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That's a nice long post that GC4 put up, but look carefully -- he has offered not one bit of authority to back up his assertions. Not one case or statute.
So it does not count that I quoted the actual language of the specific section of the Magnuson-Moss/Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1976 upon which you rely, and which you have mischaracterized? Apparently, your paraphrase of it is authority, but the language of the sttaute itself is
not authority, then?
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GC4, the statute, and the cases I cited, say what they say.
Yes, yes, yes! (However, none of those say what
you say.)
The "shifting burden of proof" is a chimera, a fictitious beast. Yes, people, even some lawyers, even some judges, use the phrase, just as some people talk of "centrifugal force" (there is no such thing) or "warped rotors" when speaking of brakes. (Brake rotors that really are warped are rarer than unicorns.) Misleading phrases are common currency in our language.
In any civil litigation, there is a single burden of proof for each count of the complaint and each counterclaim (if any). It is the burden of the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he (she or it) is entitled to prevail under the applicable law. That burden never shifts. When the claimant presents evidence, the person against whom the claim is made has an opportunity to present other evidence that may refute the claimant's evidence. The purpose of presenting evidence that refutes the claimant's evidence is to cause the claimant to fail to sustain
the claimant's burden of proof. The burden of proof does not "shift." There is never any obligation upon the person against whom the claim is made to present any evidence whatsoever. Indeed, many litigated cases end dispositively when the person against whom the claim is made demurs (enters a demurrer), files a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, or files a motion for summary judgement that assumes all of the claimant's evidence but argues that the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain the claimant's burden of proof.
In a warranty case, the claimant (usually the plaintiff) has the burden of proving that the warrantor has breached the warranty, usually a warranty that the goods were free of defects in materials or workmanship or (under the Uniform Commercial Code) that the goods were not merchantable or that the goods were not fit for the specific purpose that the warrantor warranted them to be good for. It is the claimant's burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the warrantor breached the warranty. The warrantor has no burden of proof; only the claimant has a burden of proof. The burden of proof never "shifts."
Subsection 2304(c) specifically allows the warrantor to escape performing the remedies that the warrantor promises in the warranty if the warrantor can show that the failure the claimant alleges was not due to a defect in the warranted goods. (It is redundant of the common law, and the warrantor would have that right without the subsection.) It gets more specific than the common law, however to recognize specifically that the warrantor may show that alleged failure was "
caused by damage (not resulting from defect or malfunction) while in the possession of the consumer, or unreasonable use (including failure to provide reasonable and necessary maintenance)," and thereby be relieved of performing the warranty remedies.
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The bottom line, though, is that assuming the existence of a defect, the mfr has to defend itself by proving a non-mfr-connected basis for the failure. That’s more than just "picking apart the owner's case", as suggested by GC4. If the manufacturer questions the existence of a defect at all, it could certainly try to “pick apart” the owner’s case at the outset. I suppose there may be cases where this is an issue (phantom failures, allegedly loose radio buttons, and the like), but if it’s an oil-related failure, as most of us are thinking of here, I don’t see a problem establishing the existence of the problem.
The manufacturer does not have to defend itself; it can perform the warranty remedy (usually repair or replacement, at its option, oftentimes pro-rated for mileage or time); it can demur to the allegations and see if the court thinks that the owner has made its
prima facie case. It can simply not answer the complaint, and it may lose the battle in court (or depending on state procedures concerning default judgements, may not lose if the plaintiff fails to jump through the right hoops). Nothing in Magnuson-Moss requires the warrantor to defend itself in court. And if it does defend itself in court, it needs prove nothing other than that the plaintiff (owner) has failed to prove his case.
Where you step off the edge is where you assume the defect. Nothing in Magnuson-Moss assumes a defect. Start from assuming that the reason the owner makes a warranty claim is just a product
failure: then the
issue for the court to decide is
whether the failure was the consequence of a defect. The manufacturer is liable only if the cause of the failure was a defect, and not if the proximate cause was something else. CapriRacer was right that the matter is not cut and dry.
