Yeah, sure was.Astro14: I also watched the episode about PSA Flight 182. That was a horrific crash
That’s Little Rock, right?AA1420. I researched this extensively in school, and it's come up on more than one occasion as I studied and ultimately received my dispatcher certificate. This accident highlighted a lot of problems that we knew existed at the time, and some of those that still exist to this day.
Correct- Little Rock, AR, 01JUN1999.That’s Little Rock, right?
Fatigue is the big lesson I take from that one.
It’s OK to say that you’re too tired. Passengers will complain, loudly and unfairly. Managers will pressure. Gate agents will be angry.
So what? You’re in one piece. The passengers are in one piece. And so is the airplane.
More like pilots trying to give passengers an unobstructed view of the Grand Canyon by flying around cloud formations.As someone who has worked for an airline most "Accidents" are a series of small incidents that lead up to a major accident. The TWA Grand Canyon accident was due to the pilot showing off.
Notice co-pilot has ejected from aircraft. Did not survive. I believe he landed in the fireball.
The full truth is known.
TWA 800, straight up, was a Center Fuel tank explosion. Conspiracy theorists love that crash, but there’s no evidence to suggest anything beyond the simple explanation, it blew up from a center fuel tank explosion. People find the idea that something just blew unsettling, but that’s what happened.
Run the AC packs on the ground for a long time, on a hot summer day with a long taxi out, and you will heat up the tank right above them to over 100C, let the empty tank build up volatile fumes, with atmospheric oxygen present, and then introduce spark via failed wiring and shorted sensors, boom.
All Boeing airplanes now have nitrogen gas generators to vent the center tanks. This keeps the oxygen in the tank to a minimum. Even our 28 year old 757s have the nitrogen system retrofitted. The AC packs on those airplanes sit right under the center tank and yes, they get quite hot on a summer day.
Further, 747 fuel management procedures were changed as a result of TWA 800. All 747s had to be inspected. What we found two decades ago was shocking.
We found that all of our 747s had failed thrust bearings in the Center tank pumps, allowing the impeller to grind itself into the pump housing, and those pumps would heat up to over 150C if run dry in that Center tank...a result of the friction heat from that grinding when fuel wasn’t cooling them.
Super hot pump in empty tank full of hot fuel vapor, day in and day out, it’s a wonder we didn’t have any issues.
Until we got new pumps, with improved thrust bearings, the pumps had to be kept cool by leaving 5,000# of unusable fuel in the center tank. The engine fuel filters filled up with aluminum shavings from the impeller grinding away the housing, while we were waiting on new pumps, but the airplanes were OK.
AA 587 was a shocking bit of pilot error that resulted in the industry retraining pilots on how to manage roll, flight controls, and extreme flight conditions The FO snapped the tail off the airplane by going full deflection on the rudder and slamming it back and forth.
The rudder is designed for a steady full control deflection. Going immediate, opposite direction introduces loads far in excess of design/certification load. You’re adding the side slip load already present, and the rudder deflection load, which is increased due to side slip, and the net result is much more load than it was ever designed to handle.
The AA training program (Known, at the time as advanced maneuvers, IIRC) for upset recovery had emphasized the use of rudder as roll control and made no mention of avoiding sequential, opposite control inputs. The FO may, as a result of that training, have believed that he could slam the rudder back and forth with impunity.
Current upset recovery training emphasizes AOA control and specifically cautions against excessive rudder use.
The one that really blows my mind is the Tenerife disaster in I think 1977. Fog and Air traffic controller problems never end well.
Re TWA Flight 800, how can you dismiss the eyewitness accounts ?
I say it was a USN missile, and a tragic accident.
Re Juan Brown, he is intentionally slow and methodical.
His Kobe Bryant crash reports were excellent.
The full truth is known.
TWA 800, straight up, was a Center Fuel tank explosion. Conspiracy theorists love that crash, but there’s no evidence to suggest anything beyond the simple explanation, it blew up from a center fuel tank explosion. People find the idea that something just blew unsettling, but that’s what happened.
Run the AC packs on the ground for a long time, on a hot summer day with a long taxi out, and you will heat up the tank right above them to over 100C, let the empty tank build up volatile fumes, with atmospheric oxygen present, and then introduce spark via failed wiring and shorted sensors, boom.
