockpit culture will be contributing...pilot error was certainly there...
 
Astro14 and myself have throughly discussed the issue about the traps of FMS (Flight Management) systems and using automation in a high workload environment. Aviation Week seems to agree with our prior discussion and assessments, particularly in that we are pilots, not automation managers. Aviation Week also mentions the YouTube "Children of the Magenta" video I highlighted from American Airlines as particularly important.

Aviation Week commentary on Automation Dependency: https://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_19_2013_p0-598906.xml&p=1
 
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Thanks 757 guy for the "Children of Magenta" video. That instructor was one of the best I have ever seen on ANY subject. I too look forward to a transcription of the CVR. It probably become a training "classic" used for many years.
 
Great article, and they are calling out problems existing in Asian and Middle East airlines.

On a side note, I love reading about the piloting skills of the pilots of Buffalo Airways and the legendary DC-3. No Koreans flying with them:)
 
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