Why didn't the industry identify the problem earlier? The industry was not required to consider this as part of the certification process. SFAR No 88 and Advisory Circular AC 25.981-1B FUEL TANK IGNITION SOURCE PREVENTION GUIDELINES now require that "The design approval holder would be expected to develop a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) for all components in the fuel tank system. Analysis of the FMEA would then be used to determine whether single failures, alone or in combination with foreseeable latent failures, could cause an ignition source to exist in a fuel tank. A subsequent quantitative fault tree analysis should then be developed to determine whether combinations of failures expected to occur in the life of the affected fleet could cause an ignition source to exist in a fuel system." If this is such a problem, why aren't airplanes falling out of the sky all the time due to fuel tank explosions?You wouldn't expect them to. The frequency of commercial aviation fuel tank explosions worldwide is estimated by the industry to be about one every 5 years without any preventative measures (see the FTHWG ARACreport for a complete discussion). Given that major airplane accidents are relatively rare events, the observed and predicted frequencies of major accidents due to fuel tank explosions are consistent. (PAL 1991, TWA 1996, Thai Air 2001) In the last two decades, there has been an average of about 1.5 major accidents per year in the USA (due to all causes) with relatively large fluctuations from year to year. Of these, one (TWA 800) has been a fuel tank explosion. Accidents have been reduced to this very low rate in commercial aviation through careful attention to design, engineering safety features, and redundant systems. This applies to fuel tank explosions just as it applies to any other mode of failure. The fact that a failure mode or safety hazard is identified by an accident investigation does not mean that it has a high probability of occurring. On the other hand, the fact that a system has engineering safety features does not mean that accidents can never occur. Accidents in complex engineering systems like aircraft are frequently due to a combination of failures that were never considered by the original designers. In the interest of safety, the NTSB does investigate every accident in commercial (and general) aviation and attempts to find a probable cause. The purpose of this is not to fix blame but to improve safety. Identification of a potential safety hazard requires that the investigative and regulatory agencies respond with proposals to reduce or eliminate the problem. The burden of evaluating the solutions and carrying out a cost-benefit study (required by federal statute) falls to the FAA - who relies almost exclusively on the industry to make the evaluation of technical feasibility and economic viability of any proposed solutions. Cars contain fuel pumps and wiring inside the fuel tanks - why don't they blow up more often? Gasoline tank vapor spaces are almost never flammable while Jet A tanks in airplanes will always pass through a flammable regime during normal flight operations. The ullage of gasoline fuel tanks in automobiles is almost always too rich to be flammable except at very low temperatures. This is due to the much lower flash point (about -40 C) of gasoline in comparison to Jet A. The vapor space in a partially-filled gasoline tank does not become flammable until the temperature has dropped below about 10F and a serious hazard will exist below 0 F down to about -40 F for a typical gasoline (Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) of 9.5 psi, flammability limits between 1.4 and 7 % by volume). [See W.F. Marshall and G. A. Schoonveld, SAE Transactions, Vol. 99, No. 4, 594-617, 1990] For this reason, the probability that a fuel tank containing liquid gasoline has a flammable vapor space is extremely small in most climates except in the artic regions. The exception to this is when the tank is removed for servicing and the fuel is drained from the tank. Since gasoline has such a high vapor pressure, the tank can have a flammable vapor space even if there is no liquid fuel visible inside that tank. For example, the complete vaporization of about 1-2 tablespoons of gasoline will result in a flammable mixture inside a 15-gallon capacity automobile tank! This is the reason why welding on or near "empty" gas tanks is extremely hazardous and thorough purging of the tank with steam, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, or other inert gas is required before repair work is started. The in-tank fuel pumps in modern fuel-injected vehicles are designed to run submerged in fuel, as are the fuel pumps in aircraft, and the fuel circulates through the pump, including the sparking brush-commutator system. Unless the gasoline tank is almost completely emptied of fuel, this will not pose a hazard since there will be only fuel and not a fuel-air mixture within the pump. So in order for an in-tank fuel pump to pose an ignition hazard, the tank must be "run dry" under very cold conditions so that flammable vapor surrounds the commutator. Fire and explosions occasionally (about 3 accidents out of 1000) do happen when gasoline-powered vehicles crash. Post-crash fires are a serious safety issue for automobiles and are the subject of ongoing study, legislation, and litigation. Fires occur after the gas tank is ruptured and the accident results in an ignition source, often arcing electrical wiring or exposed hot lamp filaments. It is actually much harder to ignite gasoline by spilling it on a moderately hot surface that it is to ignite Jet A so that tailpipes and exhaust manifolds are not good ignition sources for gasoline. On the other hand, gasoline makes a large vapor cloud very quickly and if a high-temperature ignition source is introduced, a very rapid or "flash fire" will be the result. This can serve as an ignition source for the puddle or pool of fuel under the leaking tank, causing a pool fire that may destroy the vehicle. If a fuel tank temperature is above the flash point, then an explosion will always occur False A potential explosion hazard exists when a liquid fuel is above its flash point but an explosion occurs only if an appropriate ignition source is present in the flammable portion of the fuel vapor-air mixture within the tank. Some possible ignition sources include a hot surface, an electrical arc or spark, static electricity discharge, open flame, or burning metal fragments (e.g. from grinding or incendiary devices). Unless the surface temperatures of a fuel tank containing kerosene exceed the minimum AIT of 190 C, ignition will not occur due to the elevated temperature alone. The term "flash" in flash point temperature refers to the measurement technique, in which an open flame is introduced into the vapor space above a warm liquid fuel. The flash point is the minimum liquid temperature for which a "flash" is observed by the operator when the flame is inserted in the vapor space. In general, in order for a explosion to take place, three elements are required: fuel, oxidizer, and an ignition source. This is usually refered to as the "fire triangle" by fire and explosion investigators. In addition, two conditions are needed before an explosion actually occurs: 1) The fuel and oxidizer must be molecularly mixed in the correction (flammable) proportions, 2) An ignition source of the appropriate size and duration must be present in the flammable portion of the mixture. |
You say it was missile? How? What proof you have?Re TWA Flight 800, how can you dismiss the eyewitness accounts ?
I say it was a USN missile, and a tragic accident.
Re Juan Brown, he is intentionally slow and methodical.
His Kobe Bryant crash reports were excellent.